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Abstract 
 
In this thesis I attempt to clarify and evaluate G. A. Cohen’s positive contribution 
to the question of what type of society we ought to seek, following his turn from 
Marxism to normative political philosophy. I specifically focus on clarifying and 
evaluating certain views that appear in his critical engagement with Ronald 
Dworkin and John Rawls, and in his positive vision of society as set out in Why 
Not Socialism? I interpret Cohen as holding that, in principle, we ought to seek a 
society that reflects equal access to advantage (or some other luck egalitarian 
principle of equality of opportunity), Pareto-efficiency, freedom of occupational 
choice, and a principle of community that, by means of voluntary non-state 
agency, significantly tempers inequalities consistent with luck egalitarianism. 
With respect to evaluative matters, I argue: (i) that we ought not to embrace 
equal access to advantage but rather an alternative luck egalitarian principle of 
equality of opportunity where opportunities are specified in terms of resources; 
(ii) that although equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of 
occupational choice might be co-obtainable in principle, they are not co-
obtainable in practice; and (iii) that in practice equality of opportunity ought to 
be constrained by a sufficiency qualification rather than by Cohen’s community 
principle. In addition, I interpret a concession from Cohen about Pareto-
efficiency often trumping equality of opportunity, in practice, in terms of a 
pluralist distributive ethic that combines telic egalitarian and telic prioritarian 
beliefs. I defend the plausibility of this ethic to some extent, but ultimately come 
to embrace a sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism that secures a decent 
life for all by means of state coercion, and which minimizes the unfairness of the 
prudent having to bear the costs of other’s imprudence. 
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Introduction 
 
1. Why Cohen? 
1.1. As a first year undergraduate studying Politics and International Relations at 
the University of Kent, I first became aware of G. A. (Jerry) Cohen in late 2007. 
Following a political theory lecture on Isaiah Berlin’s “Two Concepts of 
Liberty,” an article called “Freedom and Money” caught my eye among the 
additional readings. As a somewhat naïve young Marxist, Cohen’s principle 
contention in this article that a ‘lack of money, poverty, carries with it lack of 
freedom’ (Cohen, 2011f, pp. 166-167), was a view with which I greatly 
sympathized. 
Over the next three years of my degree, my interest in the views of Karl 
Marx led me to choose, wherever possible, any course that enabled me to learn 
more about his thought. Of course, one of the titles on my reading list during this 
period was Cohen’s 1978 work, Karl Marx’s Theory of History. My interest in 
Marx, particularly with his theory of alienation, continued into postgraduate 
study. But then I happened upon a more recent argument from Cohen as to why 
leftists ought to turn away from Marxism and engage in normative political 
philosophy. The argument to which I refer is made in “Equality: From Fact to 
Norm,” the sixth chapter of Cohen’s 2000 work, If you’re an Egalitarian, How 
Come You’re So Rich?, and draws on material published in his 1995 work, Self-
ownership, Freedom, and Equality. The subject of this argument is classical 
Marxist beliefs about the historical inevitability of socialist revolution and 
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resource abundance that are supposed to render redistributive means for securing 
equality unnecessary. 
 
1.2. As regards the belief in the historical inevitability of socialist revolution, 
Cohen rightly notes that it relies on a conception of the working class as: 
producing the wealth of society; being the exploited people in society; 
constituting the majority of society; and being the needy people in society. From 
this conception of the working class, so the argument goes, their neediness 
together with their being the majority and the producers on which society is 
dependent makes socialist revolution inevitable, because ‘it was within the 
capacity and in the interest of the working class to change society, so that it could 
and would transform society’ (Cohen, 2000, p. 107; Cohen, 1995, p. 155). But, 
as Cohen argues in both If You’re an Egalitarian and Self-ownership: 
 
[T]here is now no group in advanced industrial society which 
unites the four characteristics of: (1) being the producers on whom 
society depends, (2) being exploited, (3) being (with their 
families) the majority of society, and (4) being in dire need. There 
certainly still exist key producers, exploited people, and needy 
people, but these are not now, as they were in the past, even 
roughly coincident designations, nor, still less, alternative 
designations of the great majority of the population. And as a 
result, there is now no group with both (because of its 
exploitation, and its neediness) a compelling interest in, and 
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(because of its productiveness, and its numbers) a ready capacity 
to achieve, a socialist transformation. 
(Cohen, 2000, pp. 107-108; Cohen, 1995, p. 8) 
 
A common counter argument acknowledged by Cohen is that the four 
constitutive elements of the above conception of the working class are still 
present at a global level. In other words, the counter argument appeals to the 
emergence of an international proletariat. Having an interest in the anti-capitalist 
movement, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in Mexico, and the 
emergence of socialist governments across Latin America, this was my go to 
response when people pressed arguments, albeit with far less clarity, of the sort I 
was now reading from Cohen. Yet as I continued to read, the following passage 
convinced me it was false. 
 
It is no doubt true that, across the countries which form the bulk 
of the world’s population, there are producers, previously cut off 
form capitalism, who amply realize the exploitation and need 
characteristics… But they do not form a majority within or across 
the societies in question, which remain largely agrarian, and they 
do not represent producers on whose labor capitalism is 
dependent, in the traditional projected sense. For the engine of 
production in today’s world is the transnational corporation, 
which absorbs and expels sets of workers at will. No group of its 
workers has substantial clout, because so many other groups form 
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a kind of reserve army vis-à-vis any one of those groups. The 
actual and potential proletariats of India and China are ready to 
displace the workers of Birmingham, Detroit, and Lille, and of 
Manila and Sao Paolo and Capetown. 
(Cohen, 2000, p. 111) 
 
If we avoid the distinction between industrial and agrarian producers, it 
seems to me that the exploited and needy producers of the world may well form a 
majority; the extent to which the world is dependent on them, and therefore the 
extent of their power to transform society, is another matter. With respect to 
industrial producers, I entirely agree with Cohen that the power of transnational 
corporations to transfer their workforce from one region to another has the 
consequence that no society is dependent on its own industrial working class. 
The world may be dependent on an international working class, but unless the 
rallying call of The Communist Manifesto is realized, unless ‘WORKING MEN 
[AND WOMEN] OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!’ (Marx and Engels, 1977, p. 
246), that dependency is not by itself a capacity to transform society, and the 
additional requirement of international unity seems unlikely. For as Cohen says, 
‘the cultural diversity across nations and the huge gulfs between them in actual 
and expected living standards make mutual identification… difficult’ (Cohen, 
2000, p. 112). It is hard, for example, to imagine needy individuals in one region 
of the world refusing employment in solidarity with other relatively less needy 
individuals thousands of miles away, and with whom they share little in 
common, in an attempt to combat the power of transnational corporations to 
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switch their base of operations whenever wage-laborers become ‘too 
demanding.’ Far from being historically inevitable, then, socialist revolution 
appears highly improbable. 
As regards the belief in the historical inevitability of resource abundance, 
this relates to a famous passage from the Critique of the Gotha Programme 
where Marx gives an account as to how society’s resources will be distributed in 
the lower and higher phases of communism. In the lower phase (the initial phase 
after the fall of capitalism) resources will be distributed in accordance with 
people’s labor contribution minus a deduction for common funds (the 
contribution principle). Despite ownership of the means of production no longer 
playing a distributive role, Marx objects to the contribution principle because ‘it 
tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity as 
natural privileges’ (Marx, 1977, pp. 568-569). In other words, Marx recognizes 
that because of differences in people’s natural abilities the contribution principle 
will arbitrarily reward some more than others, and because of differences in 
people’s circumstances, it may also reward those who are less needy than others. 
The lower phase of communism therefore remains ‘stigmatized by a bourgeois 
limitation’ (Marx, 1977, p. 568). But in the higher phase of communism, ‘after 
the productive forces have also increased with the all round development of the 
individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly…, 
society [can] inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs’ (the needs principle) (Marx, 1977, p. 569).1 
                                                 
1 For greater clarification re this passage, see Chapter 4, section 2.3. 
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 Exactly what level of resource abundance Marx thought historically 
inevitable and necessary for the implementation of the needs principle is a 
subject of great debate.2 Cohen’s interpretation, with which I agree, is that Marx 
envisaged ‘a plenary abundance [that] ensures extensive compatibility among the 
material interests of differently endowed people: that abundance eliminates the 
problem of justice, the need to decide who gets what at whose expense, and a 
fortiori, the need to implement any such decisions by force’ (Cohen, 1995, p. 
127). Interpreted as such, the historical inevitability of resource abundance from 
a 21st century perspective, like the supposed inevitability of socialist revolution, 
again seems highly improbable. For as Cohen argues, fossil fuels are depleting 
and new means of satisfying humanity’s current consumption levels may prove 
impossible, let alone the satisfaction of human needs and wants to an extent that 
would render distributive justice obsolete (Cohen, 2000, p. 113; Cohen, 1995, p. 
9). He therefore concludes: 
 
We cannot rely on technology to fix things for us; if they can be 
fixed, then we have to fix them, through hard theoretical and 
political labor. Marxism thought that equality would be delivered 
to us, by abundance, but we have to seek equality for a context of 
scarcity, and we consequently have to be far more clear than we 
were about what we are seeking, why we are justified in seeking 
it, and how it can be implemented institutionally. That recognition 
                                                 
2 See (for example): Buchanan, 1982; Cohen, 1995 & 2000; Elster, 1985; Geras, 1985; and 
Lukes, 1985. 
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must govern the future efforts of socialist economists and 
philosophers. 
(Cohen, 2000, p. 115; Cohen, 1995, p. 11) 
 
1.3. The above argument altered the course of my studies, for Cohen had 
succeeded in convincing me that I ought to turn from Marxism to normative 
political philosophy. More specifically, his concluding remarks convinced me 
that leftists need to be clear about what type of society we ought to seek. Whereas 
Cohen had come to this conclusion sometime prior to 19963, he had convinced 
me of it in 2010; a year after his death. Naturally, I wondered whether he had 
sought, during those intervening years, to develop such a view. 
His turn from Marxism to normative political philosophy resulted, as he 
says, in ‘a sustained engagement with the work of three leading American 
political philosophers: Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, and John Rawls’ 
(Cohen, 2000, p. 117). At the time of first reading “Equality: From Fact to 
Norm,” I was somewhat familiar with his critique of Nozick (more so with how 
it relates to classical Marxism4), but not with the nature of his engagement with 
Dworkin and Rawls. As I began to familiarize myself with the relevant texts it 
soon became clear that, as with Nozick, Cohen’s engagement with Dworkin and 
Rawls takes the form of critique. A positive view of what type of society we 
ought to seek is not therefore clearly set out in these writings. 
                                                 
3 Although If You’re an Egalitarian was published in 2000, its content is based on Cohen’s 
Gifford Lectures which he delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1996. And, although Self-
ownership was published in 1995, it draws on material published in earlier articles (see Cohen, 
1995, p. x). 
4 See section 3.2 
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A notable exception to Cohen’s preference for critically engaging with 
others is Why Not Socialism?, first published in 20015 and posthumously as a 
small hardback in 2009, where he outlines a positive vision of society that 
reflects a principle of equality of opportunity and a principle of community. 
However, it is only a short exploratory essay that, by itself, provides insufficient 
insight as to what type of society Cohen believes we ought to seek. Considering 
how influential his critical engagement with Nozick, Dworkin and Rawls has 
been, and that he presents himself as more radically egalitarian than Rawls, and 
that his turn to normative political philosophy was originally motivated by a 
belief that leftists need to be clearer about what we seek and why we are justified 
in seeking it, Cohen’s positive contribution to the question of what type of 
society we ought to seek should be clarified and evaluated. 
 
2. Value pluralism, fundamental principles and rules of regulation 
2.1. In clarifying and evaluating Cohen’s positive contribution to the question of 
what type of society we ought to seek, his methodological approach to normative 
political philosophy is of central importance. As a student of Berlin, Cohen is 
clearly influenced by his teacher’s understanding of the relationship between 
different values – justice, liberty, equality, community, and so on. In his essay, 
“The Hedgehog and the Fox,” Berlin opens with a quote from the Greek poet 
Archilochus: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big 
thing.” He then uses this line of poetry to draw a distinction between two types of 
thinkers. On the one hand, there are hedgehogs, ‘who relate everything to a 
                                                 
5 In Democratic Equality: What Went Wrong?, ed. Edward Broadbent, Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. 
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single central vision, one system, less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of 
which they understand think and feel’ (Berlin, 2013, p. 2). On the other hand, 
there are foxes, whose ‘thought is scattered or diffused, moving on many levels, 
seizing upon the essence of a vast variety of experiences and objects for what 
they are in themselves, without, consciously or unconsciously, seeking to fit 
them into, or exclude them from, any one unchanging, all-embracing, sometimes 
self-contradictory and incomplete, at times fanatical, unitary vision’ (Berlin, 
2013, p. 2). 
As regards the relationship between values, then, hedgehogs believe in 
the unity of value and/or that values are reducible to one master value, such as 
well-being. Recently, the unity of value has been defended by Dworkin in his 
Justice for Hedgehogs, for he believes ‘[t]he truth about living well and being 
good and what is wonderful is not only coherent but mutually supporting; what 
we think about any one of these must stand up, eventually, to any argument we 
find compelling about the rest’ (Dworkin, 2011, p. 1). In contrast, foxes believe 
in a plurality of conflicting values, with the consequence that the realization of a 
value or values will often regrettably necessitate sacrificing and/or compromising 
another value or values. Berlin embraces such competitive value pluralism, for 
he insists in “Two Concepts of Liberty” that ‘not all good things are compatible, 
still less all the ideals of mankind… [E]mpirical observation and ordinary human 
knowledge… give us no warrant for supposing… that all good things, or all bad 
things for that matter, are reconcilable with each other. The world that we 
encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices 
between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of 
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some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others’ (Berlin, 2002, pp. 
213-214). 
Cohen defends value pluralism in one of his earliest papers, “A Note on 
Values and Sacrifices,” arguing that Berlin ‘succeeded in showing that plain 
consideration of plain facts of experience reveals how shallow and self-deceptive 
this optimism [about the unity of value] is’ (Cohen, 1969, p. 159). 22 years later, 
in “Isaiah’s Marx, and Mine,”6 his position remains unchanged, for he there 
reiterates his ‘agree[ment] with Isaiah that significant values are seriously 
incompatible’ (Cohen, 2013a, p. 12). And, in quoting “Two Concepts of 
Liberty,” insists that ‘we must reject the “ancient faith… that all the positive 
values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible”’7 (Cohen, 
2013a, p. 12). Another 17 years later in Rescuing Justice and Equality, the 2008 
definitive presentation of his critique of Rawls, Cohen’s belief in value pluralism 
remains intact.8 For he says in its introduction: ‘I am an Oxford man (of a certain 
[fox like] vintage)… We expect to find… that the normative requirements that 
we recognize present themselves in competitive array: they cannot all be satisfied 
all the time, nor do we have a method for systematically combining them. 
Discursively indefensible trade-offs are our fate’ (Cohen, 2008, pp. 3-4). 
A difficulty for value pluralism is that the irreducibility of values to a 
master value appears to imply incommensurability, for it suggests there is no 
                                                 
6 Originally published in: Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration, ed. Avishai Margalit and Edna Ullmann-
Margalit, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
7 See Berlin, 2002, p. 212 
8 Rescuing Chapters 1-3 and Chapter 6 were previously published as (in chapter order): Cohen, 
G. A. (1992), “Incentives, Inequality and Community,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, ed. G. Peterson, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press; Cohen, G. A. (1995), “The 
Pareto Argument for Inequality,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 12: pp. 160-185; Cohen, G. A. 
(1997), “Where the action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
26: pp. 3-30 (also reprinted in, Cohen, 2000); Cohen, G. A. (2003), “Facts and Principles,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31: pp. 211-245. 
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common standard against which conflicting values can be measured when 
deciding which are of greater importance, and therefore when deciding which 
ought to be sacrificed and/or compromised in the name of realizing others. 
However, many value pluralists respond to this difficulty with an appeal to 
rationality as a means for deciding what trade-offs to make. For example, with 
respect to the incommensurability of liberty and equality, Bernard Williams 
argues that ‘no one could believe [the implication ‘that there is no way of 
comparing or adjudicating the claims of these values wherever they conflict’], 
since obviously there are possible changes by which (say) such a trivial gain in 
equality was brought by such an enormous sacrifice of liberty that no one who 
believed in liberty at all could rationally favour it’ (Williams, 1981, p. 77). 
Despite Cohen’s references to ‘intuitive balancing’ and ‘intuitive trade-offs,’ as 
opposed to rational balancing or rational trade-offs, his remarks about people 
making choices in practice based on knowledge of what they know or believe to 
be good without incommensurability paralyzing them, suggests that he also 
views rationality as (at least part of) the solution (Cohen, 2008, pp. 5-6). So 
understood, Cohenite intuitive trade-offs are (at least sometimes) a rational 
process. 
 
2.2. When clarifying Cohen’s positive contribution to the question of what type 
of society we ought to seek, it is of the upmost importance to keep in mind his 
value pluralism, because when he makes claims of the sort, ‘the realization of 
value x requires the realization of social state of affairs a,’ he is not claiming that 
social state of affairs a is what we ought to seek all things considered. For the 
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realization of value y, if it conflicts with value x and x does not always trump y, 
will regrettably necessitate sacrificing and/or compromising value x, so that 
(rationally) we ought to instead seek the realization of social state of affairs b, 
which reflects the trade-off between values x and y.  
Particularly important in this regard is Cohen’s conception of distributive 
justice. Throughout his critique of Dworkin and Rawls we find claims of the sort, 
‘the realization of distributive justice requires the realization of egalitarian social 
state of affairs e.’ Yet, because Cohen views distributive justice as one value 
amongst a plurality of conflicting values, it will, in all probability, have to be 
compromised in the name of realizing or partly realizing other important values. 
The social state of affairs Cohen believes distributively just is not, then, the type 
of society he believes we ought to seek all things considered. This is evident in 
the fact that he draws a distinction between fundamental principles of justice and 
rules of regulation that ought to govern society. 
According to Cohen, a fundamental principle reflects nothing but 
considerations pertaining to the relevant value. A fundamental principle of 
justice thus reflects: ‘nothing but considerations of justice, or nothing but 
considerations that are not considerations of justice [a derivative principle that is 
nevertheless fundamental as regards justice], but they may not reflect a mixture 
of justice considerations and other considerations, for principles that reflect such 
a mixture are applied principles of justice’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 280). Furthermore, a 
fundamental principle is fact-insensitive, for ‘a principle can respond to (that is, 
be grounded in) a fact only because it is also a response to a more ultimate 
principle that is not a response to a fact: accordingly, if principles respond to 
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facts, then the principles at the summit of our convictions are grounded in no 
facts whatsoever’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 229). Indeed, Cohen claims that a regression 
in which only fact-sensitive principles are identified cannot go on infinitely, and 
challenges his reader to undertake a regression that can go beyond five principles 
before reaching one that is fact-insensitive (Cohen, 2008, p. 237). A fundamental 
principle of justice is therefore said to be ‘in no way dependent on the character 
of any facts, or… on any considerations of value or principle that are not 
considerations of justice’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 281). On the other hand, ‘rules of 
regulation’ for the governing of society, ‘whether they be those rules that obtain 
by order of the state or those that emerge within the milder order of social norm 
formation’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 276), ‘will reflect both values other than justice and 
practical constraints9 that restrict the extent to which justice can be applied’ 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 3). 
This distinction between fundamental principles of justice and rules of 
regulation informs a threefold distinction Cohen draws in his essay, “How to Do 
Political Philosophy.” Here, Cohen distinguishes between the political 
philosophical questions: 
 
(i) What is justice?; (ii) What should the state do?; and (iii) Which 
social states of affairs ought to be brought about? …  
[Q]uestion (i) is not the same question as question (ii), if 
only because not everything that the state should do is something 
it should do in the service of justice…, [and because] the very 
                                                 
9 Cohen more often refers to practical constraints as ‘social facts.’ 
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concept of justice does not ensure that all justice is to be achieved 
by the state. Question (ii) is not, moreover, the same as question 
(iii), if only because question (ii) places a restriction, and question 
(iii) does not, on the agency whereby whatever is to be brought 
about is to be brought about. And finally question (iii) is not the 
same as question (i), since justice is not the only reason why it 
might be right to bring about this social state of affairs rather than 
that one. Social states of affairs can have, and lack, virtues other 
than that of justice.  
(Cohen, 2011h, p. 227) 
 
The distinction between fundamental principles of justice and rules of 
regulation corresponds with these questions. Whatever the correct principles of 
justice are, they are the answer to question (i); whatever the correct state rules of 
regulation are, they are the answer to question (ii); and, because social states of 
affairs can be brought about not only by state agency but also by or in 
combination with non-state agency, whatever the correct state and non-state 
rules of regulation are, they are the answer to question (iii). As my aim is to 
clarify and evaluate Cohen’s positive contribution to the question of what type of 
society we ought to seek, I am primarily operating in the realm of question (iii). 
But question (iii) is not wholly independent of questions (i) and (ii), because the 
answer to question (iii) incorporates the answer to question (ii), and unless 
justice is completely sacrificed to the demands of competing values and social 
facts when developing rules of regulation, the answers to both questions (ii) and 
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(iii) will to some extent reflect the answer to question (i). I am thus concerned 
with all three questions, as each is relevant to my objective, but I am primarily 
concerned with question (iii). 
A problem, however, is that Cohen’s contribution to normative political 
philosophy is largely devoted to tackling question (i), and not questions (ii) and 
(iii). As noted in section 1, a positive view of what type of society we ought to 
seek is not clearly set out by Cohen. There is, however, sufficient textual 
evidence as to how he understands: the value of equality of opportunity; the 
relationship between equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of 
occupational choice in principle; the relationship between equality of opportunity 
and Pareto-efficiency in practice; and the relationship between equality of 
opportunity and community in principle. No doubt there is a plurality of other 
values and social facts that need to be considered in developing a complete 
answer to the question of what type of society we ought to seek. But what Cohen 
has to say about these desiderata in both principle and practice does amount to an 
incomplete positive contribution to the question of what type of society we ought 
to seek, which, I clarify and evaluate in the chapters to follow. 
 
3. Writings not examined 
3.1. As to whether we ought to be Cohenite value pluralists, Dworkinian monists, 
Rawlsian contractualists, or employ some alternative methodology when doing 
normative political philosophy, and whether fundamental principles are fact-
insensitive whilst reflecting considerations pertaining only to the relevant value, I 
remain silent throughout. For my concern is largely practical, and so I wish to 
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avoid getting bogged down in deep and difficult issues concerning moral 
epistemology; although I recognize that one’s methodology may affect the kind 
of justification one gives as to what type of society we ought to seek. I do not 
therefore evaluate Cohen’s critique of contractualist approaches to justice, which 
is based on his claims about fundamental principles, in Rescuing Part II.10 
Another two areas of Cohen’s normative writings I do not examine are his 
critical engagement with Nozick, as definitively presented in Self-ownership, and 
his debate with Andrew Williams on publicity, which also features in Rescuing 
part II. 
 
3.2. Before I explain why I do not evaluate Cohen’s critical engagement with 
Nozick, let me explain one of the critique’s installments. As Cohen argues, 
central to Nozickian justice is not liberty but rather the self-ownership principle. 
This principle says ‘that each person is the morally rightful owner of h[er] own 
person and powers’ (Cohen, 1995, p. 67). More specifically, Nozick’s 
entitlement based theory rests on deriving almost unrestricted property rights 
from the self-ownership principle; the rationale being that if each person is the 
morally rightful owner of her own person and powers, then by extension each 
person is the morally rightful owner of whatever she produces with the use of her 
person and powers, such that coercive redistributive taxation of whatever she 
produces appears to violate her self-ownership. Yet, market exchanges involve 
not only the exercise of self-owned powers, but also the ownership and transfer 
of the material world. The self-ownership principle does not therefore alone 
                                                 
10 See section 4.3 
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generate almost unrestricted property rights, but must be combined with a 
satisfactory account of how people can come to have almost unrestricted 
property rights over impersonal resources. 
According to Nozick, any voluntary transfer of resources is legitimate 
when the resources being transferred are legitimately owned by the seller or 
giver. Since legitimate ownership of impersonal resources depends not only on 
how their current owner came to have them, but on how others before her came 
to have them – for at some point they might have been (and considering the 
history of our world in all probability were) illegitimately acquired by force – the 
legitimacy of any transfer, on Nozick’s view, is dependent on a historical chain 
of legitimate ownership that begins at the point where people first began to claim 
ownership rights over an initially unowned material world. Nozick must 
therefore provide a satisfactory account of legitimate initial acquisition of the 
material world. If he does not, then, he consequently fails to provide a 
satisfactory account of how people can come to have almost unrestricted 
property rights over the material world in the present, which, as noted above, is 
necessary because the self-ownership principle alone does not.  
A particularly important part of Cohen’s strategy in Self-ownership is to 
demonstrate Nozick’s failure in this regard. According to Nozick, ‘[a] process 
normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously 
unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use 
the thing is thereby worsened’ (Nozick, 1974, p. 178). In other words, Nozick 
claims that an initial acquisition of the unowned material world is legitimate 
when B is no worse off following A’s acquisition than she was prior to it. The 
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italicized caveat is known as the Lockean proviso (although it does not accurately 
reflect John Locke’s view11), which, due to the inefficiency of an unowned 
material world as compared with a system of private property, is easily satisfied. 
However, we should not accept satisfaction of Nozick’s proviso as proof 
of legitimate initial acquisition, as it involves an arbitrary narrowing of options. 
As Cohen argues, ‘[i]t has the upshot that… the only counterfactual situation 
relevant to assessing the justice of an appropriation is one in which O [the 
appropriated object] would have continued to be accessible to all… [But] there 
are other intuitively relevant counterfactuals… [And these demonstrate that] 
Nozick’s proviso is too lax, that he has arbitrarily narrowed the class of 
alternatives with which we are to compare what happens when an appropriation 
occurs with a view to determining whether anyone is harmed by it’ (Cohen, 
1995, p. 78).  
For example, imagine that A appropriates all available farm land and B, 
not having any land to farm, is forced to sell her labor-power to A. But ‘suppose 
that B is a much better organizer than A so that, had B appropriated, then each of 
A and B would have had more wheat than [s]he does in the actual situation. 
Nozick’s proviso is, nevertheless, satisfied, since whether or not it is satisfied is 
unaffected by anything that might have happened had B appropriated. And this 
means that Nozick’s condition licenses, and protects, appropriations whose 
upshots make each person worse off than [s]he need be’ (Cohen, 1995, p. 81). In 
addition to Pareto-efficient possible alternatives such as this, ‘we should also 
consider not only what would have happened had B appropriated, but also what 
                                                 
11 See Cohen, 1995, pp. 77-78 
G. A. Cohen and What Type of Society We Ought to Seek 23 
would have happened had A and B cooperated under a socialist economic 
constitution’ (Cohen, 1995, p. 87).  
In short, there is a variety of alternative possible states of affairs that must 
be considered in assessing whether people are made worse off following initial 
acquisitions, as opposed to merely their situation prior to it. Amongst which, 
there will almost certainly be an alternative where some do better than they 
would following up-for-grabs initial acquisitions over which the appropriators 
have almost unrestricted property rights. Thus, Nozick fails to provide a 
satisfactory account of legitimate initial acquisition of the material world, which 
is necessary to generate almost unrestricted property rights in the present, 
because the self-ownership principle alone does not. 
Why, then, do I not evaluate Cohen’s critical engagement with Nozick? 
With respect to Cohen’s positive contribution to the question of what type of 
society we ought to seek, there is little to be gained from evaluation of the above 
argument. For as Will Kymlicka says, in light of Cohen’s critique and various 
alternative models of initial acquisition, including left-libertarian models that 
attempt to combine the self-ownership principle with some type of egalitarian 
principle, ‘virtually no one thinks that a plausible test of fair acquisition would 
generate Nozick’s view that people can appropriate unrestricted property rights 
over unequal amounts of resources’ (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 120).12  
Of course, Cohen’s critique of Nozick in the earlier chapters of Self-
ownership leads him to pursue other lines of inquiry that one might think 
relevant to my subject matter. Specifically, Cohen goes on to argue: (i) that the 
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classical Marxist condemnation of capitalist exploitation involves a latent appeal 
to self-ownership, which is problematic because a commitment to self-ownership 
prevents Marxists from being able to claim that ‘cleanly generated capitalist 
relationships’ are exploitative13; and (ii) that we ought to reject not only Nozick’s 
extension of the self-ownership principle to almost unrestricted property rights, 
but the self-ownership principle itself. 
Argument (i) I consider irrelevant to my subject matter. For my concern 
is with clarifying and evaluating Cohen’s positive contribution to the question of 
what type of society we ought to seek following his turn from Marxism to 
normative political philosophy, and not with whether or not classical Marxists 
are unknowingly committed to the self-ownership principle. Argument (ii) might 
be thought relevant because if Cohen is wrong, as left-libertarians would argue, 
and we ought to embrace the self-ownership principle, doing so may place 
constraints on the extent to which Cohen’s normative conclusions can rightfully 
be pursued.14 It is, however, as Cohen argues, ‘a considerable objection to the 
thesis of self-ownership that no one should fare worse than others do because of 
bad brute luck, for no luck is bruter than that of how one is born, raised and 
circumstanced, the good and bad results of which adhere firmly to individuals 
under the self-ownership principle’ (Cohen, 1995, p. 229). Anyone who 
recognizes this, which is to say, anyone who recognizes the injustice of some 
doing better than others as a result of circumstances for which neither they nor 
the worse-off can be held personally responsible, as do Rawls and Dworkin, has 
reason to at least doubt the self-ownership principle. Moreover, as Cohen argues, 
                                                 
13 For clarification on this point, see Cohen, 1995, pp. 161-162. 
14 For an overview of left-libertarianism, see Vallentyne and Steiner, 2000. 
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by distinguishing the thesis of self-ownership from the conditions of not being a 
slave, possessing autonomy, and not being used merely as a means, the self-
ownership principle can be rejected without the implausible consequences 
libertarians associate with its denial (Cohen, 1995, pp. 230-243). In clarifying 
and evaluating Cohen’s positive contribution to the question of what type of 
society we ought to seek, I therefore choose to concentrate on his more 
contentious views that arise from his critical engagement with Dworkin and 
Rawls, and from his positive vision of society as set out in Why Not Socialism? 
 
3.3. The catalyst for the debate between Cohen and Williams on publicity is an 
installment of Cohen’s critique of Rawls, which I discuss in greater detail in 
Chapter 2, where Cohen argues that principles of distributive justice ought to 
shape not only coercive rules but also an ethos that informs people’s choices 
within coercive rules.15 As Cohen recognizes, Rawlsians will likely respond to 
his claim that principles of distributive justice ought to inform people’s everyday 
choices by pressing the basic structure objection. According to this objection, the 
choices people make within coercive rules are irrelevant from the perspective of 
Rawlsian justice, because Rawls is commonly interpreted as intending his 
principles to regulate the basic structure of society, understood as its political 
constitution and principal social and economic arrangements.  
Cohen’s ‘fundamental’ reply to the basic structure objection is that Rawls 
deems the basic structure to be of primary importance because of its ability to 
produce deep inequalities for which people cannot be held personally 
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responsible. And yet, the choices people make within coercive rules, particularly 
within the family and the market16, can likewise result in pervasive and morally 
arbitrary inequalities. He therefore claims that Rawls ‘must either admit 
application of the principles of justice to… patterns of personal choice that are 
not legally prescribed…, or, if he restricts his concern to the coercive structure 
only, then he saddles himself with a purely arbitrary delineation of his subject 
matter’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 137). 
 In defence of Rawls, Williams draws on textual evidence that suggests he 
understands principles of justice as having to be publicly verifiable, so that 
‘individuals are able to attain common knowledge of the rules’ (i) general 
applicability, (ii) their particular requirements, and (iii) the extent to which 
individuals conform with those requirements’ (Williams, 1998, p. 233). 
Therefore, Rawlsian ‘principles are inapplicable to certain types of decision. For 
some choices, although they may be profoundly influential, cannot be regarded 
as according with, or violating, public rules’ (Williams, 1998, p. 234). In other 
words, Cohen argues that principles of distributive justice ought to shape an 
ethos that informs people’s choices within coercive rules, yet for some of these 
choices people’s conformity to the ethos cannot be publicly verified. This is 
important to Rawls, and in truth, so Williams argues, because publicity is 
‘instrumentally valuable insofar as [it] enhance[s] the long-term probability of a 
society conforming with its conception of justice’ (Williams, 1998, p. 244). For 
if individuals cannot verify that others are conforming to the principles of justice, 
they might refuse to conform themselves, so that social stability comes under 
                                                 
16 See Chapter 2, section 2.4 
G. A. Cohen and What Type of Society We Ought to Seek 27 
threat. Williams’s revised basic structure objection therefore holds that publicity 
is rightly a constraint on the content of distributive justice, so that Rawlsian 
justice does not involve an arbitrary delineation of its subject matter. 
 Cohen’s response, in the final chapter of Rescuing, is that the ability to 
attain common knowledge of the extent to which people conform to principles ‘is 
an absurdly strong requirement on principles of justice’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 347). 
For if the relevant concern is the possibility of people refusing to conform to 
principles of distributive justice unless they know others too are conforming, and 
therefore with a threat to social stability, ‘knowledge of widespread good faith 
effort by individuals at large should surely suffice, even if one not only… 
cannot… [(iii)] sort out the great majority of good-faith-effort makers from a 
minority of backsliders, but also cannot [(ii)] be sure precisely what the 
implications of the rules are for particular situations’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 352). 
Cohen therefore rejects Williams’s publicity conditions (iii) and (ii) as being 
constraints on the content of distributive justice.  
Williams refers to Cohen’s response as the alien factors reply, in the 
sense that it deems publicity to fall outside of Cohenite parameters for a 
fundamental principle of justice. That being the case, he argues that Cohen is 
guilty of talking at cross purposes with Rawls, because Rawls ‘does not aim to 
identify first principles of justice in Cohen’s robust and pure sense…, [and any 
proponent] of the revised basic structure objection can undermine the alien 
factors reply by appealing to this conclusion’ (Williams, 2008a, p. 490). 
My reason for not evaluating this debate is that it falls outside of my aim 
to clarify and evaluate Cohen’s positive contribution to the question of what type 
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of society we ought to seek. As noted toward the end of section 2.2, although 
there is insufficient evidence to infer from Cohen’s writings a complete answer to 
this question, what he has to say about equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency, 
freedom of occupational choice, and community does amount to an incomplete 
positive contribution to the question of what type of society we ought to seek. 
But Cohen does not reflect on the value of publicity in the relevant context. 
Rather, his thoughts about publicity are limited to a denial of it being a constraint 
on the content of distributive justice.17 Thus, although publicity may be an 
important desideratum when developing a complete answer to the question of 
what type of society we ought to seek, it is not relevant to my task, which is to 
clarify and evaluate Cohen’s positive, but incomplete, contribution to answering 
that question. 
 
4. Thesis Summary 
4.1. Amongst Cohen’s normative political philosophical writings, the primary 
texts for clarifying and evaluating his positive contribution to the question of 
what type of society we ought to seek are: his 1989 essay, On the Currency of 
Egalitarian Justice and related follow-up essays on luck egalitarianism; Rescuing 
Part I and a section on justice and Pareto-efficiency in Rescuing Part II; and Why 
Not Socialism? In this summary I explain why these writings are of primary 
importance to my task, the four views I identify and clarify as Cohen’s positive 
contribution, and the conclusions I reach from evaluating them. 
                                                 
17 At one point Cohen says, ‘publicity is at most a desideratum of the rules regulating society’ 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 22). But this remark does not demonstrate any deep reflection on Cohen’s part 
as to whether publicity ought to be a desideratum of rules of regulation; it is merely illustrative of 
his rejection of publicity as a constraint on the content of distributive justice. 
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4.2. As is explicit in Cohen’s argument for the need to turn away from Marxism, 
and in his positive vision of society as outlined in Why Not Socialism?, since it 
reflects a principle of equality of opportunity, equality is the central value of 
Cohen’s normative political philosophical writings. Yet because Why Not 
Socialism? is only a short exploratory essay, Cohen does not there explain or 
defend his preferred principle of equality of opportunity in any great detail. In 
Currency and its related essays, however, Cohen defends a specific principle of 
equality of opportunity at length. These essays comprise his critical engagement 
with Dworkin on the subject of what is the appropriate metric of egalitarian 
interpersonal comparison. By way of criticizing Dworkin’s equality of resources 
and Richard Arneson’s originally favored equal opportunity for welfare, Cohen 
comes to embrace a hybrid metric of equality of opportunity that he names equal 
access to advantage. Through careful examination of these essays the principle 
of equality of opportunity that is constitutive of Cohen’s positive vision of 
society can therefore be clarified, prior to evaluating whether we ought to 
embrace it or some alternative, and how Cohen understands: the relationship 
between equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of occupational 
choice in principle; the relationship between equality of opportunity and Pareto-
efficiency in practice; and the relationship between equality of opportunity and 
community in principle. 
In Chapter 1 I argue that we ought not to embrace equal access to 
advantage as the appropriate metric of egalitarian interpersonal comparison. 
Roughly speaking, Dworkin and Cohen are both luck-egalitarians: each roughly 
believes that, all else being equal, inequalities that result from brute luck are 
G. A. Cohen and What Type of Society We Ought to Seek 30 
prima facie unjust because the bearer cannot be held personally responsible for 
her relative disadvantage, whereas inequalities that result from voluntary choice 
on the part of the bearer are prima facie just because she can, in virtue of that 
choice, be held personally responsible for her relative disadvantage. But whereas 
Dworkin elaborates and defends equality of impersonal and personal resources 
understood as external goods and people’s physical and mental abilities, Cohen 
seeks to equalize unjust inequalities of advantage specified as some set of 
desirable states of the person that one has access to in light of her resources, 
welfare and perhaps other things. 
Cohen favors equal access to advantage over equal opportunity for 
welfare and equality of resources because he thinks that it, as opposed to those 
alternatives, correctly answers compensation claims for physical impairments 
and expensive tastes (preferences that require more resources to satisfy but when 
satisfied provide the bearer with equal welfare to those with less expensive 
tastes). Contra Cohen, I argue that equality of resources answers these claims for 
compensation correctly, and that equal access to advantage is susceptible to the 
problem of indexing, the problem of perfectionism, and the problem of expensive 
tastes.  
To equalize advantage specified as some set of desirable states of the 
person that one has access to in light of her resources, welfare and perhaps other 
things, requires the creation of an index of those valuable states of the person and 
their relative worth so that an access to advantage score can be summed for each 
individual and compared against the scores of others. If a subjective theory of 
value is adopted this will prove difficult, as the number of valuable states of the 
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person will be extensive whilst their value will differ, sometimes greatly, 
between individuals. Add to this the fact that acquiring the necessary information 
with respect to people’s value judgments is unfeasible, and the creation of the 
required index appears implausible.  
To create an index that specifies what states of the person are valuable 
and their relative worth Cohen would have to adopt an objective theory of value. 
But if that objective theory of value is derived from a perfectionist theory of the 
good-life, equal access to advantage will be susceptible to the problem of 
perfectionism. Equalizing for a list of objectively valuable states of the person 
whose value is derived from a perfectionist theory of the good-life conflicts with 
justificatory neutrality (the view that government should not act in order to help 
some ways of life over others), because the list being equalized for cannot be 
justified over some other list without appeal to the relevant perfectionist theory. 
If Cohen wishes for the state to maintain justificatory neutrality he must therefore 
provide a non-perfectionist explanation of from where a list of states of the 
person derives its objective value, which he does not.  
The problem of indexing and the problem of perfectionism aside, equal 
access to advantage counterintuitively compensates for expensive tastes when 
claimants fail the continuity test; a Dworkinian desideratum of egalitarian 
interpersonal comparison, as interpreted by Matthew Clayton and Andrew 
Williams, whereby compensation is granted only if the claimant is able to claim 
in good-faith that relevant others are better off in terms of opportunities 
consistent with her beliefs as to what makes for a valuable life. 
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4.3. Evidence of how Cohen understands the relationship between equality of 
opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of occupational choice in principle, 
and between equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency in practice, is to be 
found in Rescuing Part I and a section on justice and Pareto-efficiency in 
Rescuing Part II.  
Rescuing Part I is primarily devoted to challenging the incentives 
argument for inequality. According to the incentives argument, inequalities are 
unjust unless they are necessary to make the worst-off better off, but, so the 
argument goes, unequalizing incentive payments to productively talented people 
are necessary to make the worst-off better off, and so they are just; the rationale 
being that unequalizing incentive payments result in greater productivity and thus 
a greater sum total of resources, which allows for greater absolute amounts to be 
distributed to the worst-off. Cohen criticizes the incentives argument on grounds 
that unequalizing incentives are relevantly necessary only because the 
productively talented make them necessary by choosing to vary their productivity 
relative to their reward. He deems this an attempt to rescue equality from Rawls 
because the difference principle is commonly thought to permit unequalising 
incentive payments.  
Rescuing Part II, on the other hand, criticizes contractualist approaches to 
justice. Once again Rawls is the prime target, for in deriving principles of justice 
from what hypothetical contractors would supposedly agree to in the original 
position18, Rawlsian principles of justice inevitably reflect considerations 
pertaining to a plurality of values and social facts. Thus, in drawing on his 
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distinction between fundamental principles of justice and rules of regulation, 
Cohen argues that Rawls provides us with a theory of the latter rather than of the 
former, and so looks to rescue justice from Rawls by revealing this supposed 
truth. 
The success or failure of either rescue attempt is not especially relevant to 
my task. My primary concern is not with whether unequalizing incentive 
payments are just or with how we ought to conceptualize justice; much has 
already been written on this, predominantly in defence of Rawls.19 Rather, my 
concern is with what type of society we ought to seek, which for Cohen, because 
of his value pluralism, is distinct from what type of society is just. And, through 
careful examination of Rescuing Part I and the relevant section from Part II, it 
becomes evident that Cohen ultimately believes the state should often 
compromise equality of opportunity in the name of realizing Pareto-efficiency. 
 In developing his critique of the incentives argument, Cohen presses the 
claim, which operates at the level of fundamental principle and so abstracts from 
social facts, that equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency are co-obtainable 
if and when the productively talented voluntarily choose to work at their upmost 
capacity for reward consistent with equality of opportunity. The freedom 
objection to this claim of Cohen’s is that even granting its truth, Cohen 
nevertheless faces the equality-Pareto-freedom trilemma: any two of equality of 
opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of occupational choice may co-
obtain, but all three cannot, as to fill occupations Pareto-efficiently whilst 
realizing equality of opportunity would require forcing people who prefer 
                                                 
19 See (for example) Arneson, 2008; Cureton, 2015; Estlund, 1998; Kofman, 2012; Pogge, 2000 
& 2008; Quong, 2010; Rondel, 2012; Scheffler, 2006; Tomlin, 2010; Williams, 1998 & 2008a; 
and Ypi, 2012. 
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different occupations for reward consistent with equality of opportunity to fill 
those occupations on which the realization of Pareto-efficiency depends; note 
that, absent freedom of occupational choice, for equality of opportunity and 
Pareto-efficiency to co-obtain it still requires people to produce Pareto-
efficiently, but that it leaves open the possibility of forcing them to.  
Cohen’s ethical solution to the trilemma holds that all three desiderata are 
co-obtainable in principle when people’s occupational choices are informed by a 
commitment to equality of opportunity in combination with a commitment to 
produce Pareto-efficiently both in terms of productive capacity and occupational 
choice. In principle, then, Cohen maintains that equality of opportunity, Pareto-
efficiency and freedom of occupational choice are co-obtainable when the 
choices of the productively talented are informed by an egalitarian-Paretian 
ethos. 
As my concern is with what type of society we ought to seek, I am more 
concerned with what we ought to do in practice than with what is possible in 
principle. In Chapter 2 I therefore evaluate whether the ethical solution succeeds 
not only when we abstract from social facts, but also when we recognize those 
social facts that are particularly relevant. As Cohen allows for a prerogative to 
pursue self-interest to a reasonable extent, which effectively allows many to 
depart from the egalitarian-Paretian ethos on which the ethical solution relies, I 
argue that the ethical solution succeeds only if either (i) we deny the prerogative 
or (ii) people do not exercise it with respect to occupational choice. Cohen is 
against (i) and so, on his view, the ethical solution succeeds only if (ii). But the 
probability that (ii) will not occur, that many will exercise their prerogative with 
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respect to their choices about how hard to work and what occupations to fill, has 
the consequence that we must choose between either the sacrificing or 
compromising of equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency, or freedom of 
occupational choice. 
Although the failure of the ethical solution in practice is no critique of 
Cohen, because he intends it to operate at the level of fundamental principles 
where we abstract from social facts, it is important to clarify that, in practice, the 
type of society we ought to seek when taking into account considerations 
pertaining to equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of 
occupational choice does require either the denial of freedom of occupational 
choice or at least one of equality of opportunity or Pareto-efficiency to be 
sacrificed or compromised. 
Despite my concerns being largely practical I additionally note that even 
at the level of fundamental principle, the success of the ethical solution depends 
on whether the egalitarian-Paretian ethos is a requirement of distributive justice 
and on how we conceptualize freedom. For as Paula Casal argues, on a positive 
conception of freedom, where freedom of occupational choice requires an 
adequate range of acceptable options, and the egalitarian-Paretian ethos is, as 
Cohen argues, a requirement of distributive justice, the ethical solution fails 
because one is not relevantly free when their occupational choices are limited to 
two options and one of them is unjust. 
 
4.4. Chapter 2 reveals that when we do not abstract from the relevant social facts, 
we must choose between either sacrificing or compromising equality of 
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opportunity, Pareto-efficiency or freedom of occupational choice. In Chapter 3 I 
therefore move to consider which of the desiderata ought to be sacrificed or 
compromised. Particularly relevant in this respect is Cohen’s concession in 
Rescuing Part I, and which he expands on in a section on justice and Pareto-
efficiency in Rescuing Part II, that Pareto-efficiency often trumps egalitarian 
justice when developing state rules of regulation.20  
Being a concession rather than a fully developed view, Cohen’s view 
that, in practice, the state should often compromise equality of opportunity in the 
name of realizing Pareto-efficiency, is somewhat open to interpretation. I argue 
that Cohen is best interpreted here as embracing a pluralist distributive ethic that 
combines telic egalitarian and telic prioritarian beliefs.21 It says that a luck 
egalitarian social state of affairs – because fair – has non-instrumental value, but 
that the state should often pursue Pareto-efficiency over a luck egalitarian 
principle of equality of opportunity because a social state of affairs in which 
people, and particularly the worst-off, enjoy greater benefits is non-
instrumentally more valuable than egalitarian justice.  
Unlike the largely critical chapters 1, 2 and 4, in Chapter 3 I defend 
Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian ethic from two objections. As the ethic is a 
combination of telic egalitarian and telic prioritarian beliefs it faces objections 
from either side of the debate as to whether we ought to embrace egalitarianism, 
prioritarianism or an alternative distributive ethic. The most prominent of these 
objections are the levelling down objection to telic egalitarianism and the Otsuka-
Voorhoeve objection to prioritarianism. 
                                                 
20 For clarification re state rules of regulation, see section 2.2. 
21 For clarification of the distinctions between egalitarianism and prioritarianism, and between 
telic and deontic variants of egalitarianism and prioritarianism, see Chapter 3 section 2.2. 
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The levelling down objection is meant to reveal the implausibility of 
claiming that equality has non-instrumental value and thus the implausibility of 
telic egalitarianism. The objection holds that, to believe an egalitarian state of 
affairs has non-instrumental value is to believe that its realization by making 
everyone as badly off as the worst-off is in one way better than the relevant 
inequality, which, so the objection goes, is implausible because a state of affairs 
is not in any way better than another state of affairs when it is better for no one. 
Thus, equality does not have non-instrumental value. If the objection succeeds 
the telic egalitarian component of Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian ethic is 
implausible. I argue, however, that despite its force the levelling down objection 
is not decisive.  
The objection rests on the person-affecting claim, which holds that states 
of affairs cannot be in any way better or worse than another when there are no 
persons for whom it affects for better or worse. Yet, as Larry Temkin argues, 
there are states of affairs that when realized reflect certain values and which we 
tend to believe are in one way better than relevant alternatives even when they 
are better for no one. For example, if A represents people who live ethically 
whereas B represents mass murders, we tend to believe state of affairs x: A 8, B 
2, is in one way better than state of affairs y: A 8, B 10, even though state of 
affairs x is better for no one. The person-affecting claim may therefore be false. 
If it is, and if equality of opportunity has non-person-affecting value in the sense 
that desert appears to have non-person-affecting value above, that is, if there is 
something morally good about a state of affairs where everyone is as badly off as 
the worst-off as compared with a state of affairs where some are better off merely 
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as a consequence of brute luck, then, telic luck egalitarianism escapes the 
levelling down objection. My intuition is that there is something morally good 
about it, and that something is fairness. Thus, I share Temkin and Cohen’s view 
that, although we ought not to level down, a luck egalitarian social state of affairs 
– because fair – has non-instrumental value and thus is in one way better than the 
unequal alternative even when it is better for no one. The force of the levelling 
down does not therefore, at least in my view, show the telic egalitarian 
component of Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian ethic to be implausible. 
The Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection to prioritarianism rests on the claim that 
there is greater priority to benefit the badly-off when we move from intrapersonal 
to interpersonal cases, and that whereas prioritarianism cannot explain this shift 
in weighting, it can be explained by telic and/or deontic egalitarian 
considerations that are present only in interpersonal cases (e.g., the non-
instrumental value of equality and/or the comparative strength of different 
people’s claims to benefit). The upshot, so Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve 
argue, is that prioritarianism is implausible. If they are right, so is the telic 
prioritarian component of Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian ethic.  
In defence of Cohen, however, I embrace Martin O’Neill’s pluralist 
response to the Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection, which says that it shows 
prioritarianism to be incomplete rather than implausible. For it is open to any 
prioritarian, unless she dogmatically believes the priority view accounts for the 
whole truth about distributive ethics, to explain the shift in weighting between 
intrapersonal and interpersonal cases by appeal to egalitarian considerations. 
Consequently, the telic prioritarian component of Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian 
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ethic is not implausible. And, unlike non-restricted pure prioritarianism22, it can 
explain the greater priority to benefit the badly-off in interpersonal cases by 
appeal to the non-instrumental value of equality of opportunity. 
 
4.5. Why Not Socialism? is of course relevant to my clarificatory and evaluative 
objectives because, rather that merely engage in critique of other philosophers, 
Cohen here outlines a positive vision of society that reflects a principle of 
equality of opportunity and a principle of community. As noted previously, 
because of its limited detail, clarification and evaluation of Cohen’s principle of 
equality of opportunity is done through careful examination of the substantially 
more detailed Currency and related essays on luck egalitarianism in Chapter 1. 
Why Not Socialism? remains particularly relevant to my objectives, however, 
because of what Cohen says here about the relationship between equality and 
community. 
As noted in section 4.2, Cohen is a luck egalitarian and so his principle of 
equality of opportunity does not object to inequalities that result from voluntary 
choice on the part of the bearer, because she can, in virtue of that choice, be held 
personally responsible for her relative disadvantage. But in Why Not Socialism? 
Cohen argues that when inequalities of this sort obtain on a sufficiently large 
scale they undermine community, and ought therefore to be tempered by a 
principle of community. As I interpret the community principle, it tempers luck 
egalitarianism by keeping the inequalities it permits within a range that ensures 
people’s lives, where possible, labor under similar challenges as a result, where 
                                                 
22 Andrew Williams’s deontic-restricted prioritarianism is not susceptible to the Otsuka-
Voorhoeve objection, and therefore need not appeal to egalitarian considerations to explain the 
shift. See Chapter 3, section 4.2  
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necessary, of the better-off voluntarily helping the worse-off. In principle, Cohen 
therefore believes that equality of opportunity ought to be constrained by a 
principle of community that is realized by means of voluntary non-state agency. 
That is to say, in principle, Cohen embraces a community-constrained luck 
egalitarianism. 
Evaluation of Cohen’s community-constrained luck egalitarianism 
requires an assessment of whether we ought to forbid large inequalities permitted 
by a luck egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity, and if so, whether we 
ought to forbid them because they undermine community or because of some 
other value or reason. In Chapter 4 I argue that, even though inequalities 
resulting from voluntary choice on the part of the bearer are prima facie just, 
because the bearer can, in virtue of that choice, be held personally responsible for 
her relative disadvantage, we ought not to leave people to bear the consequences 
of their voluntary choices, both in principle and in practice, when the effect is 
their falling below a sufficiency threshold of what is required in order to live a 
decent life. We ought not to allow this because insufficiency for the imprudent is 
more repugnant than securing sufficiency for all, either through restricting 
people’s negative freedom to participate in risk and/or through forcing the 
prudent to bear the costs of other’s imprudence. Yet because of the unfairness 
involved in the latter means of securing sufficiency for all, it ought to be secured 
to the greatest extent possible by special taxes, compulsory insurance and/or 
prohibition on reckless activities before turning to redistributive taxation. Thus, I 
embrace a sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism that seeks to minimize the 
unfairness of the prudent having to bear the costs of other’s imprudence. 
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As Cohen’s community-constrained luck egalitarianism keeps the 
relevant inequalities within a range that ensures people’s lives, where possible, 
labor under similar challenges, it is more demanding than sufficiency-constrained 
luck egalitarianism. For we can imagine large inequalities resulting from 
voluntary choice where those at the lower end enjoy a decent life but 
nevertheless lead lives that labor under significantly different challenges to the 
very rich. In circumstances such as these the bearers of inequality do not qualify 
for compensation on a sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarian view. But on 
Cohen’s community-constrained luck egalitarian view, the inequality ought to be 
reduced to the extent that the lives of the worse-off and better-off labor under 
similar challenges. I argue that the value of community is not a weighty enough 
reason to justify such further tempering of inequality by coercive means when 
everyone is guaranteed a minimally decent life and no inequalities exist for 
which people cannot be held personally responsible. But this is no objection to 
the community principle, because rather than temper inequality to a greater 
extent than a sufficiency qualification by coercive means, it does so by means of 
voluntary non-state agency.  
However, as noted previously, I am more concerned with what we ought 
to do in practice than with what is possible in principle, and so I evaluate 
Cohen’s community-constrained luck egalitarianism in much the same way as I 
evaluate his ethical solution to the equality-Pareto-freedom trilemma in Chapter 
2. That is, I evaluate it in the context of the prerogative to pursue self-interest to a 
reasonable extent, for which Cohen allows, and people’s predictable use of it. In 
this context, when people are guaranteed a decent life and suffer no disadvantage 
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above the sufficiency threshold for which they cannot be held personally 
responsible, voluntarily helping the worse-off falls within the better-off’s 
prerogative not to do. As in all probability many of the better-off will exercise 
that prerogative, and because luck egalitarianism ought to be tempered to avoid 
abandonment of the imprudent to unnecessary suffering, I conclude that, in 
practice, equality of opportunity ought to be constrained by a sufficiency 
qualification that is realized by means of state coercion, rather than by Cohen’s 
community principle. 
 
4.6. Through careful examination of these texts, then, it is possible to clarify 
Cohen’s positive contribution to the question of what type of society we ought to 
seek. I indentify four views: 
 
1. The appropriate metric of egalitarian interpersonal comparison is equal 
access to advantage. A luck egalitarian principle of equality of 
opportunity where opportunities are specified as some set of desirable 
states of the person that one has access to in light of her resources, 
welfare and perhaps other things. 
2. In principle, equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of 
occupational choice are co-obtainable when people’s occupational 
choices are informed by a commitment to equality of opportunity in 
combination with a commitment to produce Pareto-efficiently both in 
terms of productive capacity and occupational choice. 
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3. In practice, the state should often compromise equality of opportunity in 
the name of realizing Pareto-efficiency.  
4. In principle, equality of opportunity ought to be constrained by a 
principle of community that is realized by means of voluntary non-state 
agency. 
 
For those reasons highlighted in this summary, my evaluation of these 
views leads me to conclude: 
 
1. The appropriate metric of egalitarian interpersonal comparison is not 
equal access to advantage, but rather an alternative luck egalitarian 
principle of equality of opportunity where opportunities are specified in 
terms of resources. 
2. Although equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of 
occupational choice might be co-obtainable in principle, they are not co-
obtainable in practice. 
3. Cohen’s view that, in practice, the state should often compromise equality 
of opportunity in the name of realizing Pareto-efficiency is best 
understood as a pluralist distributive ethic that combines telic egalitarian 
and telic prioritarian beliefs. Neither the levelling down objection to telic 
egalitarianism nor the Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection to prioritarianism 
show this distributive ethic to be implausible. 
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4. Equality of opportunity ought to be constrained in both principle and in 
practice, and in practice it ought to be constrained by a sufficiency 
qualification rather than by Cohen’s community principle. 
 
With respect to conclusions 2 and 4 one might be tempted to argue that 
views 2 and 4 are views about what is possible in principle, and yet conclusions 
2 and 4 are conclusions about what is possible, and about what we ought to do, in 
practice. Similarly to how Andrew Williams criticizes Cohen for talking at cross 
purposes with Rawls23, one might therefore accuse me of talking at cross 
purposes with Cohen. In response I highlight the fact that I do not frame 
conclusions 2 and 4 as objections to views 2 and 4, on the contrary, I emphasize 
that they are not objections. Moreover, even though it is open to Cohen to agree 
with conclusions 2 and 4, they are nevertheless important when it comes to 
clarifying and evaluating his positive contribution to the question of what type of 
society we ought to seek. For we see that much of his contribution is about what 
is possible in principle, rather than in practice, and is in that sense utopian. In 
light of the fact that his turn from Marxism to normative political philosophy was 
originally motivated by a belief that leftists need to be clearer about what we 
seek and why, I find this disappointing. For Cohen has very little to say about 
what the left ought to seek in practice, which is surely more important than what 
is possible when we abstract from the relevant social facts. This is a matter on 
which I reflect in greater detail at the end of the thesis.24 
 
                                                 
23 See section 3.3 
24 See Conclusion, section 2 
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Chapter 1 
Equal Access to Advantage 
 
1. Introduction 
As set out in the Introduction, my aim is to clarify and evaluate Cohen’s positive 
contribution to the question of what type of society we ought to seek. In this 
chapter I take the first step to achieving this aim by clarifying and evaluating his 
preferred luck egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity, which he defends 
at length in On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and related follow-up essays 
on luck egalitarianism. These essays comprise his critical engagement with 
Ronald Dworkin and his contribution to what is commonly known as the 
“equality of what?” debate. Named after Amartya Sen’s seminal 1979 Tanner 
Lecture on Human Values1, this debate concerns what is the appropriate metric 
of egalitarian interpersonal comparison: should egalitarians seek to alleviate 
and/or compensate for inequality of outcome or inequality of opportunity, and 
should egalitarians specify outcomes or opportunities in terms of welfare, 
capabilities, resources or some hybrid? 
Cohen’s answer to “equality of what?” is equal access to advantage. It is 
a reactive answer, in that it is presented as a critique of Richard Arneson’s 
originally favored equal opportunity for welfare and Dworkin’s equality of 
resources, and as bearing some resemblance to Sen’s equality of capability. 
Rather than conceptualize fair shares in terms of opportunity for welfare or 
resources, Cohen argues that we should equalize access to advantage specified as 
                                                 
1 See Sen, 1980. 
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some set of desirable states of the person that one has access to in light of her 
resources, welfare and perhaps other things. Since Cohen’s argument for equal 
access to advantage takes the form of critique, its evaluation requires an 
understanding of that to which he is reacting. As it makes for neater exposition I 
therefore clarify and evaluate the views of Arneson, Sen and Dworkin, before 
proceeding to clarify and evaluate equal access to advantage.  
Cohen favors equal access to advantage over equal opportunity for 
welfare and equality of resources because he thinks that it, as opposed to those 
alternatives, correctly answers compensation claims for physical impairments 
and expensive tastes (preferences that require more resources to satisfy but when 
satisfied provide the bearer with equal welfare to those with less expensive 
tastes). Contra Cohen, I argue that equality of resources answers these claims for 
compensation correctly, and that equal access to advantage is susceptible to the 
problem of indexing, the problem of perfectionism and the problem of expensive 
tastes, with the latter being reinforced by the appeal of the continuity test. I 
therefore conclude that the appropriate metric of egalitarian interpersonal 
comparison is not equal access to advantage, but rather an alternative luck 
egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity where opportunities are specified 
in terms of resources. 
 
2. Equality of what? 
2.1. Before clarifying the alternative metrics to which Cohen’s argument for 
equal access to advantage reacts, it should be noted why many contributors to the 
debate, including Cohen, favor equality of opportunity over equality of outcome. 
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As Clayton and Williams point out in their summary of the debate, equality of 
outcome is susceptible to ‘the familiar conservative criticism that egalitarianism 
is blind to personal responsibility’ (Clayton and Williams, 2002, p. 8). The 
thought behind this line of critique is that equality of outcome unfairly requires 
the prudent to bail out the reckless.  
To illustrate, let us imagine a world in which two people, reckless Rita 
and prudent Pam, start from a position of equality of outcome specified in terms 
of wealth, and let us further imagine that whereas Rita voluntarily chooses to 
squander her wealth playing exorbitant amounts of bingo, Pam voluntarily 
chooses to retain much of her wealth in savings; a voluntary choice being one 
that is made in the absence of coercion and with full knowledge of the relevant 
facts. Clearly, inequality of outcome specified as wealth will quickly obtain 
between reckless Rita and prudent Pam as a result of their choices. To re-
establish equality of outcome will require that some percentage of Pam’s wealth 
be redistributed to Rita; perhaps on numerous occasions if Rita continues to 
squander her wealth down the bingo hall. Many would consider that unfair, even 
if it were only a one off redistribution, as Rita bears personal responsibility for 
her relative disadvantage and yet Pam, who bears no personal responsibility for it 
whatsoever, pays the price for Rita’s voluntary choice. If, in the above case, we 
instead deem the appropriate metric of interpersonal comparison to be equal 
opportunity for wealth, and we further imagine that Rita and Pam enjoy equal 
opportunity for wealth, then no relevant inequality obtains. Instead, Rita will be 
left to bear the consequences of her voluntary choice and egalitarians escape the 
conservative critique.  
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Of course, in contemporary societies equality of opportunity does not 
obtain. As opposed to characterizing our protagonists as reckless and prudent we 
might therefore characterize them in terms of their social and economic 
circumstances. Let us imagine that whereas rich Rose had the good fortune to be 
born to wealthy parents with advantageous social connections, poor Pip had the 
misfortune to be born to heroine addicts who live in abject poverty. In 
contemporary societies Rose’s and Pip’s opportunities to acquire wealth will 
differ greatly as a consequence of their different social and economic 
circumstances for which neither is personally responsible. To take one especially 
pervasive example of how this is true, we might imagine that Rose and Pip are 
born with similar levels of natural ability but that Rose’s abilities are fostered to 
a greater extent than Pip’s. This might be the result of Rose’s parent’s buying 
their daughter a superior private education, or because Rose’s parents foster their 
daughter’s natural abilities through familial relations (bedtime stories, helping 
with home work, etc) whereas Pip suffers from parental neglect as a consequence 
of her parents’ addiction. Either way, Rose will likely become more able than Pip 
over time and consequently enjoy occupational opportunities not open to Pip, 
which, of course, are opportunities to acquire wealth.  
The more radical principles of equality of opportunity seek to alleviate 
and/or compensate not only for inequalities of opportunity that result from social 
and economic circumstance, as in the case of rich Rose and poor Pip, but also for 
inequalities of opportunity that result from differences in natural ability. For just 
as people cannot be held personally responsible for the social and economic 
circumstances into which they are born, neither can they be held personally 
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responsible for the varying degrees of natural ability with which they are born. 
As John Rawls says, when ‘distributive shares are decided by the outcome of the 
natural lottery…, this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective. There is no 
more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the 
distribution of natural assets than by historical and social fortune’ (Rawls, 1999, 
p. 64).  
To illustrate, let us imagine that able Amy and impaired Ida are sisters 
such that they were born into the exact same social and economic circumstances. 
However, whereas Amy had the good fortune to be born with great natural 
ability, Ida had the misfortune to be born with severe learning difficulties. As a 
consequence of these differences in natural ability, for which neither individual is 
personally responsible, Amy will enjoy all sorts of opportunities that Ida will not. 
For instance, come adulthood Amy’s greater natural ability and Ida’s severe 
learning difficulties will likely result in Amy enjoying occupational opportunities 
not open to Ida. All else being equal, Amy and Ida type cases suggest that we 
should seek to alleviate and/or compensate for all inequalities of opportunity for 
which people cannot be held personally responsible. That is, all else being equal, 
we should seek to alleviate and/or compensate not only for inequalities of 
opportunity that result from differences in social and economic circumstance for 
which people cannot be held personally responsible, but also for inequalities that 
result from differences of natural ability for which people cannot be held 
personally responsible. 
An alternative way of characterizing equality of opportunity, then, is as 
alleviating and/or compensating for inequalities that result merely from the 
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bearer’s bad brute luck; ‘brute luck’ being distinct from ‘option luck’ in that 
whereas the bearer cannot be held personally responsible for the former, she can 
be held personally responsible for the latter because it involves a voluntary 
choice on her part to partake in some sort of gamble or risk. As we have seen, 
equality of opportunity seeks to correct for inequalities of opportunity that result 
from people’s bad brute luck with respect to their social and economic 
circumstances, and the more radical equality of opportunity metrics go further by 
additionally seeking to correct for inequalities of opportunity that result from 
people’s bad brute luck with respect to their natural abilities. It is for this reason 
that Elizabeth Anderson famously branded a variety of equality of opportunity 
metrics ‘luck egalitarianism’ (Anderson, 1999, p. 289).2 Broadly speaking, luck 
egalitarians maintain that, all else being equal, inequalities that result from brute 
luck are prima facie unjust because the bearer cannot be held personally 
responsible for her relative disadvantage, whereas inequalities that result from 
voluntary choice on the part of the bearer are prima facie just because she can, in 
virtue of that choice, be held personally responsible for her relative disadvantage. 
 
2.2. Although Arneson later came to recant equal opportunity for welfare in 
favour of responsibility-catering prioritarianism3, I am concerned only with the 
former, because equal opportunity for welfare is that to which Cohen’s argument 
for equal access to advantage reacts. Since welfare is a somewhat vague concept, 
welfare egalitarians must adopt a specification of it for the purposes of 
egalitarian interpersonal comparison, otherwise it is by no means clear what they 
                                                 
2 Anderson’s seminal critique of luck egalitarianism is discussed in Chapter 4, section 3.1. 
3 See Arneson, 1999 & 2000. 
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seek to equalize. When previously arguing for equal opportunity for welfare, 
Arneson adopted an ideal preference-satisfaction specification of welfare: ‘I take 
welfare to be [ideal] preference satisfaction… The extent to which a person’s life 
goes well is the degree to which his ideally considered preferences are satisfied. 
My ideally considered preferences are those I would have if I were to engage in 
thoroughgoing deliberation about my preferences with full pertinent information, 
in a calm mood, while thinking clearly and making no reasoning errors’ 
(Arneson, 1989, pp. 82-83). 
By specifying welfare as ideal preference-satisfaction Arneson escapes 
the problem of misinformed preferences. If we were to adopt an actual 
preference-satisfaction specification of welfare, equality of welfare would 
require that we equalize the satisfaction of preferences that people actually have 
regardless of their basis, to which an objector might pose the question: “Why 
should we seek to alleviate and/or compensate for inequalities of actual 
preference-satisfaction when people’s actual preferences can be based on 
misinformation, irrational thinking, ignorance, inexperience, and so on?” The 
objector’s point is that because of such factors, to equalize actual preference-
satisfaction is to equalize the satisfaction of preferences that in some cases will 
not improve people’s welfare and may even be detrimental to it. For example, 
misinformed Mel might have an actual preference for homeopathic remedies that 
are of no medicinal benefit to her whatsoever. Equality of welfare specified as 
actual preference-satisfaction therefore appears counterintuitive, as its realization 
will likely involve wasting resources on satisfying preferences that are not 
beneficial to people’s welfare. 
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A similar problem is the problem of malformed preferences. People’s 
preferences are malformed when they have subconsciously formed their 
preferences in accordance with their un-chosen circumstances. For example, poor 
Pete and rich Rob may have subconsciously formed their preferences according 
to their economic circumstances, such that Pete gains the same level of 
preference-satisfaction from dinning at McDonalds as Rob gains from dinning at 
a Michelin-starred restaurant. Equality of welfare specified as actual preference-
satisfaction can therefore treat people unfairly, for it can view people as equal 
despite the possibility that their preferences are relevantly malformed. 
By specifying welfare as ideal preference-satisfaction Arneson avoids 
both of these problems. As regards the problem of misinformed preferences, to 
equalize for ideal preference-satisfaction is to equalize only for the satisfaction of 
those preferences that, because they are ideally considered, will be beneficial to 
people’s welfare. As regards the problem of malformed preferences, that the 
satisfaction of preferences being equalized for are those that are ideally 
considered negates the possibility of people subconsciously forming their 
preferences in accordance with their un-chosen circumstances. It should be 
remembered, however, that Arneson originally favored equal opportunity for 
welfare, not, equality of welfare. Thus, he recognizes that inequalities of 
opportunity for ideal preference-satisfaction can obtain as a result of voluntary 
choices for which people should be held personally responsible, such as a choice 
to partake in an option luck gamble that leaves one with insufficient resources to 
satisfy her ideal preferences to an equal degree as others (Arneson, 1989, pp. 83-
84).  
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But welfarists encounter further problems. They also face the problem of 
expensive tastes; ‘tastes’ being just another word for preferences. As Dworkin 
argues, ‘the problem of expensive tastes… [is that e]quality of welfare seems to 
recommend that those with champagne tastes, who need more income simply to 
achieve the same level of welfare as those with less expensive tastes, should have 
more income on that account’ (Dworkin, 2002, pp. 48-49). Dworkin finds this 
counterintuitive, in the sense that equality of welfare grants those with expensive 
tastes more than their fair share of resources and, since resources are finite, 
consequently denies those with cheap tastes their fair share of resources.  
To illustrate, Dworkin asks us to imagine a society in which equality of 
welfare has been achieved and that by coincidence it has been achieved 
consistent with equality of wealth. Following this Louis voluntarily develops an 
expensive taste for plover’s eggs that he cannot satisfy with his current wealth 
allocation such that he comes to suffer from inequality of welfare. To re-establish 
equality of welfare requires that wealth be redistributed from those with less 
expensive tastes to Louis (Dworkin, 2002, p. 49-50). To further illustrate, he then 
asks us to imagine a society that initially achieves equality of welfare via an 
unequal distribution of wealth, because Jude’s cheap tastes mean that he requires 
less wealth to attain the same welfare level as others. After reading 
Hemmingway, however, Jude develops an expensive taste for bullfighting that he 
cannot satisfy with his current wealth allocation so that he comes to suffer from 
inequality of welfare. Importantly, whereas re-establishing equality of welfare in 
Louis’ case requires that he be allocated more wealth than others, re-establishing 
equality of welfare in Jude’s case requires that he be allocated no more wealth 
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than others, because his initial tastes were so cheaply satisfied. If, because of this 
fact, our intuition is to compensate Jude but not Louis, then, so Dworkin argues, 
we are inclining toward a conceptualization of fair shares in terms of resources 
rather than welfare (Dworkin, 2002, p. 58).  
Responding to the problem of expensive tastes, Arneson points out that 
Jude’s case raises concerns about preference formation. If Jude has 
subconsciously formed his initial tastes in accordance with a small wealth 
allocation, then it is an example of malformed preferences that gives us reason to 
compensate Jude and not Louis without appealing to fair shares in terms of 
resources (Arneson, 2002, p. 191). But Dworkin’s examples should not be 
interpreted as such. As I understand them, the initial distribution of wealth in 
each case occurs only after an assessment of what people require for equality of 
welfare to obtain. In the former case wealth is initially distributed equally only 
after it is known that equality of wealth happens to be consistent with equality of 
welfare, and in the latter case wealth is initially distributed unequally only after it 
is known that Jude requires less than others for equality of welfare to obtain. 
Arneson, however, goes further than merely pointing out concerns about 
preference formation. Dworkin’s examples employ equality of welfare as 
opposed to equal opportunity for welfare (although, as shall become evident, the 
case of Jude anticipates equal opportunity for welfare). As Arneson suggests, we 
might therefore imagine a society that initially achieves equal opportunity for 
welfare. We then imagine that Louis and Jude develop expensive tastes which 
cause them to suffer from inequality of welfare. In terms of equal opportunity for 
welfare, whether Louis and Jude’s expensive tastes qualify for compensation 
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depends on whether they were developed in a sufficiently voluntary or 
involuntary way. If Louis voluntarily develops his expensive taste, as in 
Dworkin’s example, he is personally responsible for his disadvantage and does 
not qualify for compensation. The same applies to Jude if he voluntarily chose to 
develop his expensive taste or knew it to be a likely consequence of some other 
voluntary course of action. If, however, Jude developed his expensive taste in a 
sufficiently involuntary way, then, he qualifies for compensation because 
through no fault of his own he has fewer opportunities for welfare (Arneson, 
2002, pp. 191-192).  
Appealing to equality of opportunity provides Arneson and other 
welfarists with a reply to the problem of expensive tastes, but not one which fits 
with my intuitions. In effect, the reply argues that there is nothing 
counterintuitive or unfair about granting some more resources than others in 
order to realize equal opportunity for welfare, because when an expensive taste is 
involuntarily developed the bearer cannot be held personally responsible for 
having fewer opportunities for welfare than others. Those who are inclined 
toward an ideal of fair shares in terms of resources may argue that the 
recommendations of equal opportunity for welfare remain counterintuitive, 
because compensating for involuntary expensive tastes requires denying those 
with cheap tastes their fair share of resources. But those who embrace equal 
opportunity for welfare reject that conceptualization of fair shares. Instead, they 
favor an ideal of fair shares in terms of equal opportunity for welfare. Thus, so 
long as cheap tastes are not misinformed or malformed, those with cheap tastes 
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are not denied their fair share when they have sufficient resources to enjoy equal 
opportunity for welfare.  
That reply, however, overlooks Dworkin’s point vis-à-vis the case of 
Jude. In Arneson’s reworking of the example, equal opportunity for welfare is 
realized consistent with inequality of resources because of Jude’s cheap 
preferences. This might initially seem fair. After all, the reason we care about 
resources is because of their instrumental value to the realization of other things, 
such as opportunity for welfare. To think of fair shares in terms of resources 
therefore appears superficial; the problem of superficiality is often pressed by 
welfarists in response to resource metrics. But the counterintuitive 
recommendations of equal opportunity for welfare are evident only after Jude 
develops his new expensive taste. For according to it, if Jude develops his new 
expensive taste voluntarily he has no claim to compensation, even though 
compensation would still leave him with fewer resources than others because his 
initial tastes were so cheaply satisfied. I find that recommendation 
counterintuitive, for it is surely unfair that Jude is denied the ability to satisfy his 
new taste simply because he voluntarily developed it. Whether he developed it 
voluntarily or involuntarily is beside the point, what matters is that compensation 
requires allocating him no more than his fair share of resources. My intuitions 
vis-à-vis Jude are therefore supportive of equality of resources. As shall become 
evident when returning to the problem of expensive tastes in the evaluation of 
equal access to advantage to follow, Dworkin believes that the relevant intuition 
is supported by reasons as to why the distinction between voluntary and 
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involuntary expensive tastes is unsustainable, and why compensating for 
expensive tastes is to treat people as alienated from their personalities. 
What if, contrary to Arneson, welfare egalitarians were to adopt an 
objective specification of welfare for the purposes of egalitarian interpersonal 
comparison? Would equal opportunity for welfare remain problematic? 
Objective list theories of well-being hold that the more objectively valuable 
goods people have the higher their level of welfare; objectively valuable goods 
being those goods that are deemed beneficial to people’s welfare irrespective of 
their value judgments and thus irrespective of their subjective preferences. As the 
value of these goods is not subjective, it must be derived from somewhere else. It 
is common here to turn to perfectionist theories of the good-life, so that the list of 
goods and their value is derived from a theory as to what people require in order 
to live a perfect human life. Yet if a welfarist makes this turn they face the 
problem of perfectionism. To defend a perfectionist theory of the good-life is a 
significant undertaking which may prove indefensible. Furthermore, even if such 
a theory can be successfully defended, we might nevertheless doubt its suitability 
for deriving a list of objectively valuable goods for the purposes of egalitarian 
interpersonal comparison.  
Anti-perfectionist liberals believe, rightly in my view, that people should 
be free to pursue their own conception of the good-life. This requires what 
Kymlicka calls ‘liberal neutrality;’ it requires ‘that the state should not reward or 
penalize particular conceptions of the good life but, rather, should provide a 
neutral framework within which different and potentially conflicting conceptions 
of the good can be pursued’ (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 883). Drawing on the work of 
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Joseph Raz4, Kymlicka draws a distinction between two principles of liberal 
neutrality: ‘[consequential neutrality] requires that the state seek to help or 
hinder different life-plans to an equal degree…, [whereas justificatory neutrality] 
allows that government action may help some ways of life more than others but 
denies that government should act in order to help some ways of life over 
others… The first requires neutrality in the consequences of government policy; 
the second requires neutrality in the justification of government policy’ 
(Kymlicka, 1989, pp. 883-884).  
Equalizing for welfare or opportunity for welfare specified as a list of 
objectively valuable goods whose value is derived from a perfectionist theory of 
the good-life, conflicts with consequential neutrality because the consequences of 
that distributive policy, rather than be neutral, favor the pursuit of the relevant 
perfectionist conception of the good-life. However, we should not embrace 
consequential neutrality, for as Kymlicka argues, even respecting basic liberties 
is likely to have non-neutral consequences; for example, freedom of speech and 
freedom of association will result in some conceptions of the good-life being 
more popular than others (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 884). But the very same 
distributive policy also conflicts with justificatory neutrality, because the list of 
goods or opportunity for goods being equalized for cannot be justified over some 
other list without appeal to the relevant perfectionist theory. Welfarists who 
adopt an objective specification and who wish for the state to maintain 
justificatory neutrality must therefore provide a non-perfectionist explanation of 
from where their list of goods derives its objective value. 
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2.3. Sen’s answer to “equality of what?” is equality of capability. As he explains, 
the capability approach to egalitarian interpersonal comparison views the extent 
to which people are advantaged ‘in terms of his or her actual ability to achieve 
various valuable functionings as a part of living… Functionings represent parts 
of the state of a person – in particular the various things that he or she manages 
to do or be in leading a life. The capability of a person reflects the alternative 
combinations of functionings the person can achieve, and from which he or she 
can choose one collection’ (Sen, 1993, pp. 30-31). Equality of capability 
therefore seeks to equalize people’s capabilities to realize valuable functionings 
understood as valuable states of the person.  
Sen places functionings into two categories. ‘Elementary’ or ‘basic’ 
functionings are states of the person such as being adequately nourished and 
being in good health, whereas ‘complex’ functionings are states of the person 
such as achieving self-respect and social integration. He maintains that basic 
functions are ‘valued by all, for obvious reasons,’ and that complex functions are 
‘still widely valued’ (Sen, 1993, p. 31). From such comments Sen might appear 
to be embracing a subjective theory of value, since both categories of 
functionings are said to derive their value from people’s value judgments. 
Alternatively, it could be that various functionings are objectively valuable; that 
they are valuable independent of people wanting them and that they are 
universally valued or at least widely valued because people recognize their 
objective value. In fact, Sen refrains from embracing a theory of value with the 
consequence that his approach to egalitarian interpersonal comparison remains 
incomplete. He insists, however, that ‘quite different specific theories of value 
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may be consistent with the capability approach, and share the common feature of 
selecting value-objects from functionings and capabilities’ (Sen, 1993, p. 48). 
 Like welfarists, Sen considers basic resource metrics such as equality of 
wealth to be superficial, since ‘the conversion of income into basic capabilities 
may vary greatly between individuals and also between different societies’ (Sen, 
1993, p. 41). But Sen is also critical of welfarists for sometimes failing to 
compensate for inequalities of capability. To illustrate, Sen asks us to imagine an 
individual who despite suffering from a physical impairment enjoys equality of 
welfare specified as either happiness or actual preference-satisfaction; he enjoys 
equality of happiness because despite his physical impairment he happens to 
have a ‘jolly disposition,’ or he enjoys equality of actual preference-satisfaction 
because he prefers not to be compensated, believing that ‘he will be rewarded in 
after-life..., [or that his impairment is] just penalty for misdeeds in a past 
incarnation’ (Sen, 1980, p. 217). If we think that this individual should 
nevertheless be compensated for his physical impairment, then, the relevant 
welfare metrics appear counterintuitive.  
Of course, welfarists who embrace either hedonist of actual preference-
satisfaction specifications of welfare can simply bite the bullet in response to 
Sen’s example; they can argue that physical impairments do not warrant 
compensation when the bearer does not suffer from inequality of welfare and that 
the intuition to nevertheless compensate is mistaken. In addition, Sen’s example 
is not problematic for welfarists such as Arneson who embrace an ideal 
preference-satisfaction specification of welfare, nor is it problematic for certain 
objective specifications of welfare. The actual preference of Sen’s individual not 
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to be compensated for his physical impairment may be misinformed; atheists 
would certainly consider it so. If that is the case, then his physical impairment 
qualifies for compensation on an ideal preference-satisfaction view. As regards 
objective specifications of welfare, absence of physical impairment could well be 
amongst those goods that are deemed objectively valuable with respect to 
people’s welfare. If so, the physical impairment of Sen’s individual qualifies for 
compensation regardless of his level of happiness or preference-satisfaction. 
The key problem with the capability approach is the problem of indexing. 
To realize equality of capability requires an index of the various valuable 
functionings and their relative worth so that a capability score can be summed for 
each individual and compared against the scores of others. If a subjective theory 
of value is adopted this will prove difficult, as the number of valuable 
functionings will be extensive whilst their value will differ, sometimes greatly, 
between individuals. Add to this the fact that acquiring the necessary information 
with respect to people’s value judgments is unfeasible, and the creation of the 
required index appears implausible.  
To create an index that specifies what functionings are valuable and their 
relative worth the capability approach would have to adopt an objective theory of 
value. But if the index is derived from a perfectionist theory of the good-life, 
equality of capability will be susceptible to the problem of perfectionism. 
Equalizing for a list of objectively valuable functionings whose value is derived 
from a perfectionist theory of the good-life conflicts with justificatory neutrality, 
because the list of functionings being equalized for cannot be justified over some 
other list of functionings without appeal to the relevant perfectionist theory. 
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Those who favor equality of capability and who wish for the state to maintain 
justificatory neutrality must therefore provide a non-perfectionist explanation of 
from where their list of functionings derives its objective value. 
 
2.4. Dworkin’s argument for equality of resources begins with him asking us to 
imagine a hypothetical market process that originates with a group of shipwreck 
survivors located on an unpopulated island. These individuals face no prospect of 
being rescued anytime soon, and since none of them can claim entitlement over 
the island’s resources, they agree that the resources should be divided between 
them equally. Importantly, they also agree to the envy test, according to which: 
‘No division of resources is an equal division if, once the division is complete, 
any immigrant would prefer someone else’s bundle of resources to his own 
bundle’ (Dworkin, 2002, p. 67).  
An element of potential unfairness remains, however, since the envy test 
can be satisfied without avoiding arbitrary compositions of the resource bundles 
to be distributed; one may prefer that the bundle compositions were different yet 
the envy test can be satisfied so long as no individual prefers another’s bundle to 
their own. Dworkin’s solution is to hold an auction in which all of the island’s 
resources are sold and in which each individual participates with equal currency. 
Following the auction the envy test is satisfied as no individual should prefer 
another’s resource bundle to their own, whilst arbitrary compositions of those 
bundles is avoided through an auction process in which ‘each person played, 
through his purchases against an initially equal stock of [currency], an equal role 
in determining the set of bundles actually chosen’ (Dworkin, 2002, p. 68).  
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A particular strength of equality of resources is that it does not require us 
to embrace a theory of value or to construct an index of valuable resources. The 
subjective value of resources, regardless of whether their value is in truth 
subjective or objective, is determined by the auction. It also has the benefit of 
remaining neutral as regards conceptions of the good-life, because an auction in 
which all resources are up-for-grabs and in which everyone has equal currency 
provides everyone with an equal chance of acquiring the resources they deem 
instrumentally valuable to the pursuit of their conception of the good-life.  
 A difficulty for Dworkin is that inequalities of resources can obtain post-
auction for which people cannot be held personally responsible. For example, 
post-auction one may use their resources in an entrepreneurial manner such that 
they come to acquire more resources than another who, for instance, squanders 
their initial resources on an option luck gamble from which they lose. Although 
luck egalitarians would consider this outcome just because the relevant 
individuals are personally responsible for the inequality that obtains, these 
individuals may bear children who though no fault of their own would likely 
suffer from inequality of opportunity as a result of the differing economic 
circumstances of their parents. In other words, cases such as the aforementioned 
rich Rose and poor Pip can obtain post-auction.5  
Not wishing to embrace a metric of egalitarian interpersonal comparison 
that allows for such outcomes, Dworkin maintains that equality of resources is to 
be understood as ambition-sensitive but endowment-insensitive. It is ambition-
sensitive in that it ‘allow[s] the distribution of resources at any particular moment 
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to… reflect the cost or benefit to others of the choices people make so that, for 
example, those who choose to invest rather than consume, or to consume less 
expensively rather than more, or to work in more rather than less profitable ways 
must be permitted to retain the gains that follow from these decisions’ (Dworkin, 
2002, p. 89). It is endowment-insensitive in that it does ‘not allow the 
distribution of resources at any moment to… be affected by differences in ability 
of the sort that produce income differences in a laissez-faire economy among 
people with the same ambitions’ (Dworkin, 2002, p. 89). In effect, Dworkin’s 
resource metric employs a luck egalitarian distinction between inequalities for 
which people cannot be held personally responsible and which therefore qualify 
for compensation, and inequalities for which people can be held personally 
responsible and which do not therefore qualify for compensation. 
As equality of resources is concerned not only with impersonal resources 
understood as external goods but also with personal resources understood as 
people’s physical and mental abilities, Dworkin requires a method of 
equalization as regards the latter. For although inequalities of impersonal 
resources for which people cannot be held personally responsible can be 
corrected post-auction by redistributive means, inequalities of personal resources 
for which people cannot be held personally responsible, such as being born with 
a severe mental and/or physical impairment, can only be compensated for by 
allocating the bearer additional impersonal resources. 
Dworkin’s solution is a hypothetical insurance market that individuals 
‘effectuate through compulsory insurance at a fixed premium for everyone on the 
basis of speculations about what the average immigrant would have purchased by 
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way of insurance had antecedent risk of various handicaps been equal’ (Dworkin, 
2002, p. 80). Those who bear severe physical and/or metal impairments are then 
eligible to claim from the insurance fund. Paralysis and Huntington’s disease are 
clear examples of physical and mental impairments that would qualify. It should 
be noted that expensive tastes the bearer would prefer to be rid of, such that she 
would be willing to take a preference-changing pill, also constitute compensation 
qualifying impairments (Dworkin, 2002, pp. 291-293). But what about merely 
lacking in natural ability? Is that a compensation qualifying impairment? After 
all, equality of resources is meant to be endowment-insensitive. However, 
equality of resources is not completely endowment-insensitive. Instead, Dworkin 
favors a progressive redistributive tax scheme based on another hypothetical 
insurance market in which people can insure against not having the talents 
necessary to achieve a moderate income (Dworkin, 2002, pp. 92-109). Thus, 
equality of resources ensures a moderate income regardless of natural ability, but 
inequalities of resources between people with the same ambitions might 
nevertheless remain post-auction due to differences in ability for which the 
bearer cannot be held personally responsible (Dworkin, 2002, p. 104).  
Does this fact mean that we should reject equality of resources? Dworkin 
maintains that the hypothetical insurance device ‘is ex ante better for everyone 
(except, perhaps, citizens who are imprudent) than a rescue approach [which, in 
the relevant case, requires equalization to an extent greater than ensuring a 
moderate income and perhaps even full equalization], because it gives each the 
choice as to how much future protection he wishes as against how much 
sacrifice, in the form of insurance premiums, he is willing and deems it right to 
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make now, rather than forcing on him a collective decision that no one would 
make for himself’ (Dworkin, 2002, p. 342). In other words, equalizing for 
inequalities of resources traceable to differences in natural ability to an extent 
greater than guaranteeing a moderate income would require a level of 
redistributive taxation that effectively imposes far more expensive insurance 
premiums than what people would choose for themselves. The greater the 
income one insures against being unable to realize, the greater the cost of the 
insurance premium, such that the potential benefit is offset. Of course, the 
hypothetical insurance device is exactly that, hypothetical, and so we can only 
speculate about what level of insurance the average individual would purchase 
when devising a progressive redistributive tax scheme. Yet we can assume that 
on average people would purchase some level of cover but nothing approaching a 
‘rescue policy’ because the potential benefit would be offset by the expensive 
cost of the premium. It thus seems fair to ask those who bear inequalities of 
resources due to differences in natural ability to be satisfied with a redistributive 
tax scheme that guarantees them the average income that people would insure 
against being unable to realize, which would be something like a moderate 
income (Dworkin, 2002, pp. 342-345). 
Despite the complexity of Dworkin’s view welfarists might nevertheless 
claim that, like more basic resource metrics, it is susceptible to the problem of 
superficiality. As noted when discussing the problem of expensive tastes6, 
welfarists can argue that resources are merely of instrumental value to the 
realization of other things and that what matters when drawing egalitarian 
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interpersonal comparisons is opportunity for welfare. It is open to them to argue 
that the auction and the envy-test are irrelevant, for although one may not prefer 
another’s resource bundle to their own, one may nevertheless have insufficient 
resources to enjoy equal opportunity for welfare, whilst others in virtue of their 
cheap tastes may have resource holdings surplus to what they require to enjoy 
equal opportunity for welfare. 
Yet, as previously argued, the problem of expensive tastes, particularly in 
the case of Jude, shows equal opportunity for welfare to have counterintuitive 
recommendations. In cases where equal opportunity for welfare is achieved 
consistent with inequality of resources because some, in virtue of their cheap 
tastes, require fewer resources than others for it to obtain, it counterintuitively 
denies those with initially cheap tastes compensation for newly voluntarily 
developed tastes even though compensation would still leave them with fewer 
resources than others because their initial tastes were so cheap. It is unfair to 
deny these people their fair share of resources simply because they voluntarily 
chose to develop a new taste. Equality of resources thus appears not superficial, 
but a requirement of fair distribution. Moreover, as I alluded to previously, the 
relevant intuition rests on compelling reasons as to why people should take 
responsibility for their tastes. These reasons come to the fore in Dworkin’s reply 
to Cohen’s critique of equality of resources.  
 
3. Cohen’s hybrid: equal access to advantage 
3.1. Cohen opts not to embrace equal opportunity for welfare because he thinks 
that ‘some of Dworkin’s objections to equality of welfare cannot be handled in 
G. A. Cohen and What Type of Society We Ought to Seek 68 
Arneson’s way, and that the right response to them is to affirm… equal access to 
advantage, where “advantage” is understood to include, but be wider than, 
welfare’ (Cohen, 2011a, p. 4). The objections to which Cohen here refers relate 
to compensation claims for physical impairments and expensive tastes which he 
maintains both equal opportunity for welfare and equality of resources give 
incorrect answers. Reacting to this, he argues in favor of a hybrid specification of 
equality of opportunity that he thinks answers the relevant compensation claims 
correctly. Since Cohen’s argument for equal access to advantage is reactive, 
taking the form of a critique of equal opportunity for welfare and equality of 
resources, I proceed to evaluate Cohen’s argument for equal access to advantage 
by evaluating his critique of these metrics of egalitarian interpersonal 
comparison. 
 
3.2. Before evaluating equal access to advantage, it is worth explaining why 
Cohen prefers to speak of “access” than of “opportunity,” and why his metric of 
advantage is incredibly vague. This is worth explaining not only for clarity of 
exposition, but because it reveals Cohen’s own dissatisfaction with equal access 
to advantage.  
For Cohen, talk of “access” is preferable to talk of “opportunity” when 
referring to equality. As he sees it, ‘[y]our opportunities are the same whether 
you are strong and clever or weak and stupid: if you are weak and stupid, you 
may not use them well – but that implies that you have them’ (Cohen, 2011a, p. 
14). That thought strikes me as somewhat nonsensical, for it makes little sense to 
say that people born with limited natural ability enjoy the same opportunities as 
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those born with great natural ability. For example, unintelligent people do not 
have, nor do reasonably intelligent people for that matter, the opportunity to 
become a theoretical physicist. For this reason, I think Cohen would have done 
better to name his metric of egalitarian interpersonal comparison equal 
opportunity for advantage. But, of course, this is nothing more than semantics.  
The important point is that Cohen’s preference for “access” is motivated 
by his belief that all involuntary disadvantages should be of egalitarian concern; 
involuntary disadvantage being disadvantage for which the bearer cannot be held 
personally responsible because its source is bad brute luck as opposed to a 
voluntary choice on her part (Cohen, 2011a, p. 13). His preference for “access” 
reflects a concern that talk of “opportunity” may neglect inequalities that result 
from differences in natural ability for which the bearer cannot be held personally 
responsible and which should therefore qualify for compensation. Thus, Cohen is 
a luck egalitarian and equal access to advantage is a radical equality of 
opportunity metric; that is, equal access to advantage seeks to alleviate and/or 
compensate not only for inequalities of opportunity for advantage that result 
from social and economic circumstance, but also for inequalities of opportunity 
for advantage that result from differences in natural ability.  
 What requires greater clarification is Cohen’s metric of advantage. In the 
above quote Cohen says, ‘“advantage” is understood to include, but be wider 
than, welfare.’ That is an extremely vague conceptualization. How is welfare 
specified and what else, other than welfare, qualifies as advantage? Without an 
answer we have little idea as to what equal access to advantage actually 
equalizes. Unfortunately, Cohen provides no satisfactory answer. He avoids 
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adopting a particular specification of welfare; for illustrative purposes only does 
he refer to both hedonist and actual preference-satisfaction specifications. And 
with respect to what, other than welfare, qualifies, Cohen merely says that 
advantage includes ‘both resources and welfare, and perhaps other things too, in 
an open-ended conception’ (Cohen, 2011c, p. 61), and that it should be 
understood as ‘like Sen’s “functioning”…, a heterogeneous collection of 
desirable states of the person reducible neither to his resources bundle nor to his 
welfare level’ (Cohen, 2011b, p. 59). The former conceptualization is again 
incredibly vague, whereas the latter effectively makes equal access to advantage 
susceptible to the very same problems that plague equality of capability.  
If advantage is to be understood as a heterogeneous collection of valuable 
states of the person, then, to compare people’s access to advantage will require 
the creation of an index of those valuable states of the person and their relative 
worth so that an access to advantage score can be summed for each individual 
and compared against the scores of others. Consistent with a subjective theory of 
value the creation of such an index will prove implausible, whilst if the index is 
based on an objective theory of value derived from a perfectionist theory of the 
good-life it will lead to the problem of perfectionism, and if not, then Cohen 
must explain from where the index derives its objective value.7 As Cohen admits 
in the afterword, ‘no method of aggregation of the different types of advantage 
was suggested, or may readily be envisaged, and the very heterogeneity that 
makes counterexamples absorbable also made me, and still makes me, wonder 
whether what I offered is any kind of theory, as opposed to a repository of 
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conditions with which an acceptable theory must come to terms’ (Cohen, 2011c, 
p. 61). Tellingly, he also admits that ‘[i]t remains puzzling that a metric should 
include both resources, out of which people generate welfare, and welfare itself’ 
(Cohen, 2011c, p. 62). 
Clearly, Cohen is not completely satisfied with equal access to advantage. 
It is an incomplete metric which if completed will encounter the same problems 
as Sen’s equality of capability, whilst the need for a hybrid remains puzzling. He 
embraces it because he thinks equal opportunity for welfare and equality of 
resources give incorrect answers to compensation claims for physical 
impairments and expensive tastes. Thus, I now turn to evaluating whether that is 
true, and therefore whether we ought to embrace equal access to advantage. 
 
3.3. As regards compensation claims for physical impairments, Cohen’s critique 
of equal opportunity for welfare is much the same as Sen’s attempt to discredit 
equality of welfare. He asks us to imagine an individual who requires an 
expensive wheelchair to be adequately resourced due to a severe physical 
impairment, but who is nevertheless ‘blessed with abundant opportunity for 
happiness: [because] he need not do much to get a lot of it’ (Cohen, 2011a, p. 
15). If we think that he ought to be compensated for his impairment despite his 
abundant opportunity for happiness, then, equal opportunity for welfare specified 
as happiness appears counterintuitive. 
With respect to Arneson’s equal opportunity for welfare this 
counterexample is in no way problematic, because Arneson specifies welfare not 
as happiness, but as ideal preference-satisfaction; the preferences of Cohen’s 
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impaired individual are given no weight in the counterexample. A Sen inspired 
alteration could be made such that the impaired individual does not suffer from 
inequality of opportunity for welfare specified as actual preference-satisfaction, 
because the individual prefers not to be compensated due to a belief that ‘he will 
be rewarded in the after-life’ or that his impairment is ‘just penalty for misdeeds 
in a past-incarnation.’8 If we think that he nevertheless ought to be compensated, 
then, equal opportunity for welfare specified as actual preference-satisfaction 
appears counterintuitive. But again, Arneson specifies welfare not as actual 
preference-satisfaction, but as ideal preference-satisfaction. As noted previously 
when responding to Sen’s impairment case, Arneson can point out that the 
individual’s actual preferences are likely misinformed. If his preferences were 
ideally considered, that is, if he were ‘to engage in thoroughgoing deliberation 
about [his] preferences with full pertinent information, in a calm mood, while 
thinking clearly and making no reasoning errors,’9 a preference to be adequately 
mobile as opposed to bedridden would likely be amongst them. Thus, Arneson’s 
equal opportunity for welfare recommends allocating the impaired individual the 
expensive wheelchair he requires. I therefore conclude that neither Cohen’s 
counterexample nor the Sen inspired alteration shows Arneson’s equal 
opportunity for welfare to be counterintuitive.10 
 As regards equality of resources, Cohen develops his counterexample so 
that his impaired individual suffers an additional impairment. As Cohen 
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describes him, ‘[t]here is also something wrong with his arms. He is not less able 
to move them than most people are: I shall even assume, to make my point more 
vivid, that he is especially good at moving them. But there is, nevertheless, 
something seriously wrong with them, and it is this: after he moves them, he 
suffers severe pain in his arm muscles’ (Cohen, 2011a, p. 16). This impairment 
qualifies for compensation under equal access to advantage, if the impaired 
individual is not personally responsible for it, and is compensated for by 
supplying him with an expensive pain relieving medicine. Yet, according to 
Cohen, this cannot be thought of as compensating for an inequality of personal 
resources as the impaired individual ‘is especially good at moving’ his arms. On 
the contrary, Cohen believes it must be thought of as compensating for a hedonic 
welfare deficiency for which equality of resources would not compensate. Thus, 
if our intuition is to compensate, equality of resources appears counterintuitive. 
In reply, Dworkin argues that Cohen’s counterexample poses no problem 
for equality of resources. He insists that, ‘[a] pain-producing infirmity is a 
canonical example of a lack of personal resources for which equality of resources 
would, in principle, provide compensation… [I]f the pain that Cohen imagines 
were serious and, as he also imagines, medicine could relieve it, then a 
hypothetical insurance agreement would almost certainly provide funds adequate 
to purchase that medicine’ (Dworkin, 2002, p. 297). In other words, Dworkin is 
adamant that what is being compensated for in Cohen’s counterexample is not 
inequality of opportunity for welfare specified hedonically, but an inequality of 
personal resources that happens to cause pain and which, because equality of 
resources is endowment-insensitive, qualifies for compensation via the 
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hypothetical insurance fund. This fund being the sum of fixed premiums for all 
based on speculations about what the average individual would insure against if 
her susceptibility to physical and/or mental impairment were unknown, and 
which would likely by sufficiently large to provide people such as Cohen’s 
impaired individual with expensive medication.  
Cohen maintains that Dworkin’s reply is ineffective, on grounds that 
‘[y]ou do not turn a welfare consideration into a resource consideration by 
appealing to the fact that the source of the illfare in question is a person’s 
physical constitution’ (Cohen, 2011d, p. 92). But Dworkin is not guilty of such 
trickery. All he need do to escape Cohen’s counterexample is show, as he 
succeeds in doing, that equality of resources would not counterintuitively deny 
compensating the impaired individual. It makes little sense to claim that someone 
who suffers from severe pain following the use of their arms, even if they can 
still use their arms, is not physically impaired. But that is what must be claimed 
for the counterexample to undermine equality of resources. For if an individual 
suffers from a physical and/or mental impairment through no fault of their own, 
then they suffer from an inequality of personal resources through no fault of their 
own, and that is all that need be true for Cohen’s impaired individual to qualify 
for compensation under equality of resources. I therefore conclude that Cohen’s 
counterexample fails to show equality of resources to be counterintuitive.  
 
3.4. As regards compensation claims for expensive tastes and the answers of 
equal opportunity for welfare and equality of resources, Cohen refers to 
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Dworkin’s examples of Louis and Jude.11 To briefly recap: In the former 
example, equality of welfare is achieved consistent with equality of wealth. 
Louis then voluntarily develops an expensive taste for plover’s eggs that he 
cannot satisfy with his current wealth allocation such that he comes to suffer 
from inequality of welfare. To re-establish equality of welfare requires that 
wealth be redistributed from those with cheap tastes to Louis. In the latter 
example, equality of welfare is achieved consistent with inequality of wealth 
because of Jude’s cheap tastes. After reading Hemmingway, Jude then develops 
an expensive taste for bullfighting that he cannot satisfy with his current wealth 
allocation such that he comes to suffer from inequality of welfare. To re-establish 
equality of welfare requires a redistribution of wealth, but not one which 
allocates Jude more wealth than others because his initial tastes were so cheap. If 
we are inclined to compensate Jude but not Louis, because in claiming 
compensation Louis asks for more than his fair share of wealth whereas Jude 
does not, then, our intuitions are supportive of equality of resources.  
 With respect to Louis’ compensation claim, just as equal opportunity for 
welfare denies Louis compensation not because he asks for more than his fair 
share of resources but because he voluntarily developed his expensive taste12, 
equal access to advantage denies Louis compensation because he voluntarily 
developed his expensive taste and because he could unlearn it. As Cohen says, ‘I 
distinguish among expensive tastes according to whether or not their bearer can 
reasonably be held responsible for them. There are those which he could not have 
helped forming and/or could not now unform, and then there are those for which, 
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by contrast, he can be held responsible, because he could have forestalled them 
and/or because he could now unlearn them’ (Cohen, 2011a, p. 21). Thus, Cohen 
argues that we can explain our intuition to deny Louis compensation without 
appealing to fair shares in terms of resources, and that we should reject equality 
of resources because it ‘wrongly refuses compensation for involuntary expensive 
tastes, and [because] it does not refuse compensation for voluntary ones for the 
right reason’ (Cohen, 2011a, p. 21).  
 With respect to Jude’s compensation claim, as noted previously, equal 
opportunity for welfare denies Jude compensation for his expensive taste if he 
developed it voluntarily, whereas equality of resources considers the 
voluntariness of Jude’s expensive taste irrelevant and simply grants him his fair 
share of resources.13 Rejecting both answers, Cohen argues: ‘Pace equality of 
opportunity for welfare, I see no manifest injustice in Jude’s getting the funds he 
needs to travel to Spain [even though he could have forestalled and/or unlearn his 
expensive taste for bullfighting]. He then still has fewer resources than others, 
and only the same welfare, so equality of access to advantage cannot say, on that 
basis, that he is overpaid. But, pace equality of resources, it seems not 
unreasonable to expect Jude to accept some deduction from the normal resource 
stipend because of his fortunate high ability to get welfare out of resources’ 
(Cohen, 2011a, p. 23).  
Cohen’s answer to Jude’s compensation claim reflects his 
conceptualization of advantage. As noted previously, Cohen says that advantage 
includes ‘both resources and welfare, and perhaps other things too, in an open-
                                                 
13 See section 2.2 
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ended conception,’ and that advantage should be understood as ‘a heterogeneous 
collection of desirable states of the person reducible neither to his resources 
bundle nor to his welfare level.’14 Jude therefore enjoys equal access to 
advantage when his access to advantage score, which is the desirable states of the 
person he has access to in light of the sum of his resources, welfare and other 
things, is the same as the access to advantage scores of others. To accurately 
know whether Jude qualifies for compensation under equal access to advantage 
thus requires an index of desirable states of the person and their relative worth; 
otherwise Jude’s access to advantage score cannot be summed and compared 
against the scores of others. Although Cohen provides no such index, he makes a 
rough guess that for Jude to enjoy equal access to advantage the sum of his 
resources and welfare would be consistent with granting him compensation 
whilst denying him equality of resources because of his otherwise cheap tastes. 
Earlier I noted that my intuitions vis-à-vis Jude are supportive of equality 
of resources.15 I said that the voluntariness of Jude’s expensive taste is beside the 
point, and that what matters is that he asks for no more than his fair share of 
resources. I also noted that when returning to the problem of expensive tastes in 
the evaluation of equal access to advantage, it would become evident that 
Dworkin believes the relevant intuition is supported by reasons as to why the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary expensive tastes is unsustainable 
and why compensating for expensive tastes is to treat people as alienated from 
their personalities. These reasons come to the fore in Dworkin’s critique of how 
Cohen and others respond to the problem of expensive tastes, and arguably show 
                                                 
14 See section 3.2 
15 See section 2.2 
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that, even if Cohen were to construct an index of desirable states of the person to 
which people should have equal access without deriving it from a perfectionist 
theory of the good-life, that is, the problem of indexing and the problem of 
perfectionism aside, we ought not to embrace equal access to advantage. 
Dworkin argues, rightly in my view, that the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary expensive tastes, to which both equal opportunity for 
welfare and equal access to advantage appeal in response to the problem of 
expensive tastes, is unsustainable. This is because our tastes are the product of 
background tastes that are constitutive of our un-chosen personalities. Cohen’s 
illustrative example of an involuntary expensive taste is that of Paul the 
photographer (Cohen, 2011a, pp. 20-21). Paul does not choose to develop a 
liking for photography; it just so happens that he gains preference-satisfaction 
from it yet cannot afford to pursue it as a hobby. He therefore suffers from 
unequal access to advantage and, unlike Louis who voluntarily developed his 
expensive taste, qualifies for compensation. But, so Dworkin argues, Louis 
developed his expensive taste because it seemed appropriate given his wealthy 
upbringing; it is a consequence of background tastes that are constitutive of his 
un-chosen personality. Therefore, Louis’ expensive taste for plover’s eggs ‘is no 
more “traceable” to choice than the photographer’s taste for photography’ 
(Dworkin, 2002, p. 289). As the distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
expensive tastes is unsustainable, Cohen cannot explain his refusal to 
compensate Louis by appeal to it.  
How might equal access to advantage be revised in light of the un-
sustainability of the distinction between voluntary and involuntary expensive 
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tastes? As noted in the second paragraph of this sub-section, Cohen distinguishes 
between expensive tastes which people could not have helped forming and/or 
could not unlearn (and which therefore qualify for compensation because the 
bearer cannot be held personally responsible for any relative disadvantage they 
incur) and expensive tastes which people could have forestalled and/or could 
unlearn (and which therefore do not qualify for compensation because the bearer 
can be held personally responsible for any relative disadvantage they incur). This 
distinction is not completely undone by the un-sustainability of the distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary expensive tastes. Despite all expensive tastes 
being involuntary, there remains Cohen’s distinction between those which can 
and cannot be unlearnt. If Louis’ expensive taste for plover’s eggs can be 
unlearnt whereas Paul’s expensive taste for photography cannot, it is open to 
Cohen to deny Louis compensation but grant Paul compensation for that reason. 
It is important to note, however, that Cohen later revises his view by 
drawing a distinction between brute and judgmental tastes. Whereas judgmental 
tastes reflect one’s value judgments, brute tastes do not. As regards expensive 
judgmental tastes, Cohen later reports: ‘I no longer think that the mere fact that 
people chose to develop and/or could now school themselves out of an expensive 
judgmental taste means that they should pick up the tab for it, and that is 
precisely because they did and do identify with it, and therefore cannot 
reasonably be expected to have not developed it or to rid themselves of it’ 
(Cohen, 2011d, p. 88). He therefore revises the relevant distinction so that it 
distinguishes between expensive tastes which people ‘could not have helped 
forming and/or could not now unform without violating their own judgment, and 
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then there are those for whose cost, by contrast, they can be held responsible, 
because they could have forestalled their development, and/or because they could 
now quite readily unlearn them, without violating their own judgment’ (Cohen, 
2011d, p. 88, emphasis added). Revising that distinction once again, in light of 
the un-sustainability of the distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
expensive tastes, there remains a distinction between expensive tastes which 
people cannot unlearn without violating their valuational judgments, and 
expensive tastes which people can unlearn without violating their valuational 
judgments. Thus, if Louis’ expensive taste for plover’s eggs can be unlearnt 
without violating his valuational judgments whereas Paul’s expensive taste for 
photography cannot, it is open to Cohen to deny Louis compensation but grant 
Paul compensation for that reason. 
In addition to the un-sustainability of the distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary expensive tastes, Dworkin argues that we should deny 
compensation for expensive tastes not only because of the counterintuitive 
implications already mentioned, but because to not hold people responsible for 
their personalities and by extension for their tastes would be contrary to our 
everyday ethics. Whenever we make decisions that affect the course of our lives, 
our personalities, to a greater or lesser extent, influence the decisions we make. 
Yet we do not consider the decisions we make to be a matter of brute luck. That, 
as Dworkin says, ‘would be to treat ourselves as dissociated from our 
personalities rather than identified with them… It would be bizarre for someone 
to say that he should be pitied, or compensated by his fellow citizens, because he 
had the bad luck to have decided that he should help his friends in need, or that 
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Mozart is more intriguing than hip-hop, or that a life well lived includes foreign 
travel’ (Dworkin, 2002, p. 290).16 
Cohen finds Dworkin’s alienation argument ‘entirely unpersuasive, since 
the relevant bad luck does not lie in the mere having of the preference… [On the 
contrary,] the person regards the relevant taste as bad luck only in light of its 
price. And people can certainly without any self-misrepresentation or 
incoherence ask for compensation for (what might be, in every relevant sense) 
the circumstance that their taste is expensive’ (Cohen, 2011d, p. 93). For 
example, ‘[i]t might indeed be absurd for Mozart-lovers to regard their love for 
Mozart as itself bad luck. But there is nothing absurd, there is no dissociation 
from their own personality, when they express regret that Mozart CDs are more 
expensive than Madonna CDs’ (Cohen, 2011d, p. 94).  
Cohen is right, except where one’s tastes are merely for expensive things, 
that the relevant bad luck lies not in one’s having the preference but in the 
circumstance that her preference is priced expensively by the market. However, 
Dworkin’s alienation argument can be interpreted such that it is not undermined 
by appeal to this truth. Clayton (2000) and Williams (2002) both interpret 
Dworkin’s alienation argument in terms of an endorsement test, whereby if one 
endorses her tastes because she deems them to be constitutive of a valuable life, 
then she ought to bear the costs of those tastes. Williams refers to it as the 
continuity test, as it effectively insists on continuity ‘between ethical judgments 
about what makes one’s life go well and distributive judgments about the 
existence of inequality’ (Williams, 2002, p. 387). For example, if Paul believes 
                                                 
16 Similarly, Rawls argues that to compensate for expensive tastes is to ‘presuppose that citizens’ 
preferences are beyond their control…, [and to regard them] as passive carries of desires’ (Rawls, 
1982, p. 169). 
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that a valuable life involves the expensive pursuit of photography, such that he is 
unwilling to switch places with Fred who believes that a valuable life involves 
the cheap pursuit of fishing, then, no relevant inequality obtains despite Fred’s 
greater opportunity for preference-satisfaction. To claim otherwise, so the 
continuity test holds, would be discontinuous with Paul’s judgments as to what 
makes for a valuable life.17 
In reply to Clayton and Williams, Cohen interprets the continuity test as 
requiring that one must consider her life all things considered worse than those of 
relevant others for an unjust inequality to obtain. Accordingly, so Cohen argues, 
it is inconsistent with equality of resources because Dworkin does not require 
that condition to be satisfied for an unjust inequality of resources to obtain; a 
claimant need not consider her life all things considered worse than those of 
relevant others to be granted compensation from the hypothetical insurance fund. 
Why, then, should the continuity test be satisfied before compensating for 
unequal access to advantage? As Cohen argues, ‘Dworkin has no monopoly on 
the idea that you can be worse off precisely in the justice-sensitive respect 
without thinking yourself worse off tout court’  (Cohen, 2011d, p. 114). 
But, Cohen’s reply to Clayton and Williams oversimplifies the continuity 
test. It does not require that one must consider her life all things considered 
worse than those of relevant others for an unjust inequality to obtain. Rather, the 
continuity test requires that one must believe that the opportunities of relevant 
others are more valuable than her own for an unjust inequality to obtain; it 
requires that one must be able to claim in good-faith that relevant others are 
                                                 
17 Dworkin himself presses a challenge to Cohen’s bad price luck argument which appears to 
mirror the continuity test (Dworkin, 2004, p. 345). 
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better off in terms of opportunities consistent with the claimant’s beliefs as to 
what makes for a valuable life.  
To illustrate, if Paul believes that one’s life has more value the greater 
one’s opportunities to satisfy her subjective preferences, then, Paul can claim in 
good-faith that he is relatively disadvantaged compared to Fred in virtue of his 
bad price luck. His claim for compensation would then pass the continuity test 
because his beliefs as to what makes for a valuable life would be continuous with 
judgments about the existence of inequality. But, as will often be true, Paul might 
not believe that one’s life has more value the greater one’s opportunities to 
satisfy her subjective preferences. For example, he might instead believe that 
one’s life has more value the greater one’s opportunities to pursue photography 
but reject the idea that fishing is in any way constitutive of a valuable life. If this 
variant of Paul were to claim compensation his claim would fail the continuity 
test, because his claim to be relatively disadvantaged would be discontinuous 
with his judgments about what makes for a valuable life; Paul cannot claim in 
good-faith that Fred is better off in terms of opportunities consistent with his 
beliefs as to what makes for a valuable life.  
The revised version of equal access to advantage developed in light of the 
un-sustainability of the distinction between voluntary and involuntary expensive 
tastes, compensates for expensive tastes that people cannot unlearn without 
violating their valuational judgments, regardless of whether the bearer considers 
herself relevantly worse off. Thus, although Cohen is right that there is nothing 
absurd, that there is no dissociation from one’s personality, when one expresses 
regret that her taste is expensive, it is absurd to compensate one for her expensive 
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taste if she does not, as a result, consider herself worse off in terms of 
opportunities to pursue that which she deems constitutive of a valuable life. Why 
should we compensate one for bad price luck when she does not consider herself 
relevantly worse off as a result? Without a satisfactory answer to that question, 
equal access to advantage remains susceptible to the problem of expensive tastes.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In summary, then, equal access to advantage is susceptible to a variety of 
problems that give us reason not to embrace it as the appropriate metric of 
egalitarian interpersonal comparison. As regards the problem of indexing, 
because Cohen specifies advantage as some set of desirable states of the person 
that one has access to in light of her resources, welfare and perhaps other things, 
the ability to draw interpersonal comparisons requires the creation of an index of 
those valuable states of the person and their relative worth so that each person’s 
access to advantage score can be summed and compared against the scores of 
others. Consistent with a subjective theory of value this will prove difficult, as 
the number of valuable states of the person will be extensive whilst their value 
will differ, sometimes greatly, between individuals. Add to this the fact that 
acquiring the necessary information with respect to people’s value judgments is 
unfeasible, and a subjective index version of equal access to advantage is 
implausible. If, on the other hand, the index is based on an objective theory of 
value derived from a perfectionist theory of the good-life, equal access to 
advantage becomes susceptible to the problem of perfectionism: equalizing 
access to a list of states of the person whose value is derived from a perfectionist 
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theory of the good-life conflicts with justificatory neutrality, because the list of 
states of the person to which access is being equalized cannot be justified over an 
alternative list without appeal to the relevant perfectionist theory. Those who 
favor an objective list version of equal access to advantage, but who also believe 
the state ought not act in order to help some ways of life over others, must 
therefore provide a non-perfectionist explanation of from where their objective 
list derives its value. Absent a satisfactory explanation equal access to advantage 
remains susceptible to the problem of indexing. 
 As regards the problem of expensive tastes, we saw that in cases where 
equal opportunity for welfare is achieved consistent with inequality of resources, 
because Jude, in virtue of his cheap tastes, requires fewer resources than others 
for it to obtain, equal opportunity for welfare counterintuitively denies Jude 
compensation for his new voluntarily developed expensive taste, even though 
compensation would still leave him with fewer resources than others because his 
initial tastes were so cheaply satisfied. To know whether Jude qualifies for 
compensation under equal access to advantage requires a solution to the problem 
of indexing; otherwise Jude’s access to advantage score cannot be summed and 
compared against the scores of others. Cohen compensates Jude only because he 
makes a rough guess that for Jude to enjoy equal access to advantage the sum of 
his resources and welfare (and perhaps other things) would be consistent with 
granting him compensation for his new voluntarily developed expensive taste 
whilst denying him equality of resources because of his otherwise cheap tastes.  
As it shows equal opportunity for welfare to have implausible 
implications, whilst again highlighting the problem of indexing for equal access 
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to advantage, the case of Jude is another point against embracing equal access to 
advantage; it supports a distributive principle that grants people their fair share of 
resources, as opposed to one that compensates for expensive tastes in seeking to 
realize equal opportunity for welfare or a resource-welfare hybrid such as 
advantage. The appeal of the continuity test further strengthens the argument in 
favor of denying compensation for expensive tastes, at least in most cases. For 
although Cohen is right that the bearer of an expensive taste suffers from bad 
price luck, as opposed to bad preference luck, this fact alone is insufficient 
reason to compensate for expensive tastes. It ought additionally to be true that the 
bearer of an expensive taste is able to claim in good-faith, as a consequence of 
her bad price luck, that others are better off in terms of opportunities consistent 
with her beliefs as to what makes for a valuable life. Otherwise, we somewhat 
absurdly compensate people for expensive tastes even when they do not consider 
themselves relevantly worse off as a result. That equal access to advantage 
compensates for expensive tastes (when the claimant’s access to advantage score 
is not equal to that of others) regardless of whether the bearer’s claim to 
compensation passes the continuity test, is yet another reason, in addition to the 
problem of indexing and the related problem of perfectionism, as to why we 
ought not to embrace equal access to advantage.  
With respect to my aim of clarifying and evaluating Cohen’s positive 
contribution to the question of what type of society we ought to seek, this chapter 
has served to clarify and evaluate the first view I identify with his positive 
contribution; namely, that the appropriate metric of egalitarian interpersonal 
comparison is equal access to advantage. In evaluating this view, I have argued 
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that the appropriate metric of egalitarian interpersonal comparison is not equal 
access to advantage, but rather an alternative luck egalitarian principle of 
equality of opportunity where opportunities are specified in terms of resources. 
For reasons not discussed in this chapter, however, I do not fully embrace 
Dworkin’s equality of resources, because whereas he is a deontic egalitarian, and 
not therefore committed to the claim that equality has non-instrumental value, I 
argue in Chapter 3 that a luck egalitarian social state of affairs has non-
instrumental value (in addition to instrumental value).18 Moreover, in Chapter 4 I 
argue that luck egalitarianism ought to be constrained by a sufficiency 
qualification. Before making these arguments, however, I now turn to clarifying 
and evaluating the second view I identify with Cohen’s positive contribution to 
the question of what type of society we ought to seek. 
 
                                                 
18 See Chapter 3, section 3 
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Chapter 2 
The Egalitarian-Paretian Ethos  
 
1. Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is the second view I indentify with Cohen’s positive 
contribution to the question of what type of society we ought to seek. This view 
is that, in principle, equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of 
occupational choice are co-obtainable when people’s occupational choices are 
informed by a commitment to equality of opportunity in combination with a 
commitment to produce Pareto-efficiently both in terms of productive capacity 
and occupational choice.  
Evidence of how Cohen understands the relationship between equality of 
opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of occupational choice, in principle, 
is to be found in Rescuing Part I. As part of his attempt to rescue equality from 
Rawls, or, to be more accurate, from the incentives argument for inequality 
which is commonly viewed as consistent with the difference principle, Cohen 
presses the claim, which operates at the level of fundamental principles and so 
abstracts from social facts, that equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency are 
co-obtainable if and when the productively talented voluntarily choose to work at 
their upmost capacity for reward consistent with equality of opportunity. The 
freedom objection to this claim is that, even granting its truth, Cohen must 
nevertheless solve the equality-Pareto-freedom trilemma:  
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The equality-Pareto-freedom trilemma: Any two of equality of 
opportunity (however specified1), Pareto-efficiency and freedom of 
occupational choice may co-obtain, but all three cannot, as to fill 
occupations Pareto-efficiently whilst realizing equality of opportunity 
would require forcing people who prefer different occupations for reward 
consistent with equality of opportunity to fill those occupations on which 
the realization of Pareto-efficiency depends; note that, absent freedom of 
occupational choice, for equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency to 
co-obtain it still requires people to produce Pareto-efficiently, but that it 
leaves open the possibility of forcing them to. 
 
In response to the trilemma Cohen offers the ethical solution: 
 
The ethical solution: Equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and 
freedom of occupational choice are co-obtainable when occupational 
choice is informed by a commitment to equality of opportunity in 
combination with a commitment to produce Pareto-efficiently whether in 
terms of productive capacity or occupational choice (the egalitarian-
Paretian ethos). 
 
In principle, then, Cohen maintains that equality of opportunity, Pareto-
efficiency and freedom of occupational choice are co-obtainable when the 
choices of the productively talented are informed by the egalitarian-Paretian 
                                                 
1 Cohen’s critique leaves ‘opportunity’ unspecified; he says that the “equality of what?” question 
does not matter because the argument he targets ‘is for inequality no matter what conception of 
equality is embraced’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 94, n. 21). 
G. A. Cohen and What Type of Society We Ought to Seek 90 
ethos. As my concern is with what type of society we ought to seek, I am more 
concerned with what we ought to do in practice than with what is possible in 
principle. I therefore evaluate whether the ethical solution succeeds not only 
when we abstract from social facts, but also when we recognize those social facts 
that are particularly relevant.  
As Cohen allows for a prerogative to pursue self-interest to a reasonable 
extent, which effectively allows many to depart from the egalitarian-Paretian 
ethos on which the ethical solution relies, I argue that the ethical solution 
succeeds only if either (i) we deny the prerogative or (ii) people do not exercise it 
with respect to occupational choice. Cohen is against (i) and so, on his view, the 
ethical solution succeeds only if (ii). But the probability that (ii) will not occur, 
that many will exercise their prerogative with respect to their choices about how 
hard to work and what occupations to fill, has the consequence that we must 
choose between either the sacrificing or compromising of equality of 
opportunity, Pareto-efficiency, or freedom of occupational choice. 
Although the failure of the ethical solution in practice is no critique of 
Cohen, because he intends it to operate at the level of fundamental principles 
where we abstract from social facts, it is important to clarify that, in practice, the 
type of society we ought to seek when taking into account considerations 
pertaining to equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of 
occupational choice does require either the denial of freedom of occupational 
choice, which virtually nobody would endorse2, or one of equality of opportunity 
or Pareto-efficiency to be sacrificed or compromised. With this clarification 
                                                 
2 Cohen labels the denial of freedom of occupational choice ‘Stalinist’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 186). 
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made we are better placed to understand why Cohen ultimately concedes that the 
state should often compromise equality of opportunity in the name realizing 
Pareto-efficiency; the third view I indentify as part of his positive contribution to 
the question of what type of society we ought to seek, and the subject of Chapter 
3. 
Despite my concerns being largely practical I additionally note that even 
at the level of fundamental principle, the success of the ethical solution depends 
on whether the egalitarian-Paretian ethos is a requirement of distributive justice 
and on how we conceptualize freedom. For as Paula Casal argues, on a positive 
conception of freedom, where freedom of occupational choice requires an 
adequate range of acceptable options, and the egalitarian-Paretian ethos is, as 
Cohen argues, a requirement of distributive justice, the ethical solution fails 
because one is not relevantly free when their occupational choices are limited to 
two options and one of them is unjust. 
 
2. The background 
2.1. The equality-Pareto-freedom trilemma comes in to view following Cohen’s 
attempt to rescue equality from Rawls, with his proposed solution drawing on 
claims made therein. As such, clarification of the relevant claims is required prior 
to my pursuit of the above advertised argument. That is the aim of this section. It 
is not my intention to provide a summary of Cohen’s critique that accounts for all 
of its particular nuances, nor, as noted in the Introduction, is it my intention to 
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assess its validity with respect to Rawls3; I seek only to clarify that which 
requires clarification as regards my subject matter. 
 
2.2. Cohen’s attempt to rescue equality from Rawls in Rescuing Part I is 
primarily devoted to challenging the incentives argument for inequality as a 
claim about distributive justice. 
 
The incentives argument 
1. Inequalities are unjust unless they are necessary to make the 
worst off people better off, in which case they are just. 
2. Unequalizing incentive payments to productive people are 
necessary to make the worst off people better off. 
3. Therefore, unequalizing incentive payments are just. 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 19) 
 
Cohen views his critique of the incentives argument as an attempt to 
rescue equality from Rawls because the difference principle is commonly 
interpreted as permitting unequalising incentive payments. According to the 
difference principle, after the lexically prior principles of equal basic liberties 
and fair equality of opportunity have been secured, distributive justice requires 
that ‘social and economic inequalities… be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society’ (Rawls, 2001, pp. 42-43). The difference 
principle therefore mirrors premise 1 of the incentives argument to the extent that 
                                                 
3 See Introduction, section 4.3 
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both view the justice of an inequality as being dependent on it benefiting the 
worst-off; although the difference principle is more demanding in that the justice 
of an inequality is dependent not only on it benefiting the worst-off but on it 
being to their greatest benefit. That stricter condition aside, if unequalising 
incentive payments to ‘the talented’4 are necessary to benefit the worst-off, the 
difference principle is commonly thought to permit unequalising incentive 
payments. 
The reasoning behind premise 2 of the incentives argument is that large 
rewards motivate the talented to produce more than they otherwise would, thus 
unequalising incentive payments to the talented result in a greater sum total of 
resources, which allows for greater absolute amounts to be distributed to the 
worst-off. Hence, unequalising incentive payments to the talented are necessary 
to make the worst-off better off (premise 2). Cohen’s initial strategy is not to 
reject that reasoning per se, but to argue that unequalising incentive payments are 
necessary only because the talented make them necessary, and moreover, that 
they would struggle to justify making them necessary to the worst-off. 
 The talented make it true that large rewards motivate them to produce at 
their upmost capacity, Cohen argues, because of a disposition not to work at their 
upmost capacity unless they receive large rewards. Thus, unequalising incentive 
payments are not strictly necessary to improve the situation of the worst-off, 
because their necessity is merely a consequence of the talented choosing to vary 
their productivity relative to their reward (Cohen, 2008, pp. 48-51). This claim, 
however, rests on a psychological assumption. For as Cohen notes, Samuel 
                                                 
4 Understood merely as those whose abilities are valued by the market and on whose labor the 
realization of Pareto-efficiency is dependent. 
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Scheffler put it to him that unequalising incentive payments ‘might elicit motives 
that could not “be summoned at will,” that nothing else would induce, and that 
would enable agents to perform better than they otherwise could’ (Cohen, 2008, 
p. 52). Despite this possibility, Cohen believes that people do possess free will to 
an extent that the relevant disposition is what makes unequalising incentive 
payments necessary to improve the situation of the worst-off (Cohen, 2008, pp. 
52-53). 
The talented would struggle to justify making unequalising incentive 
payments necessary, so Cohen argues, because absent controversial appeals to 
entitlement and desert5 the sort of justifications they might offer would fail the 
interpersonal test. According to the interpersonal test, if the person or group to 
whom a justificatory argument is presented can offer a valid rejection, then the 
argument fails to justify the actions, or intended actions, of the person or group 
presenting the argument (Cohen, 2008, p. 42).6 
To illustrate, Cohen imagines that the large rewards enjoyed by the 
talented have been reduced due to a rise in the top rate of income tax from 40 to 
60 percent.7 Against this tax rise the talented say to the worst-off: “Public policy 
should make the worst off people (in this case, as it happens, you) better off. If 
the top tax goes up to 60 percent, we shall work less hard, and, as a result, the 
position of the poor (your position) will be worse. So the top tax on our income 
should not be raised to 60 percent” (Cohen, 2008, p. 59). To that, the worst-off 
can reply: “Given that you would still be much better off than we are if you 
                                                 
5 Their controversial nature having to do with the fact that people’s circumstances are always, in 
part, a matter of brute luck. 
6 As regards the interpersonal test and justificatory community, see Chapter 4, section 2.4. 
7 The reverse of Nigel Lawson’s 1988 income tax cut to which Cohen refers in Rescuing Chapter 
1. 
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worked as you do now at the 60 percent tax, what justifies your intention to work 
less if the tax rises to that level?” (Cohen, 2008, p. 60). Absent controversial 
appeals to entitlement and desert the talented appear unable to answer that 
question. They cannot answer with premise 2 of the incentives argument; they 
cannot claim that large rewards are necessary to make the worst-off better off, 
because it is merely their disposition to vary their productivity relative to their 
reward that makes it necessary. Thus, if Cohen is right that premise 2 of the 
incentives argument is true only because the talented make it so, the incentives 
argument fails the interpersonal test when offered as a justificatory argument by 
the talented to the worst-off. 
Considering alternative justificatory arguments the talented might put to 
the worst-off, Cohen ponders, again as a result of comments from Scheffler, 
whether they might argue that, ‘only an extreme moral rigorist could deny that 
every person has a right to pursue self-interest to some reasonable extent (even 
when that makes things worse than they need be for badly off people)’ (Cohen, 
2008, p. 61).8 According to Cohen, denial of this personal prerogative would be 
tantamount to viewing people as ‘nothing but slaves to social justice’ (Cohen, 
2008, p. 10). Hence, he embraces it as a caveat. He does not consider it to 
undermine his critique, as in making it true that unequalising incentive payments 
are necessary to improve the situation of the worst-off, he believes the talented 
exceed its reasonability threshold. Rather than pursuing self-interest to a 
reasonable extent, he believes the talented are guilty of pursuing self-interest to 
an unreasonable extent (Cohen, 2008, pp. 61-62). 
                                                 
8 The italicized principle affirms Scheffler’s ‘agent-centered prerogative.’ See Scheffler, 1985, p. 
418. 
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The personal prerogative: every person has a right to pursue self-interest 
to some reasonable extent (even when that makes things worse than they 
need be for badly off people).  
 
As regards Rawls, what matters is the claim that the talented make 
premise 2 of the incentives argument true. If unequalising incentive payments to 
the talented are not strictly necessary to improve the situation of the worst-off, 
then premise 2 is false and the incentives argument collapses. A great deal 
depends, however, on how we interpret the necessity condition of the incentives 
argument, which, Cohen views as also being implied by the difference principle. 
If we interpret ‘necessity’ as intention-independent and unequalising incentive 
payments are necessary to improve the situation of the worst-off only because of 
the talented’s intention to vary their productivity relative to their reward, then, 
the difference principle does not permit unequalising incentive payments; Cohen 
calls this ‘the strict difference principle.’ If, however, we interpret ‘necessity’ as 
being intention-relative, then, despite unequalising incentive payments not being 
strictly necessary to benefit the worst-off, the difference principle permits 
unequalising incentive payments; Cohen calls this ‘the lax difference principle’ 
(Cohen, 2008, pp. 68-69).  
Cohen believes there is evidence in support of both the strict and lax 
interpretations of the difference principle in Rawls’s writings. However, he 
maintains that if ‘people in the society it governs… are concerned to ensure that 
their own conduct is just in the sense defined by the principle, then what they 
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comply with is the principle in its strict interpretation’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 69). In 
other words, if people truly believe in the difference principle, then when 
relevant, their choices will be informed by a belief that social and economic 
inequality is just only when it is to the greatest benefit of the worst-off. As such, 
if the choices of the talented are informed by a belief in the difference principle, 
and there is a feasible distribution that is of greater benefit to the worst-off than 
that which results from unequalising incentive payments, the talented would 
choose not to make unequalising incentive payments necessary. 
 
2.3. Is there a feasible distribution that benefits the worst-off to a greater extent 
than that which results from unequalising incentive payments? Cohen’s answer 
to this question is evident in his critique of the Pareto argument.9 The following 
breakdown is consistent with Cohen’s explanation of it. 
 
The Pareto argument: 
1. Equality of opportunity requires the elimination of all morally 
arbitrary inequalities such that differences of outcome do not reflect 
differences of natural endowment and/or socio-economic 
circumstance, but only differences of taste and/or choice. 
2. Equality of opportunity is prima facie just. 
3. Inequalities of opportunity may nevertheless be just in virtue of their 
consequences. 
                                                 
9 This argument is Brian Barry’s reconstruction of Rawls’s argument for the difference principle. 
See Barry, 1989, pp. 213-234 
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4. Inequalities of opportunity are just when they result in a strong 
Pareto-improvement.10 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 89) 
 
The Pareto argument is clearly not Rawls’s official argument for the 
difference principle, as in omitting the original position it fails to capture his 
contractualism. Rather than think inequality of opportunity is distributively just 
simply because it results in a strong Pareto-improvement on equality, Rawls 
thinks it distributively just when and because it is sanctioned by the worst-off. As 
he says in Restatement, ‘[t]he parties would accept inequalities… when these 
work effectively to improve everyone’s situation starting from an equal division. 
This suggests the difference principle: taking equal division as the benchmark, 
those who gain more are to do so only on terms acceptable to those who gain 
less, and in particular those who gain least’ (Rawls, 2001, p. 123).11 Furthermore, 
because it requires that ‘social and economic inequalities… be to the greatest 
benefit of the least-advantaged members of society’ (Rawls, 2001, pp. 42-43), 
the difference principle picks out a particular Pareto-improvement from the set of 
feasible distributions. For example, if we start at (i) 10, 10, and the feasible 
alternatives are (ii) 11, 15, and (iii) 12, 14, both of the feasible alternatives 
represent strong Pareto-improvements on (i), but, all else being equal12, the 
                                                 
10 A strong Pareto-improvement occurs when a distributive move makes everyone better off. A 
weak Pareto-improvement occurs when a distributive move makes at least one individual better 
off but no individual worse off. 
11 The same explanation appears in the revised edition of Theory (Rawls, 1999, p. 131). 
12 The difference principle does not require continual economic growth, and so acting 
consistently with it does not always require the state to select the distribution from the feasible set 
that is to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. See Chapter 3, section 2.3 
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difference principle says that justice requires a move to (iii), because (iii) is to 
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. 
Cohen recognizes that the Pareto argument is not Rawls’s official 
argument for the difference principle, but nevertheless sees it as warranting 
critique as it ‘advance[s] the Rawlsian purpose… to reconcile certain inequalities 
with justice’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 88). Cohen says that the essence of his objection to 
the Pareto argument, ‘is that consistent adherence to the rationale of its first 
move puts its second move in question: …that anyone who believes that, because 
the possible sources of inequality are morally arbitrary, an initial equality [of 
opportunity] is prima facie just has no reason to believe that the recommended 
Pareto improvement preserves justice, even if that improvement should be 
accepted on other grounds’ (Cohen, 2008, pp. 89-90). In other words, Cohen 
rejects the idea that inequalities of opportunity deemed prima facie unjust can 
subsequently be deemed just simply because they happen to benefit the worst-
off; such inequalities of opportunity might be desirable all things considered, but 
they nevertheless remain unjust because of their moral arbitrary source.  
What is most relevant as regards the trilemma, however, is a claim made 
in his critique of the Pareto argument that serves to answer the question raised 
four paragraphs back; namely, is there a feasible distribution that benefits the 
worst-off to a greater extent than that which results from unequalising incentive 
payments? Cohen claims that if a strongly Pareto-superior but unequal alternative 
to equality of opportunity is feasible because of unequalising incentive payments, 
then so too is a strongly Pareto-superior alternative that preserves equality of 
opportunity and benefits the worst-off to a greater extent. 
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To illustrate, let us imagine the distribution which the Pareto argument 
takes as the starting point in the search for distributive justice, namely, a 
distribution that is consistent with equality of opportunity. For simplicity of 
argument, let us further imagine that the society in question consists of only two 
people, A and B, who happen to share the exact same tastes and/or choices so that 
in this instance equality of opportunity results in equality of outcome (e.g., D1: A 
5, B 5). However, A happens to be naturally endowed with greater productive 
talent than B. Thus, so advocates of the incentives argument would press, a 
strong Pareto-improvement on equality of opportunity is feasible when 
unequalising incentive payments are made to A; rather than dividing the sum 
total of social product equally, allowing A to retain a larger share would motivate 
her to produce more than she otherwise would (e.g., 4 extra units), thus resulting 
in a greater sum total that in turn allows for greater absolute amounts to be 
distributed to B (e.g., D2: A 8, B 6). But, so Cohen would argue, if A were to 
produce at her upmost capacity for equal reward, that is, whilst still dividing the 
sum total of social product equally with B, a strong Pareto-improvement on D1 
that achieves the same sum total as D2, but which preserves the equality of 
opportunity of D1 and benefits the worst-off to a greater extent than D2, is also 
feasible (e.g., D3: A 7, B 7).13 
 This claim is most relevant as regards the trilemma because it holds, prior 
to freedom of occupational choice being brought into play, that equality of 
opportunity and Pareto-efficiency are co-obtainable; they are co-obtainable when 
the talented produce at their upmost capacity for reward consistent with equality 
                                                 
13 For Cohen’s more complex wage rate illustration, see Cohen, 2008, pp. 97-101. 
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of opportunity. As with his critique of the incentives argument, this claim is also 
susceptible to Scheffler’s thought that unequalising incentive payments might 
motivate people to an extent that free will cannot, such that the co-obtaining of 
equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency is unfeasible. Yet, as noted 
previously, Cohen believes people do possess free will to the required extent.  
What Cohen is willing to concede, is that the realization of Pareto-
efficiency may require the talented to undertake labor that is sufficiently 
burdensome to justify allocating them greater rewards. When that is the case, 
Cohen considers the appropriate level of greater reward to be compensatory, so 
that once labor burden is factored into the metric of egalitarian interpersonal 
comparison no inequality obtains. In what he calls ‘the standard case,’ however, 
the realization of Pareto-efficiency does not require the talented to undertake 
especially burdensome labor. Rather, Cohen thinks their labor tends to be more 
pleasant than that of others. In the standard case, then, Cohen is adamant that 
‘there is no reason for an egalitarian to regard D2 as acceptable, and every 
reason for him to recommend D3’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 105). 
 
2.4. Cohen seeks a fatal blow against Rawls’s apparent endorsement of the 
incentives argument by moving to argue that distributive justice requires not only 
coercive rules but also an ethos of distributive justice that informs people’s 
choices within those rules. If that is true, then even accepting the difference 
principle as a principle of distributive justice (which, in light of his parameters 
for fundamental principles of justice, Cohen does not14), it would fail to permit 
                                                 
14 See Introduction, sections 2.2 and 4.3 
G. A. Cohen and What Type of Society We Ought to Seek 102 
unequalising incentive payments because distributive justice would then require 
the talented to practice the strict difference principle. It would require that the 
talented, whose relevant choices would be informed by an ethos whose content 
reflects justice as fairness (Rawls’s principles of justice), refrain from making 
the receipt of unequalising incentive payments necessary to benefit the worst-off 
when the resulting distribution is not that from the feasible set which is to their 
greatest benefit. For if they were to choose otherwise, they would be making a 
choice contrary to what the difference principle informs them.  
At this point, an important clarification should be made. To act 
consistently with a belief that distributive justice requires social and economic 
inequality to be to the greatest benefit of the worst-off, does not require one to 
produce at their upmost capacity for reward consistent with equality of 
opportunity. To see this, imagine that unequalising incentive payments are 
offered to the talented. Acting in accordance with the strict difference principle, 
the talented refuse the offered incentives in favor of reward consistent with 
equality of opportunity. But, rather than produce at their upmost capacity, the 
talented choose to produce at a more relaxed pace for no reason other than a 
preference for a more relaxed working life. As a consequence, the realized sum 
total of social product is Pareto-inefficient; we might imagine that the above D1 
is realized instead of D3. Nothing about the talented’s behavior here contradicts a 
belief that distributive justice requires social and economic inequality to be to the 
greatest benefit of the worst-off, as they are not guilty of creating any such 
inequality. For their behavior to be contradictory the talented would have to 
believe in a duty to produce Pareto-efficiently. Whether Cohen incorrectly thinks 
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that the strict difference principle implies such duty is unclear. What is clear, 
however, and as shall become evident later, is that the content of the ethos of 
distributive justice on which Cohen’s proposed solution to the trilemma relies 
does include a belief in a duty to produce Pareto-efficiently. 
To any suggestion that justice as fairness should inform people’s choices 
within coercive rules, Rawlsians will likely press the basic structure objection. 
According to the basic structure objection, the choices people make within the 
coercive structure, including those that are not to the greatest benefit of the 
worst-off, are irrelevant from the perspective of justice as fairness, because they 
occur within and do not determine the basic structure of society (Cohen, 2008, p. 
124). 
According to Rawls, the basic structure, understood as society’s political 
constitution and its principal social and economic arrangements, is the primary 
subject of justice: 
 
The basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its 
effects are so profound and present from the start. The intuitive 
notion here is that this structure contains various social positions 
and that men born into different positions have different 
expectations of life determined, in part, by the political system as 
well as by economic and social circumstances. In this way the 
institutions of society favor certain starting places over others. 
These are especially deep inequalities. Not only are they 
pervasive, but they affect men’s initial chances in life; yet they 
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cannot possibly be justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or 
desert. It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic 
structure of any society, to which the principles of social justice 
must in the first instance apply. These principles, then, regulate 
the choice of a political constitution and the main elements of the 
economic and social system. 
(Rawls, 1999, p. 6) 
 
Despite the qualifications ‘primary subject’ and ‘first instance’ appearing 
to suggest that justice as fairness might apply beyond the basic structure, this 
passage is commonly interpreted as evidence for its principles solely regulating 
the basic structure. This reading is reinforced by Rawls’s later insistence that as a 
consequence of ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism,’ justice as fairness should be 
understood as ‘a political conception… designed for the special case of the basic 
structure of society and not… as a comprehensive moral doctrine’ (Rawls, 2001, 
p. 19).15 
Cohen’s ‘fundamental’ reply to the basic structure objection is fairly 
straightforward. Either we interpret the basic structure as purely coercive, or we 
adopt a broader interpretation so that justice as fairness also influences the 
relevant choices that people make within it; on the latter interpretation, 
distributive justice requires not only coercive rules but also an ethos that informs 
people’s choices within those rules. The basic structure objection is, of course, 
dependent on embracing the purely coercive interpretation. But, and this is 
                                                 
15 Additionally, see Rawls, 1993 
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Cohen’s fundamental reply, Rawlsians cannot embrace the purely coercive 
interpretation of the basic structure without undermining the reason Rawls gives 
for it being the primary subject of justice. Rawls derives its primacy from its 
power to create ‘especially deep inequalities,’ with the qualifier referring to their 
pervasiveness, their morally arbitrary source, and their effect on people’s initial 
chances in life. And yet, certain choices that people make within the coercive 
structure can also create similarly deep inequalities.  
To illustrate, Cohen discusses inequalities that can occur within the 
family and as a consequence of unequalising incentive payments (Cohen, 2008, 
pp. 137-138). For brevity and continuity I refer only to the latter. If we adopt the 
purely coercive interpretation of the basic structure then the lax difference 
principle applies. As such, no injustice is thought to obtain when, as a result of 
the talented choosing to vary their productivity relative to their reward, policy is 
to pay the talented unequalising incentives payments. And yet, the resulting 
inequality is in part morally arbitrary. To be relevantly talented will always be in 
part and perhaps in combination a consequence of natural endowment, or of 
better fostering of natural endowment in virtue of social and/or economic 
privilege, or of one’s abilities fortunately being valued by the market. 
Importantly, the unequal distribution created by unequalising incentive payments 
is not only, in part, morally arbitrary, it may also be pervasive and large. When 
that is the case, many people’s initial chances in life will greatly differ, and not 
because of coercive structure but because of choices made within it. The reason 
for taking the coercive structure as the primary subject of justice thus applies to 
certain choices made within it. Cohen therefore insists that Rawls ‘must either 
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admit application of the principles of justice to… patterns of personal choice that 
are not legally prescribed…, or, if he restricts his concern to the coercive 
structure only, then he saddles himself with a purely arbitrary delineation of his 
subject matter’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 137).16 
 
2.5. For clarity of exposition, it is worth ending this section with a summary of 
the relevant claims. 
 
Claim 1: Equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency are co-obtainable 
(minus those inequalities and/or Pareto-inefficiencies consistent with the 
personal prerogative) if and when the talented produce at their upmost 
capacity for equal reward. 
 
Claim 2: The talented make unequalising incentive payments necessary to 
improve the situation of the worst-off by choosing to vary their 
productivity relative to their reward. 
 
Claim 3: Distributive justice requires not only coercive rules but also an 
ethos of distributive justice that informs people’s choices within coercive 
rules. 
 
                                                 
16 For Andrew Williams’s revised basic structure objection, which debatably escapes Cohen’s 
fundamental reply, see Introduction, section 3.3. 
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Claim 4: Morality allows for a personal prerogative: every person has a 
right to pursue self-interest to some reasonable extent (even when that 
makes things worse than they need be for badly off people). 
 
Claim 1 is relevant because the above mentioned freedom objection can 
be pressed in response. Claim 2 is relevant because if unequalising incentive 
payments are strictly necessary to realize Pareto-efficiency, equality of 
opportunity and Pareto-efficiency would not be co-obtainable in practice. Claim 
3 is relevant because the ethical solution to the equality-Pareto-freedom trilemma 
relies on people’s occupational choices being informed by an ethos of 
distributive justice. And, Claim 4 is relevant because the probability that many 
will exercise their prerogative with respect to freedom of occupational choice has 
the consequence that the ethical solutions fails in practice, so that the type of 
society we ought to seek does require either the denial of freedom of 
occupational choice, which virtually nobody would endorse, or one of equality of 
opportunity or Pareto-efficiency to be sacrificed or compromised 
 
3. The trilemma and the ethical solution 
3.1. In response to the claim that equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency 
are co-obtainable (minus those inequalities and/or Pareto-inefficiencies 
consistent with the personal prerogative) if and when the talented produce at their 
upmost capacity for equal reward (Claim 1), the freedom objection can be 
pressed.  
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The Freedom objection: Even if Claim 1 is true (and it might be false if 
the psychological assumption on which it rests were disproven17), Cohen 
must nevertheless solve the equality-Pareto-freedom trilemma. 
  
To illustrate the trilemma, Cohen refers to the doctor-gardener case 
(Cohen, 2008, pp. 184-185). In doctor-gardener, as would be true in reality, the 
realization of Pareto-efficiency is dependent not only on the talented producing 
at their upmost capacity but also on certain occupations being filled. For 
simplicity of illustration, in doctor-gardener the realization of Pareto-efficiency is 
dependent on just one individual’s occupational choice as regards these two 
occupations, with Pareto-efficiency being dependent on her choosing doctoring. 
This individual, A, possesses the skills required of either occupation, has a liking 
for both, but prefers gardening to doctoring for equal reward; for example, A 
prefers to be a gardener for £20k p.a. than to be a doctor for £20k p.a. But A’s 
preferences differ in light of unequalising incentive payments. When the salary 
offered for doctoring hits £50k p.a., with the salary offered for gardening 
remaining at £20k p.a., the extra £30k p.a. is sufficient material incentive for A to 
prefer doctoring to gardening. 
Before proceeding, some clarifications are necessary. In doctor-gardener, 
I assume that equality of income is used for illustrative purposes only, and that 
we should understand it as consistent with equality of opportunity; otherwise 
Cohen has strayed from his critique of the Pareto argument and the target of the 
freedom objection. Thus, for equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency to co-
                                                 
17 See section 2.2 
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obtain in doctor-gardener A must doctor at £20k p.a. If A were to garden at £20k 
p.a. it would be consistent with equality of opportunity but Pareto-inefficient, 
whereas if A were to doctor at £50k p.a. it would be Pareto-efficient but result in 
inequality of opportunity. The trilemma in doctor-gardener is thus: (i) deny A 
freedom of occupational choice by forcing her to doctor at £20k p.a.; (ii) 
compromise Pareto-efficiency by granting A freedom of occupational choice but 
no unequalising incentive payments with the consequence that A chooses to 
garden at £20k p.a.; (iii) compromise equality of opportunity by granting A 
freedom of occupational choice and unequalising incentive payments with the 
consequence that A chooses to doctor at £50k p.a. In (i) equality of opportunity 
and Pareto-efficiency co-obtain; in (ii) equality of opportunity and freedom of 
occupational choice co-obtain; and in (iii) Pareto-efficiency and freedom of 
occupational choice co-obtain. But in none of (i), (ii) and (iii) do all three 
desiderata co-obtain. 
 
3.2. In seeking a solution to the trilemma, Cohen takes inspiration from a policy 
of blood donation favored by Richard Titmuss and the work of Joseph Carens.18 
Titmuss favored neither paid nor forced blood donation, but voluntary non-paid 
blood donation. That policy, of course, risks health care services being left with 
an insufficient supply of blood if insufficient numbers volunteer to donate. An 
objector might therefore have put it to Titmuss that instead of risking an 
insufficient supply of blood, society should adopt a policy that either offers 
people incentives to donate or forces them to donate. To this, Cohen says 
                                                 
18 See Cohen, 2008, pp. 188-190; Carens, 1981. 
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Titmuss should respond with an ethical solution, ‘by expressing confidence that a 
sufficient number of people might be moved to give [blood], through some 
combination of principled commitment and fellow feeling’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 
189). Cohen proposes the very same solution to the trilemma, arguing that, 
‘equality, freedom, and Pareto [are co-obtainable] if [A] chooses the stethoscope 
against [her] preference for the hoe as a result of some combination, as in the 
Titmuss solution, of principled commitment and fellow feeling’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 
189).  
The principled commitment Cohen has in mind is a commitment to 
equality of opportunity. His solution requires that ‘the talented, in particular, 
disbelieve that anything [presumably except differences of taste and/or choice], 
including their fortunate productive endowments, entitles them to better rewards 
or better conditions of life’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 190). However, just as acting 
consistently with a belief in the difference principle does not require the talented 
to produce at their upmost capacity for equal reward, acting consistently with a 
belief in equality of opportunity does not require the talented to produce Pareto-
efficiently, whether that be in terms of productive capacity and/or occupational 
choice. As Jonathan Quong says of the ethical solution, equality of opportunity 
‘does not require talented people to choose any particular occupation – it merely 
forbids talented people (subject to a limited agent-centered prerogative) from 
accepting unequalizing incentives for taking on socially optimal jobs. The world 
where [A] chooses to [doctor at £20k p.a.] is not a more egalitarian world than 
the one where [A] chooses gardening at the same wage, it is rather a Pareto 
superior world’ (Quong, 2010, p. 327).  
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Indeed, it seems that the only case in which acting consistently with a 
belief in equality of opportunity requires a certain occupational choice, is when 
either the alleviation of, or compensation for, inequalities that do not reflect 
differences of taste and/or choice are dependent on it. For example, A would 
appear to act inconsistently with a belief in equality of opportunity if, as a 
consequence of her choice to become a gardener, another individual was left to 
suffer through no fault of her own some type of relative disadvantage that, had A 
chosen to become a doctor, could have been alleviated. But, when conditions in 
doctor-gardener are such that no matter A’s occupational choice it remains 
possible to alleviate and/or compensate for those inequalities that conflict with 
equality of opportunity, her choice to become a gardener, despite being Pareto-
inefficient, is consistent with a belief in equality of opportunity. 
This is why Cohen’s ethical solution to the trilemma requires not only 
that the choices of the talented be informed by a belief in equality of opportunity, 
but that their choices be informed by a belief in equality of opportunity in 
combination with ‘fellow feeling.’ This phrase is incredibly vague, but in the 
paragraphs that follow Cohen speaks of ‘an obligation to serve others,’ of ‘a 
desire to contribute to society,’ and of a ‘sense of commitment to other people’ 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 190). In effect, ‘fellow feeling’ is a belief in a duty to produce 
Pareto-efficiently in terms of both productive capacity and occupational choice. 
To illustrate, let us consider how Cohen thinks the ethical solution works in 
doctor-gardener: 
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[In doctor-gardener] the ethical solution [requires that] people 
believe in equality [of opportunity], so the talented, in particular, 
disbelieve that anything [except differences of taste and/or 
choice], including their fortunate productive endowments, entitles 
them to better rewards or better conditions of life. A, being one of 
them, consequently takes a doctoring job at... £20,000: thereby a 
key presumption in the trilemma argument… is falsified – it is not 
necessarily true that, under the conditions that structure the 
doctor-gardener example, the doctor will (simply) choose 
[gardening for] £20,000, and eschew doctoring unless she receives 
£50,000. [It is true only] if we set aside her desire to satisfy 
egalitarian principle and/or her sense of commitment to other 
people… 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 190) 
 
 The first thing to notice is that Cohen initially implies that a belief in 
equality of opportunity is sufficient reason for A to choose to doctor at £20k p.a. 
But, as noted previously, if the realization of equality of opportunity is not 
dependent on it, to act consistently with a belief in equality of opportunity does 
not require A to choose to doctor at £20k p.a.; it requires only that she refuse 
unequalising incentive payments to doctor at £50k p.a. The second thing to 
notice is Cohen’s claim that the trilemma holds true only if we set aside A’s 
‘desire to satisfy egalitarian principle and/or her sense of commitment to other 
people.’ It is this commitment to the well-being of others, what is effectively A’s 
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belief in a duty to produce Pareto-efficiently so as to provide the greatest 
possible contribution to society, that requires A to doctor. And, when A’s belief 
in that duty is combined with her belief in equality of opportunity, A must choose 
to doctor at £20k p.a. if she is to act consistently with both beliefs.  
 Thus, as Quong argues, ‘Cohen’s proposed ethical solution to the 
trilemma does not, properly construed, rely on an egalitarian ethos prevailing 
amongst talented persons. Rather, it relies both on an egalitarian ethos (which 
precludes unequalizing incentives) and… a Paretian ethos (which directs 
talented people to choose jobs where they will contribute the most to the overall 
social product)’ (Quong, 2010, p. 328). The Paretian ethos on which the ethical 
solution relies cannot therefore be a requirement of Cohenite distributive justice, 
because, as implied by his critique of the Pareto argument19 and in light of his 
parameters for fundamental principles of distributive justice20, considerations 
pertaining to Pareto-efficiency are distinct from those pertaining to distributive 
justice. Of course, the Paretian ethos could be constitutive of some other 
conception of distributive justice. But consistent with a Cohenite conception of 
distributive justice, even if Cohen is right that distributive justice requires not 
only coercive rules but an ethos that informs people’s choices within those rules, 
the Paretian ethos on which the ethical solution relies necessitates that A go 
beyond what Cohenite distributive justice requires of her.21 It may even be true, 
as Quong argues, ‘that Cohen’s Paretian ethos is in fact a supererogatory ethos, 
that is, it requires talented people to go beyond not only what justice requires, but 
                                                 
19 See section 2 
20 See Introduction, section 2.2 
21 For an alternative view on this point, where the duty to produce Pareto-efficiently is instead 
interpreted as a Cohenite duty of distributive justice, see Fabre, 2010. pp. 398-399. 
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what morality more generally could reasonably require (by morality I mean to 
refer to any moral duties we might owe to others, even if they are not duties of 
justice)’ (Quong, 2010, pp. 328-329). 
 
4. The trilemma unsolved 
4.1. After outlining the trilemma, but prior to offering the ethical solution, Cohen 
says:  
 
What is the egalitarian to do? He cannot sacrifice equality without 
giving up his egalitarianism. So his choice appears to be between 
rejecting freedom or declaring against Pareto. 
Old style Stalinistically inclined egalitarians might have 
responded by setting their faces against freedom of choice of 
occupation. They might have bitten the bullet (they bit, after all, 
many comparable bullets) and declared that, if people have to be 
coerced into equality, then so be it. But my own inclinations are 
more liberal, so that way out is not for me...  
There may be some egalitarians who would be willing to 
reject Pareto, but, again, not me... I am an egalitarian who would 
worry about institutionalizing equality (even though I would still 
consider it a requirement of justice) if it made us all losers (other 
than in respect of gaining the equality value). But, since I am also 
unwilling to reject freedom of occupational choice, it seems that I 
am driven to abandon equality, at the policy level. But I shall not 
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abandon equality. I shall instead try to show that the trilemma is 
misconstrued, because of a lack of clarity in the description of its 
freedom element.  
(Cohen, 2008, pp. 186-188, emphasis added) 
 
 This passage suggests that Cohen desires a solution to the trilemma not 
merely at the level of fundamental principles where we abstract from social facts, 
but in the context of what type of society we ought to seek in practice, since 
‘policy’ is merely state rules of regulation by another name.22 The 
misinterpretation of the trilemma to which Cohen refers in the final sentence is 
that freedom of occupational choice is maintained, consistent with the co-
obtaining of equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency, when occupational 
choice is informed by a commitment to equality of opportunity in combination 
with a commitment to produce Pareto-efficiently. Thus, rather than ‘abandon’ 
equality of opportunity at the level of state rules of regulation, Cohen seeks a 
solution by appeal to non-state rules of regulation; namely, an egalitarian-
Paretian ethos that informs people’s choices within state rules of regulation. Yet 
when developing rules of regulation, whether they be state or non-state rules of 
regulation, considerations pertaining to social facts come into play; otherwise 
rules of regulation would cease to reflect ‘practical constraints that restrict the 
extent to which justice can be applied’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 3). And a particularly 
relevant social fact with respect to the ethical solution is people’s predictable use 
of the personal prerogative. 
                                                 
22 For clarification re state rules of regulation, see Introduction, section 2.2. 
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The personal prerogative prevents the ethical solution from working 
when relevant social facts are taken into consideration, because unless A’s refusal 
to doctor at £20k p.a. constitutes an unreasonable pursuit of self-interest, she can 
justify a choice to garden at £20k p.a. or doctor at £50k p.a. (if unequalising 
incentive payments are offered) by appeal to it; that is, by appeal to her right to 
pursue self-interest to some reasonable extent (even when that makes things 
worse than they need be for badly off people).23 Initially, one might be tempted 
to respond to that claim by arguing that because A has a liking for both 
occupations a refusal to doctor at £20k p.a. would be unreasonably self-
interested. But, even if that were true, we can imagine a variant of doctor-
gardener in which A finds doctoring suitably unpleasant such that her refusal to 
doctor at £20k p.a. must fall within her personal prerogative; this variant of 
doctor-gardener models real world conditions where Pareto-efficiency is likely 
dependent on occupations being filled for which insufficient numbers of people 
would have a liking when reward is equal. 
The ethical solution therefore works only if either (i) we deny the 
personal prerogative or (ii) people do not exercise it with respect to occupational 
choice. Cohen is against (i) and so, on his view, the ethical solution works only if 
(ii). But, at the level of rules of regulation where social facts come into play, the 
probability that (ii) will not occur, that many of the talented (upon whose 
occupational choices about how hard to work and what occupation to fill the co-
                                                 
23 Additionally, David Estlund argues that if Cohen allows for the personal prerogative then he 
must also allow for a fraternal prerogative; a right to pursue the interests of one’s family and/or 
friends to some reasonable extent (even when that makes things worse than they need be for 
badly off people). This would likely result in much economic inequality inconsistent with 
equality of opportunity, because it would appear to justify unequalising incentive payments when 
the talented use the extra reward to reasonably benefit their family and/or friends (Estlund, 1998, 
pp. 106-107). 
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obtaining of equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency depend) will exercise 
their personal prerogative as regards occupational choice, will in turn produce 
inequality of opportunity and/or Pareto-inefficiency. Admittedly, Cohen does not 
claim that the ethical solution results in absolute equality of opportunity and 
Pareto-efficiency co-obtaining alongside freedom of occupational choice. Rather, 
he allows for some level of inequality of opportunity and/or Pareto-inefficiency 
in light of the personal prerogative.24 But when many exercise their personal 
prerogative, as no doubt many will, a great deal of inequality of opportunity 
and/or Pareto-inefficiency will obtain. It therefore makes little sense to claim that 
the ethical solution works when the relevant social facts are taken into 
consideration. On the contrary, equality of opportunity or Pareto-efficiency or 
freedom of occupational choice must be compromised to a significant degree. 
 
4.2. The above passage, however, could well be misleading. It could be that 
Cohen’s aim is not to solve the equality-Pareto-freedom trilemma in the context 
of what type of society we ought to seek in practice. After all, Cohen’s 
contribution to normative political philosophy is largely devoted to tackling the 
question “What is justice?”, as opposed to what he considers the other two 
important questions for political philosophers: “What should the state do?” and 
“Which social state of affairs ought to be brought about?”25 Furthermore, a few 
pages after the above passage, Cohen acknowledges that the co-obtaining of 
equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency may be unfeasible, but that his 
concern is with whether the ethical solution works if their co-obtaining is feasible 
                                                 
24 See Claim 1 (2.5); Cohen, 2008, p. 181. 
25 See Introduction, section 2.2 
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(Cohen, 2008, pp. 191-192). That clarification strongly suggests that Cohen is 
concerned with solving the trilemma only at the level of fundamental principles 
where we abstract from social facts. His concern is with the compatibility of the 
three desiderata whilst abstracting from considerations pertaining to the relevant 
social facts, such as the talented’s predictable use of the personal prerogative. 
Despite my concerns being largely practical, it is nevertheless worth 
noting that even at the level of fundamental principle, the success of the ethical 
solution depends on whether the ethos is a requirement of justice and on how we 
conceptualize freedom. For as Paula Casal argues, ‘different conceptions of 
freedom will yield different conclusions regarding Cohen’s claim to have solved 
the trilemma’ (Casal, 2013, p. 8). To illustrate, she draws on the following case 
provided by Joseph Raz. 
 
Imagine a person who can pursue an occupation of his choice but 
at the price of committing murder for each option he rejects. First 
he has to choose whether to become an electrician. He can refuse 
provided he kills one person. Then he is offered a career in 
dentistry, which again he is free to refuse if he kills another 
person, and so on. Like the person facing the proverbial gunman 
demanding ‘your money or your life’, who is acting freely if he 
defies the threat and risks his life, the person in our dilemma is 
acting freely if he agrees to murder in order to become a dentist, 
rather than an electrician. If he does so then his choice does not 
tend to show that his life is not autonomous. But if he chooses the 
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right way and agrees to be an electrician in order to avoid 
becoming a murderer then his choice is forced. 
(Raz, 1986, p. 379) 
 
 According to the conception of freedom employed here by Raz, 
occupational choice is autonomy restricting when the chooser lacks an adequate 
range of acceptable options. And, in doctor-gardener A might be thought to lack 
a range of adequate options. For if A’s occupational choice is not informed by the 
egalitarian-Paretian ethos, her preferences are such that she would choose to 
garden at £20k p.a. unless she is offered unequalizing incentive payments to the 
point of £50k p.a. to become a doctor.26 On the Razian conception, as Casal 
argues, A is therefore acting freely ‘if she ignores the ethos and pursues other 
careers, but not if she obeys the ethos and delivers what Cohen claims 
[distributive] justice demands. Thus…, either equality [of opportunity and 
Pareto-efficiency] is preserved (through ethical obedience) but freedom [of 
occupational choice] is not, or freedom [of occupational choice] is preserved 
(through ethical disobedience) and equality [of opportunity and/or Pareto-
efficiency] is not. Either way we once again face the trilemma’ (Casal, 2013, p. 
9). 
The ethical solution thus works at the level of fundamental principles 
when freedom of occupational choice merely requires absence of coercion, for A 
is then relevantly free when, being informed by the egalitarian-Paretian ethos, 
she chooses to doctor at £20k p.a. Indeed, this appears to be how Cohen 
                                                 
26 See section 3.1 
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conceptualizes freedom of occupational choice, for he says that ‘[t]he value of 
freedom lies in the absence of coercion itself, not in the absence of legitimate 
moral demands’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 195). But, so Raz would think, A’s autonomy 
is restricted because authorship over her life requires not only that she enjoy (i) 
absence from coercion, but that she also enjoy (ii) a certain level of mental 
capacity and (iii) an adequate range of acceptable options when making choices 
that affect the course of her life (Raz, 1986, pp. 369-378).27 
Since (ii) and (iii) are commonly associated with positive freedom, A 
must enjoy both negative and positive freedom to be an autonomous agent on a 
Razian conception. Yet, as Casal argues, both Raz’s protagonist and Cohen’s 
doctor-gardener are denied (iii) an adequate range of acceptable options when 
making choices that affect the course of their lives (Casal, 2013, p. 10). Raz’s 
protagonist faces a choice merely between murder and not-murder, whilst A, on a 
Cohenite conception of distributive justice, where the egalitarian-Paretian ethos 
is (contradictorily28) a requirement of distributive justice, faces a choice merely 
between acting justly and unjustly. Thus, if Raz’s protagonist and A act ethically 
(not-murder/act justly) neither is acting autonomously, because autonomy 
‘cannot be obtained by a person who is constantly fighting for moral survival. If 
he is to be moral then he has no choice, just as the person struggling for physical 
survival has no choice if he is to stay alive’ (Raz, 1986, pp. 379-380).  
                                                 
27 In an attempt to fully explain our aversion to restricting freedom of occupational choice, 
Michael Otsuka likewise appeals to autonomy; to the idea ‘that our lives would not be ours to 
lead if our vocation or occupation were determined solely by the greater needs of others’ (Otsuka, 
2008, p. 451). 
28 Because its Paretian component falls foul of Cohen’s parameters for fundamental principles of 
justice. 
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Accordingly, the ethical solution works at the level of fundamental 
principles when freedom of occupational choice merely requires absence of 
coercion. But on a more positive conception of freedom of occupational choice, 
where it requires an adequate range of acceptable options, the ethical solution 
fails because the egalitarian-Paretian ethos denies A an adequate range of 
acceptable options; freedom of occupational choice does not co-obtain alongside 
equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency. As to how we ought to 
conceptualize freedom of occupational choice, I have not here explored rival 
conceptions of freedom to a sufficient degree to draw a conclusion. My intention 
in this sub-section is merely to point out that the success of the ethical solution 
even when abstracting from the relevant social facts, depends on how we 
conceptualize freedom and on whether the egalitarian-Paretian ethos is a 
requirement of distributive justice. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The focus of this chapter has been how Cohen understands the relationship 
between equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of occupational 
choice in principle. We have seen that his ethical solution to the equality-Pareto-
freedom trilemma – which holds that any two of the desiderata may co-obtain but 
all three cannot, as to fill occupations Pareto-efficiently whilst realizing equality 
of opportunity would require forcing people who prefer different occupations for 
reward consistent with equality of opportunity to fill those occupations on which 
the realization of Pareto-efficiency depends – is to argue that all three desiderata 
are co-obtainable when the occupational choices of the talented are informed by 
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an egalitarian-Paretian ethos. This is the second view I indentify with Cohen’s 
positive contribution to the question of what type of society we ought to seek. 
The view is that, in principle, equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and 
freedom of occupational choice are co-obtainable when people’s occupational 
choices are informed by a commitment to equality of opportunity in combination 
with a commitment to produce Pareto-efficiently both in terms of productive 
capacity and occupational choice. 
Although Cohen’s aim is to demonstrate the compatibility of the three 
desiderata in principle, my concern is with what type of society we ought to seek, 
and so I am more concerned with what we ought to do in practice than with what 
is possible in principle. I therefore evaluated whether the ethical solution 
succeeds not only when we abstract from social facts, but also when we 
recognize those social facts that are particularly relevant; namely, each person’s 
predictable use of their right, for which Cohen allows, to pursue self-interest to a 
reasonable extent (even when that makes things worse than they need be for 
badly off people). For if A chooses to fill a Pareto-inefficient occupation for 
reward consistent with equality of opportunity, or to fill a Pareto-efficient 
occupation for reward consistent with equality of opportunity but to not work at 
her upmost capacity, or to fill a Pareto-efficient occupation for reward 
inconsistent with equality of opportunity by accepting unequalizing incentives, 
she can justify either of these choices by appeal to that prerogative if it does not 
constitute an unreasonable pursuit of self-interest. In cases where A has a liking 
for the occupation that requires filing for Pareto-efficiency to obtain, a refusal to 
fill it or a refusal to work at her upmost capacity absent unequalizing incentives 
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might constitute an unreasonable pursuit of self-interest, so that she cannot make 
those refusals by appeal to her prerogative. But the realization of Pareto-
efficiency in practice likely requires occupations to be filled for which 
insufficient numbers of people will have a preference when reward is consistent 
with equality of opportunity. As such, there will be numerous cases where it falls 
within A’s prerogative either (i) to depart from the Paretian component of the 
egalitarian-Paretian ethos by filling a Pareto-inefficient occupation or by not 
working at her upmost capacity in a Pareto-efficient occupation, or (ii) to depart 
from the egalitarian component of the egalitarian-Paretian ethos by accepting 
unequalizing incentives to fill a Pareto-efficient occupation, rather than (iii) act 
in accordance with both components of the egalitarian-Paretian ethos by 
voluntarily choosing to fill a Pareto-efficient occupation, and to work at her 
upmost capacity in that occupation, for reward consistent with equality of 
opportunity. 
Equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of occupational 
choice are therefore co-obtainable only if either (i) we deny the personal 
prerogative or (ii) people do not exercise it with respect to their occupational 
choices. If morality allows for such a prerogative, as Cohen and Scheffler 
believe, we ought not to deny people recourse to it, and so the desiderata co-
obtain only if people choose not exercise it when making occupational choices 
about how hard to work and what occupation to fill. Yet people will inevitably 
exercise their right to pursue self-interest to a reasonable extent when making 
such occupational choices. The consequence is inequality of opportunity and/or 
Pareto-inefficiency to such a significant degree that it makes little sense to claim 
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that equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of occupational 
choice co-obtain minus those inequalities and/or Pareto-inefficiencies consistent 
with the personal prerogative. Rather, they simply do not co-obtain. 
Although the failure of the ethical solution in practice is no critique of 
Cohen, because he intends it to operate at the level of fundamental principles 
where we abstract from social facts, it is important to clarify that, in practice, the 
type of society we ought to seek when taking into account considerations 
pertaining to equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of 
occupational choice does require either the denial of freedom of occupational 
choice, which virtually nobody would endorse, or one of equality of opportunity 
or Pareto-efficiency to be sacrificed or compromised. Particularly relevant in this 
respect is the third view I indentify with Cohen’s positive contribution to the 
question of what type of society we ought to seek. This view is that, in practice, 
the state should often compromise equality of opportunity in the name of 
realizing Pareto-efficiency. Should we embrace that trade-off, or should we 
instead seek to realize a society that reflects the sacrifice or compromise of 
Pareto-efficiency in favour of realizing equality of opportunity? 
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Chapter 3 
Pareto-efficiency Often Trumps Equality of Opportunity 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on how Cohen understands the relationship between 
equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency in practice. In the previous chapter 
we saw, at least when adopting a value pluralist methodology of the sort 
embraced by Cohen1, that the type of society we ought to seek when taking into 
account considerations pertaining to equality of opportunity and Pareto-
efficiency does, in practice, require either the denial of freedom of occupational 
choice, which virtually nobody would endorse, or one of equality of opportunity 
or Pareto-efficiency to be sacrificed or compromised. Particularly relevant in this 
respect is Cohen’s view, which is the third view I indentify with his positive 
contribution to the question of what type of society we ought to seek, that, in 
practice, the state should often compromise equality of opportunity in the name 
of realizing Pareto-efficiency. 
This view comes in the form of a concession in Rescuing Part I, on which 
Cohen expands in a section on justice and Pareto-efficiency in Rescuing Part II, 
that Pareto-efficiency often trumps egalitarian justice when it comes to 
developing state rules of regulation. Being a concession rather than a fully 
developed view, it is somewhat open to interpretation. I argue that Cohen is best 
interpreted here as embracing a pluralist distributive ethic that combines telic 
egalitarian and telic prioritarian beliefs. It says that a luck egalitarian social state 
                                                 
1 See Introduction, section 2 
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of affairs – because fair – has non-instrumental value, but that the state should 
often pursue Pareto-efficiency over a luck egalitarian principle of equality of 
opportunity because a social state of affairs in which people, and particularly the 
worst-off, enjoy greater benefits is non-instrumentally more valuable than 
egalitarian justice. 
Having clarified the view I proceed to evaluate it in the context of the 
“equality, priority or what?” debate. The subject of this debate is whether we 
ought to embrace egalitarianism, prioritarianism or some alternative ethic of 
distribution. As Cohen’s view that the state should often compromise equality of 
opportunity in the name of realizing Pareto-efficiency takes the form of a 
pluralist ethic that combines telic egalitarian and telic prioritarian beliefs, it faces 
objections from either side of this debate. The most prominent of these 
objections are the levelling down objection to telic egalitarianism and the Otsuka-
Voorhoeve objection to prioritarianism. For reasons to be explained, if the former 
objection succeeds the telic egalitarian component of Cohen’s pluralist ethic is 
implausible, and if the latter objection succeeds its telic prioritarian component is 
implausible. Drawing on the work of Larry Temkin and Martin O’Neill I argue 
that neither the levelling down objection nor the Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection 
show Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian ethic to be implausible. 
 
2. Pareto-efficiency vs. distributive justice 
2.1. Cohen’s claim that Pareto-efficiency often trumps equality of opportunity at 
the level of rules of regulation, that is, at the level where rules for the governing 
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of society ‘reflect both values other than justice and practical constraints2 that 
restrict the extent to which justice can be applied’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 3), comes in 
the form of a revision to the reprinting of his Tanner Lecture in Rescuing.3 In 
both the original lecture and its reprinting Cohen says: ‘socialist egalitarians… 
have no strong opinion about inequality at millionaire/billionaire levels. What 
they find wrong is that there is, so they think, unnecessary hardship at the lower 
end of the scale’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 31). Without further clarification socialist 
egalitarians are not strictly speaking egalitarians, because their objection is to the 
unnecessary hardship of the worst-off, which, can be alleviated consistent with 
inequality. And yet despite considering himself a socialist egalitarian Cohen is 
not one so characterized, because, regardless of how well off one happens to be 
in absolute terms, he believes it unjust if one suffers inequality for which she 
cannot reasonably be held personally responsible. Commenting on this 
mischaracterization of himself in a new footnote, he says: 
 
I [was] insufficiently exercised [at the time of writing] by the 
distinction between justice and optimal policy. Under the 
influence of that distinction, I would now say that distributive 
justice is (some kind of) equality, but that the Pareto principle, 
and also that constrained Pareto principle that is the difference 
principle, often trump justice.  
(Cohen, 2008, p. 30, n. 7) 
                                                 
2 Cohen more often refers to such constraints as ‘social facts.’ 
3 Rescuing Chapter 1 was previously published as: Cohen, G. A. (1992), “Incentives, Inequality 
and Community,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. G. Peterson, Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press. 
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What Cohen refers to here as ‘the distinction between justice and optimal 
policy’ is, of course, his distinction between fundamental principles of justice 
and rules of regulation by another name. More specifically, I read him as 
distinguishing between fundamental principles of justice and state rules of 
regulation. As set out in the Introduction4, Cohen distinguishes between rules of 
regulation ‘that obtain by order of the state [and] those that emerge within the 
milder order of social norm formation’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 281), and use of the 
term ‘policy’ suggests he has the former in mind, because one would not 
commonly refer to social norms as ‘policy.’ At the level of state rules of 
regulation, then, where rules for the governing of society by the state reflect both 
values other than justice and social facts that restrict the extent to which justice 
can be applied, Cohen believes Pareto-efficiency often trumps distributive justice 
which is some kind of equality.  
This is consistent with Cohen’s remarks about not wanting to reject 
Pareto-efficiency in response to the equality-Pareto-freedom trilemma. For we 
saw in Chapter 2 that he characterizes himself as: ‘an egalitarian who would 
worry about institutionalizing equality (even though I would still consider it 
a requirement of justice) if it made us all losers (other than in respect of gaining 
the equality value)’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 188).5 As regards the claim that distributive 
justice is some kind of equality, as opposed to equal access to advantage, I 
interpret this vagueness as reflective of Cohen’s concerns about: the difficulty of 
developing an index of advantage6; his puzzlement as to the need for a hybrid 
metric of egalitarian interpersonal comparison, as opposed to specifying 
                                                 
4 See Introduction, section 2.2 
5 See Chapter 2, section 4.1 
6 See Chapter 1, section 3.2 
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opportunities in terms of either welfare or resources7; and doubts he came to 
have about whether option luck ever preserves distributive justice.8 It is safe to 
assume, however, that he means some kind of luck egalitarian principle of 
equality of opportunity, as opposed to a principle of equality of outcome.9 
The claim that Pareto-efficiency often trumps distributive justice, which 
is some kind of luck egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity, is further 
clarified in a section on justice and Pareto-efficiency in Rescuing Part II. Therein, 
Cohen asks us to imagine a world populated by two individuals, A and B, whom 
each begin with five units of manna (D1: A 5, B 5). Three extra units of manna 
then fall from heaven: two fall to A and one falls to B (D2: A 7, B 6). In addition, 
we imagine that there is no way of equalizing D2; the extra manna cannot be 
divided so that A and B each gain one and a half units, nor can half a unit of A’s 
original manna be transferred to B, and nor can one unit of A’s manna be 
destroyed. Rather, we face a choice between only two feasible distributions: D1 
or the strongly (because everyone is better off) Pareto-efficient D2; D1 requires 
the destruction of the extra manna in its entirety, whereas D2 requires acceptance 
of the extra manna as the distribution fell from heaven (Cohen, 2008, pp. 316-
317). In response, Cohen says that whereas a ‘justice fetishist’ would choose D1, 
he would choose D2, because although ‘[j]ustice doesn’t follow Pareto 
optimality, and [D2] is not just, …it’s preferable on grounds of human 
flourishing and might therefore reasonably be chosen’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 319). 
Much the same point is made when illustrating his threefold distinction 
between the political philosophical questions: (i) What is justice?; (ii) What 
                                                 
7 See Chapter 1, section 3.2 
8 See Cohen, 2011e 
9 See Chapter 1, sections 2.1 and 3.2 
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should the state do?; and (iii) Which social states of affairs ought to be brought 
about? As was set out in the Introduction, Cohen’s distinction between 
fundamental principles of justice and rules of regulation corresponds with these 
questions.10 Whatever the correct principles of justice are, they are the answer to 
question (i); whatever the correct state rules of regulation are, they are the 
answer to question (ii); and, because social states of affairs can be brought about 
not only by state agency but also by or in combination with non-state agency, 
whatever the correct state and non-state rules of regulation are, they are the 
answer to question (iii). Imagining that we face a choice between two feasible 
distributions (5/5 and 8/6), Cohen says: ‘it may be grotesque [in question (ii)-
territory] for the state to make everybody worse off, [but] it does not follow that 
[in question (i)-territory] there is no injustice in the 8/6 inequality, and, partly for 
that reason, it does not follow that [in question (iii)-territory] no one should seek 
to bring the 5/5 world about’ (Cohen, 2011h, p. 229). 
Clearly, when a Pareto-efficient alternative to distributive justice is 
feasible, Cohen believes the state should often pursue it over equality of 
opportunity because human flourishing is more important than distributive 
justice. But his position is still somewhat unclear, for why does he claim that 
Pareto-efficiency often trumps equality of opportunity? The italicized caveat 
implies that sometimes it does not, as does the caveat that Pareto-efficiency 
‘might reasonably be chosen’ over equality of opportunity in the manna example. 
Why does Cohen not commit himself to the claim that Pareto-efficiency always 
trumps distributive justice when developing state rules of regulation? In a 
                                                 
10 See Introduction, section 2.2 
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footnote Cohen provides two brief answers: ‘[(i)] because (see sections 10 and 17 
of [Rescuing] Chapter 1) we might defy Pareto where it rewards injustice (it does 
not do so in our manna example), [and (ii)] because we might sacrifice Pareto to 
equality up to a certain limit’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 319, n. 66). 
As regards (i), Cohen is referring to those cases, discussed in Chapter 2, 
where the productively talented make unequalising incentive payments necessary 
to realize Pareto-efficiency by choosing to vary their productivity relative to their 
reward.11 As Cohen maintains that, as a matter of distributive justice, people’s 
choices within coercive rules ought to be informed by a commitment to equality 
of opportunity in combination with a commitment to produce Pareto-efficiently 
whether in terms of productive capacity or occupational choice (the egalitarian-
Paretian ethos), the productively talented here act unjustly.12 Thus, on a Cohenite 
conception of distributive justice, to pay the productively talented unequalising 
incentives as a means to realizing Pareto-efficiency would be to reward injustice. 
But, so Cohen argues (in the second of those sections to which he directs us), 
‘[although] paying, which makes all… better off than refusing to pay, is almost 
certainly preferable, …in some cases, with less at stake, we might prefer to forgo 
the Pareto improvement, in order not to accede to an unjust demand’ (Cohen, 
2008, p. 84). For example, a great deal is at stake when refusing to pay the 
talented unequalising incentives has the effect of denying the worst-off a 
sufficient standard of living. In cases of this type, it is preferable to pay the 
productively talented unequalizing incentives even though, on a Cohenite 
conception of distributive justice, it would be to reward injustice. But in cases 
                                                 
11 See Chapter 2, section 2.2 
12 See Chapter 2 sections 2.4 and 3.2 
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where only a small Pareto-improvement hinges on whether we pay the talented 
unequalising incentives, and everyone, including the worst-off, already enjoys a 
sufficient standard of living, not a great deal is a stake. Under conditions such as 
these, so Cohen thinks, ‘we might defy Pareto where it rewards injustice.’ That is 
to say, we might prefer to settle for what we already have rather than reward the 
talented for acting unjustly. 
As regards (ii), Cohen does not refer us to any clarificatory text, and so 
his reason for thinking ‘we might sacrifice Pareto-efficiency to equality up to a 
certain limit,’ even if its realization does not reward injustice, is unclear. One 
possibility is that although he thinks Pareto-efficiency often trumps equality of 
opportunity, there are cases where the pursuit of Pareto-efficiency compromises 
equality of opportunity to an extent that is unacceptable so that the state ought 
not to pursue it. For example, D2: A 7, B 6; D3: A 20, B 10; and D4: A 50, B 6; 
all represent Pareto-efficient alternative distributions to D1: A 5, B 5. Moreover, 
they all represent a strong Pareto-improvement on D1.13 But if D1 represents 
equality of opportunity, then the extent to which equality of opportunity is 
compromised is different in each of D2, D3 and D4, with it being compromised 
least by a move from D1 to D2, and most by a move from D1 to D4. It could be, 
then, that what Cohen means by sacrificing Pareto-efficiency to equality of 
opportunity up to a certain limit, is that when the only feasible Pareto-efficient 
alternative distribution or distributions to equality of opportunity involve its 
being compromised to an unacceptable degree (e.g., D4), the state ought not to 
pursue Pareto-efficiency. 
                                                 
13 A strong Pareto-improvement occurs when a distributive move makes everyone better off. A 
weak Pareto-improvement occurs when a distributive move makes at least one individual better 
off but no individual worse off. 
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To summarize the clarifications that have so far been made, Cohen’s view 
that the state should often compromise equality of opportunity in the name of 
realizing Pareto-efficiency is as follows: 
 
Pareto-efficiency often trumps distributive justice: When a Pareto-
efficient alternative to distributive justice, which is some kind of luck 
egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity, is feasible, the state 
should often pursue Pareto-efficiency over equality of opportunity 
because human flourishing is of greater importance than distributive 
justice. 
 
Often not always caveat: In cases where the pursuit of Pareto-efficiency 
means acceding to unjust demands and little rests on not acceding to 
them, and perhaps in cases where the pursuit of Pareto-efficiency means 
compromising equality of opportunity to an unacceptable degree, the state 
might prefer to sacrifice or compromise Pareto-efficiency instead of 
equality of opportunity. 
 
2.2. To further clarify Cohen’s view that the state should often compromise 
equality of opportunity in the name of realizing Pareto-efficiency, and because it 
enables an evaluation as to whether, all else being equal, we ought to seek a type 
of society which reflects that trade-off or some alternative, I now consider where 
the view sits in relation to two distinctions drawn by Derek Parfit in his seminal 
essay, “Equality or Priority?” 
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The first of these is Parfit’s distinction between teleological and 
deontological egalitarianism. 
 
Teleological and deontological egalitarianism 
There are two main ways in which we can believe in equality. We 
may believe that inequality is bad. On such a view, when we 
should aim for equality, that is because we shall thereby make the 
outcome better. We can then be called Teleological – or, for short 
Telic – Egalitarians. Our view may instead be Deontological or, 
for short, Deontic. We may believe we should aim for equality, 
not to make the outcome better, but for some other moral reason.  
(Parfit, 2002, p. 84) 
 
More accurately, a teleological ethical theory holds that the rightness of 
an action depends only on the value of its consequences, whereas a deontological 
ethical theory holds that the rightness of an action is not exclusively determined 
by the value of its consequences. Thus, telic egalitarians believe we should aim 
for some type of egalitarian state of affairs because it is valuable, whereas 
deontic egalitarians believe we should aim for some type of egalitarian state of 
affairs for reasons other than, but perhaps in addition to, its value. A state of 
affairs, however, could have non-instrumental value, instrumental value, or both 
non-instrumental and instrumental value; respectively that is, a state of affairs 
could have value in itself, or serve as a means to the realization of some other 
value or good, or have value in itself whilst also serving as a means to the 
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realization of some other value or good. This raises the question as to whether 
one must believe an egalitarian state of affairs has non-instrumental value and/or 
instrumental value in order to qualify as a telic egalitarian. My understanding is 
that a telic egalitarian must believe an egalitarian state of affairs has non-
instrumental value (and perhaps also instrumental value), because if she believes 
it to have only instrumental value she is not so much a telic egalitarian as she is a 
telic something-else-ian, because what she aims for is not an egalitarian state of 
affairs per se but state of affairs x, where x depicts the value or good that equality 
serves as a means to realizing.14 
There are many ways in which equality might be thought to have 
instrumental value. Thomas Scanlon, for example, argues that the moral force of 
equality is derived (amongst other things) from its serving as a means to the 
relief of unnecessary suffering; the prevention of stigmatizing differences in 
status; and the prevention of some having unacceptable power over others 
(Scanlon, 2002, pp. 42-47). Indeed, even when offering an example of how 
equality might be thought to have non-instrumental value, Thomas Nagel appears 
to provide another example of how it might be thought to have instrumental 
value when he claims: ‘[i]t is a condition of the right kind of relations among 
[society’s] members, and of the formation in [society] of healthy fraternal 
relations, desires, and sympathies’ (Nagel, 2002, p. 62). So understood, rather 
than having non-instrumental value, equality is serving as a means to the 
realization of fraternity. 
                                                 
14 For more in depth analysis of Parfit’s distinction between telic and deontic egalitarianism see 
(for example) Norman, 1997, and O’Neill, 2008. 
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Larry Temkin has sought to defend the non-instrumental value of equality 
and thus telic egalitarianism. He argues that even though values other than 
equality matter, and that equality does not matter most, it is nevertheless ‘bad, or 
objectionable, to some extent – because unfair – for some to be worse off than 
others through no fault or choice of their own’ (Temkin, 2002, pp. 129-130). 
Thus, Temkin believes some luck egalitarian state of affairs has non-instrumental 
value; that a fair distribution is valuable in itself, even if we ought not to pursue 
it all things considered. In contrast, Ronald Dworkin is an example of a deontic 
egalitarian, for his position is that equal concern for citizens is a requirement of 
legitimate governance, and this in turn requires that government aim at equality 
of resources (Dworkin, 2002, pp. 1-3). According to Dworkin, then, rather than 
pursue equality of resources because of its value as a state of affairs, government 
ought to show equal concern for its citizens by pursuing equality of resources. 
For the same reason as Temkin, Cohen is a telic egalitarian. He believes a 
luck egalitarian state of affairs has non-instrumental value as opposed to only 
instrumental value, because rather than believe a luck egalitarian state of affairs 
serves as a means to the realization of distributive justice, he thinks distributive 
justice is some kind of luck egalitarian state of affairs, and that it has value in 
itself because it is fair. No instrumental relationship occurs here, since for Cohen 
distributive justice, fairness, and equality of opportunity are one and the same 
value. As Patrick Tomlin recognizes, ‘Cohen uses ‘justice’, ‘equality’ and 
‘fairness’ as synonyms at many points [throughout Rescuing], and does the same 
with their antonyms’ (Tomlin, 2010, p. 233, n. 22).15 This, of course, reflects 
                                                 
15 For criticism of Cohen’s conception of distributive justice as equality, see (for example) 
Arneson, 2008; Quong, 2010; and Tomlin, 2010. 
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Cohen’s luck egalitarianism. Cohen believes it is non-instrumentally bad, 
because unfair, when people suffer disadvantage for which they cannot 
reasonably be held personally responsible. Thus, he believes it is non-
instrumentally valuable, because fair, when people do not suffer disadvantage 
unless it is reasonable to hold them personally responsible.16 
The second of Parfit’s distinctions we ought to consider, with respect to 
clarifying and evaluating Cohen’s view that the state should often compromise 
equality of opportunity in the name of realizing Pareto-efficiency, is his 
distinction between egalitarianism and prioritarianism. 
 
Egalitarianism and prioritarianism 
[For prioritarians] benefits to the worse off matter more, but that 
is only because these people are at a lower absolute level. It is 
irrelevant that these people are worse off than others. Benefits to 
them would matter just as much even if there were no others who 
were better off… [Thus, whereas] [e]galitarians are concerned 
with relativities: with how each person’s level compares with the 
level of other people…, [prioritarians] are concerned only with 
people’s absolute levels.17  
(Parfit, 2002, p. 104) 
 
                                                 
16 As to when Cohen believes it reasonable and unreasonable to hold one responsible for her 
disadvantage, see Chapter 1, section 3. 
17 Some political philosophers associated with prioritarianism, such as Nagel (2002, pp. 74-76), 
believe that small improvements in the circumstances of the worst-off should not be given 
priority when the alternative is significantly large improvements in the circumstances of the 
better-off. 
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For reasons I touch on below, Parfit himself favors prioritarianism over 
egalitarianism; although he is officially agnostic in “Equality or Priority?” 
Another example is Richard Arneson’s responsibility-catering prioritarianism, 
which holds that it is non-instrumentally more valuable to prioritize benefits to 
those who are worse off through no fault of their own, than it is to distribute 
benefits to those who are worse off as a result of choices for which they can be 
held personally responsible (Arneson, 2000, p. 344). Additionally, just as one can 
be either a telic or deontic egalitarian, so too can one be either a telic or deontic 
prioritarian, for as Parfit says, ‘[l]ike the belief in equality, the Priority view can 
take either Telic or Deontic forms. It can be a view about which outcomes would 
be better, or a view that is only about what we ought to do’ (Parfit, 2002, p. 101). 
No doubt, as his original characterization of socialist egalitarians 
suggests, Cohen’s concern for human flourishing is first and foremost a concern 
for alleviating the unnecessary hardship of the worst-off. But it is not merely a 
sufficientarian concern; that is to say, it is not merely a concern for securing a 
decent life for all. To illustrate, consider once again the manner from heaven case 
from Rescuing Part II.18 If a sufficiency threshold is satisfied in D1: A 5, B 5, 
Cohen would still think that D2: A 7, B 6, is ‘preferable on grounds of human 
flourishing and might therefore reasonably be chosen’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 319), 
because he is against ‘institutionalizing equality… if it made us all losers’ 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 188). Yet, neither is Cohen’s view, that Pareto-efficiency often 
trumps distributive justice, which is some kind of luck egalitarian principle of 
equality of opportunity, purely prioritarian, because it is a view about both 
                                                 
18 See section 2.1 
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relative and absolute levels. It does not therefore sit neatly on either side of 
Parfit’s distinction between egalitarianism and prioritarianism. It says relative 
levels of some specification of equality of opportunity matter for reasons of 
distributive justice, but absolute levels of human flourishing often matter more 
than distributive justice. Thus, unlike strict egalitarians, or as Cohen calls them, 
‘justice fetishists’19 and ‘fairness fanatics,’20 he does not believe equality of 
opportunity matters above all else. And yet, unlike prioritarians, he does believe 
some kind of luck egalitarian state of affairs has non-instrumental value. 
Cohen’s view that the state should often compromise equality of 
opportunity in the name of realizing Pareto-efficiency is therefore best 
understood as a pluralist distributive ethic that combines telic egalitarian and 
telic prioritarian commitments. On the one hand, we have distributive justice, 
which is some kind of luck egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity, and 
which has non-instrumental value because fair. On the other hand, when a 
Pareto-efficient alternative distribution to distributive justice is feasible, Cohen 
believes the state should pursue it over a luck egalitarian principle of equality of 
opportunity (subject to the ‘often not always’ caveat21) because a social state of 
affairs in which humanity flourishes to a greater extent is more valuable than 
egalitarian justice. And, in light of the above noted textual evidence which 
suggests Cohen’s concern for human flourishing is primarily a concern for 
alleviating the unnecessary hardship of the worst-off, we can refine that 
interpretation so that Cohen believes the state should pursue Pareto-efficiency 
over equality of opportunity (subject to the ‘often not always’ caveat) because a 
                                                 
19 See Cohen, 2008, p. 319 
20 See Cohen, 2008, p. 168. 
21 See end of section 2.1 
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social state of affairs in which people, and particularly the worst-off, enjoy 
greater benefits is more valuable than egalitarian justice. As to whether we 
should interpret him as believing it non-instrumentally and/or instrumentally 
more valuable than egalitarian justice, it seems safe to assume the former 
because it is clearly valuable in itself when people do not have to battle 
unnecessary hardship, but there is insufficient textual evidence with respect to 
the latter. 
In summary, Cohen’s view that the state should often compromise 
equality of opportunity in the name of realizing Pareto-efficiency is best 
understood as a pluralist distributive ethic that combines telic egalitarian and 
telic prioritarian beliefs. 
 
Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian ethic: some kind of luck egalitarian 
social state of affairs – because fair – has non-instrumental value, but the 
state should often pursue Pareto-efficiency over a luck egalitarian 
principle of equality of opportunity because a social state of affairs in 
which people, and particularly the worst-off, enjoy greater benefits is 
non-instrumentally more valuable than egalitarian justice. 
 
2.3. Prior to defending the plausibility of Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian ethic, it 
is worth ending this section by noting that in terms of outcomes it might be no 
more egalitarian than justice as fairness. The above quotation with which I began 
my interpretation is essentially an admission of this.22 But it is nevertheless 
                                                 
22 See section 2.1 
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worth emphasizing simply because Cohen is commonly thought of as being more 
radically egalitarian than Rawls.  
To illustrate, imagine that we start from a position of equality of 
opportunity, D1: A 5, B 5, and that the state could, if so inclined, organize society 
so that it reflects any of the following distributions: D2: A 7, B 6; D3: A 20, B 10; 
and D4: A 50, B 6. At first glance, acting consistently with the difference 
principle seems to require that the state reorganize society so that we move from 
D1 to D3, because D3 is the distribution from the feasible set where ‘social and 
economic inequalities are… to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged 
members of society’ (Rawls, 2001, pp. 42-43); in D3 the least advantaged have 
10, rather than 5 in D1 and 6 in D2 and D4. But Rawls says that the difference 
principle ‘does not require continual economic growth over generations to 
maximize upward indefinitely the expectations of the least advantaged’ (Rawls, 
2001, pp. 63-64). All else being equal, then, acting consistently with the 
difference principle does require that the state reorganize society so that we move 
from D1 to D3, but if the state has good reason not to pursue economic growth to 
that extent, it would also act consistently with the difference principle by 
reorganizing society so that we move from D1 to D2. 
In contrast, the Pareto principle has the potential to mandate distributive 
moves that result in vastly unequal states of affairs, such as a move from D1 to 
D4. As Cohen understands it, the strong Pareto principle mandates all Pareto-
improvements, that is, it mandates any distributive move that makes at least one 
individual better off so long as no individual is made worse off, and the weak 
Pareto principle mandates only strong Pareto-improvements, that is, it mandates 
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only those distributive moves that make everyone better off (Cohen, 2008, pp. 
88-89, n. 4). The state can therefore move from D1 to any of D2, D3 and D4 
whilst acting consistently with either version of the Pareto principle, because in 
all of D2, D3 and D4 no one is made worse off than they are in D1, and D2, D3 
and D4 all represent a strong Pareto-improvement on D1. The Pareto principle 
thus allows for greater inequality than the difference principle, and since Cohen 
says it often trumps egalitarian justice, the above quotation could be misread as 
evidence that there is a sense in which he is less egalitarian than Rawls. 
Notice that, as it stands, this interpretation overlooks Cohen’s reason for 
thinking that the Pareto principle often trumps egalitarian justice; namely, that 
human flourishing is more important. As I have argued, there is evidence to 
suggest that his concern for human flourishing is primarily a concern for 
alleviating the unnecessary hardship of the worst-off, so that his view that the 
state should often compromise equality of opportunity in the name of realizing 
Pareto-efficiency is best understood as a pluralist distributive ethic that combines 
telic egalitarian and telic prioritarian beliefs. It says that some kind of luck 
egalitarian social state of affairs – because fair – has non-instrumental value, but 
that the state should often pursue Pareto-efficiency over a luck egalitarian 
principle of equality of opportunity because a social state of affairs in which 
people, and particularly the worst-off, enjoy greater benefits is non-
instrumentally more valuable than egalitarian justice. On my interpretation, then, 
excluding those cases where Cohen thinks the state might prefer to sacrifice or 
compromise Pareto-efficiency instead of equality of opportunity23, acting 
                                                 
23 See section 2.1 
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consistently with the egalitarian-prioritarian ethic requires, as does acting 
consistently with the difference principle, all else being equal, that the state 
reorganize society so that we move from D1 to D3; the state ought to pursue D3 
because it is non-instrumentally more valuable than D1, D2 and D4, in virtue of 
its being the social state of affairs where the worst-off do best. Despite their 
methodological differences, then, and despite Cohen’s attempt to rescue equality 
from Rawls at the level of fundamental principles of justice, his view as to how 
the state, all else being equal, ought to balance the competing demands of 
equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency tends towards the realization of a 
social state of affairs that is no more egalitarian than that which would result 
from the state implementing the difference principle. 
 
3. The levelling down objection 
3.1. Parfit favors prioritarianism over egalitarianism partly because he feels the 
force of the levelling down objection. This objection is meant to reveal the 
implausibility of claiming that equality has non-instrumental value and thus the 
implausibility of telic egalitarianism. If the objection succeeds the telic 
egalitarian component of Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian ethic is implausible, 
and we ought to instead favor some form of deontic egalitarianism or 
prioritarianism, since neither is committed to the claim that equality has non-
instrumental value, and thus neither is susceptible to the levelling down 
objection. But, as Parfit recognizes, the levelling down objection does not 
decisively show telic egalitarianism to be implausible. 24 
                                                 
24 See Parfit, 2002, p. 115; and Parfit, 2012, p. 401. 
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If an individual believes an egalitarian state of affairs has non-
instrumental value, even if she believes we ought not to pursue it all things 
considered, she nevertheless believes it is in one way better than the relevant 
inequality regardless of how it is realized. To illustrate, let us consider that 
famous example of Robert Nozick’s where the realization of equality of outcome 
requires the coercive redistribution of body parts (Nozick, 1974, p. 206). In a 
world where half the population is sighted and the other half is blind, equality of 
outcome requires that we redistribute one eye from each of the sighted to each of 
the blind. If any of the sighted is unwilling to donate an eye to the blind, then, 
equality of outcome requires coercive redistribution. Of course, to believe that 
the egalitarian state of affairs in which everyone has one eye is in one way better 
than the relevant inequality, is not to believe that we ought to engage in coercive 
redistribution of people’s eyes. One can believe that the egalitarian state of 
affairs has non-instrumental value, and believe it does because it is fair, whilst 
maintaining that other considerations (e.g., Rawlsian basic liberties; control 
rights of self-ownership; Shefflerian agent-centered prerogatives25) trump 
equality in this case. But, egalitarian states of affairs can be realized by levelling 
down; that is, by making everyone as badly off as the worst-off. In Nozick’s 
example this requires making everyone blind. To believe an egalitarian state of 
affairs has non-instrumental value is therefore to believe that making everyone as 
relevantly badly off as the worst-off is in one way better than the relevant 
inequality. According to the levelling down objection that belief is implausible, 
                                                 
25 These examples are from: Otsuka, 2008, p. 448.  
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because a state of affairs cannot be in any way better than another when it is 
better for no one. Thus, equality does not have non-instrumental value.  
 
The levelling down objection: To believe an egalitarian state of affairs has 
non-instrumental value is to believe that its realization by making 
everyone as badly off as the worst-off is in one way better than the 
relevant inequality. That is implausible, because a state of affairs is not in 
any way better than another state of affairs when it is better for no one. 
Thus, equality does not have non-instrumental value.26 
 
3.2. Cohen has little to say about the levelling down objection. He points out, as I 
have (and in a manner that supports my interpretation of his view), only that to 
believe equality has non-instrumental value is not to believe we ought to level 
down all things considered. 
 
[T]he egalitarian can say that she would not level down, because 
equality isn’t everything, but nevertheless maintain that equality, 
as such, is in one way better than its absence: something of value 
is lost, because there is an unfairness, and therefore a kind of 
injustice, when some have more than others through no relevant 
fault or choice of anyone. The levelling down objection is not 
thereby eliminated, for some would deny that a world in which 
everyone is blind is in any way better than one in which some, but 
                                                 
26 For Parfit’s description, see Parfit, 2002, p. 98. 
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not all, can see… But, however that may be, it is important that 
those who think that the all-blind world is in one way better are 
not thereby committed to plucking out the eyes of the sighted in a 
world where some are blind and some are not. 
(Cohen, 2011h, p. 231) 
 
This pluralist response to the levelling down objection does, as Cohen 
says, make an important point, but it does not, as Cohen recognizes, refute the 
objection. The levelling down objection does not hold that to believe equality has 
non-instrumental value is to be implausibly committed to levelling down all 
things considered. Rather, it holds that to believe equality has non-instrumental 
value is to implausibly believe levelling down would be in one way better when 
it cannot be in any way better because it is better for no one. In order to refute the 
levelling down objection telic egalitarians must therefore refute the person-
affecting claim27, which says that states of affairs cannot be in any way better or 
worse than another when there are no persons for whom it affects for better or 
worse. If the person-affecting claim is false, if states of affairs can be in one way 
better or worse than another when there are no persons for whom it is better or 
worse, and an egalitarian state of affairs realized by leveling down is an example 
of this, it is plausible to claim that levelling down (e.g., the all-blind world) is in 
one way better (because fair) than the relevant inequality, and the levelling down 
objection fails to disprove the non-instrumental value of equality. 
                                                 
27 Temkin refers to the person-affecting claim as ‘the Slogan’ (Temkin, 2002, p. 132). I prefer to 
adopt Parfit’s more descriptive name for it (Parfit, 2002, p. 114). 
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 Temkin mounts a sustained challenge to the person-affecting claim on the 
grounds that it runs contrary to other commonly held beliefs (Temkin, 2002, pp. 
137-146).28 For example, in his ‘saints and sinners’ example he appeals to 
commonly held beliefs about desert. If A represents people who live ethically 
whereas B represents mass murders, we tend to believe state of affairs x: A 8, B 
2, is in one way better than state of affairs y: A 8, B 10, even though state of 
affairs x is better for no one. Correspondingly, as Temkin says, most ‘believe 
there would be something morally bad about the evilest mass murders faring 
better than the most benign saints, even if [as in state of affairs y] there was no 
one for whom it was worse’ (Temkin, 2002, p. 139). If these beliefs are 
plausible, then so is the belief that states of affairs can be in one way better or 
worse regardless of how persons are affected for better or worse.  
Of course, any comprehensive refutation of the person-affecting claim 
cannot be made solely by appeal to commonly held beliefs, because our 
commonly held beliefs may not reflect the true nature of morality. To 
comprehensively refute the person-affecting claim would require defending a 
meta-ethical theory from which it cannot be derived; a substantial undertaking I 
shall not attempt. Temkin’s challenge nevertheless provides sufficient reason to 
doubt its truth, and referring to it, Cohen declares that he too rejects the person-
affecting claim (Cohen, 2011h, p. 233). 
Yet, even if the person-affecting claim is false, for telic egalitarians to 
escape the levelling down objection it must additionally be true that equality has 
non-person-affecting value in the sense that desert has non-person-affecting 
                                                 
28 For the same challenge, see Temkin, 1993, Chapter 9 
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value in Temkin’s saints and sinners example. That is to say, it must be true that 
there is something morally good about the all-blind world as compared with the 
world in which half are sighted and half are blind. Many think not, and 
consequently feel the force of the levelling down objection. My intuition, 
however, is that there is something morally good about the all-blind world as 
compared with the world in which half are sighted and half are blind, and that 
something is fairness; the all-blind world is fairer than the world in which half 
are sighted and half are blind through no fault or choice of their own. Thus, I 
share Temkin and Cohen’s view that, although we ought not to level down, some 
kind of luck egalitarian social state of affairs – because fair – has non-
instrumental value and thus is in one way better than the unequal alternative even 
when it is better for no one. The force of the levelling down does not therefore, at 
least in my view, show the telic egalitarian component of Cohen’s egalitarian-
prioritarian ethic to be implausible. 
 
4. The Otsuka & Voorhoeve objection 
4.1. To date, the most prominent objection to prioritarianism comes from 
Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve. The essence of their objection is that there 
is greater priority to benefit the badly-off when we consider one’s situation 
relative to others than when we consider one’s situation in isolation from others, 
and that whereas prioritarianism cannot explain this shift in weighting when we 
move from intrapersonal to interpersonal cases, it can be explained by telic 
and/or deontic egalitarian considerations that are present only in interpersonal 
cases (e.g., the non-instrumental value of equality and/or the comparative 
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strength of different people’s claims to benefit). The upshot, so Otsuka and 
Voorhoeve argue, is that prioritarianism is implausible. If they are right, so is the 
telic prioritarian component of Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian distributive ethic. 
In defence of Cohen, however, I embrace Martin O’Neill’s pluralist response to 
the Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection, which says that it shows prioritarianism to be 
incomplete rather than implausible. For it is open to any prioritarian, unless she 
dogmatically believes that prioritarianism accounts for the whole truth about 
distributive ethics, to explain the shift in weighting between intrapersonal and 
interpersonal cases by appeal to egalitarian considerations. Consequently, the 
telic prioritarian component of Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian distributive ethic 
is not implausible. And, unlike non-restricted pure prioritarianism, as opposed to 
Andrew Williams’s deontic-restricted prioritarianism which escapes the Otsuka-
Voorhoeve objection29, it can explain the greater priority to benefit the badly-off 
in interpersonal cases by appeal to the non-instrumental value of equality of 
opportunity. 
Otsuka and Voorhoeve start by asking us to imagine the following 
intrapersonal case:  
 
Intrapersonal case: An individual will develop a physical impairment and 
the chance of this impairment being slight or very severe is equal. There 
are separate treatments for these impairments. The treatment for the slight 
impairment entirely cures it and the treatment for the very severe 
impairment reduces it from very severe to severe. Each of these 
                                                 
29 See section 4.2 
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treatments represents the same gain in utility; ‘slight impairment to full 
cure’ and ‘very severe impairment to severe impairment’ represent equal 
utility gains. These treatments work only when administered prior to 
development of the impairment and only one treatment can be 
administered. Thus, we must choose between preemptively treating either 
the slight or very severe impairment when the expected utility gain is 
equal and the chance of either developing is equal (Otsuka & Voorhoeve, 
2009, pp. 171-172). 
 
As the chance of either impairment developing is 50/50, and because 
either treatment amounts to the same expected utility gain, Otsuka and 
Voorhoeve argue that it is reasonable to administer either treatment in the 
intrapersonal case if the affected individual has no preference (Otsuka & 
Voorhoeve, 2009, pp. 173-175). 
 In contrast, Otsuka and Voorhoeve ask us to imagine a similar but 
somewhat different interpersonal case: 
 
Interpersonal case: A group of people will develop physical impairments. 
Half will develop the slight impairment and half the very severe 
impairment. As in the intrapersonal case, the treatment for the slight 
impairment entirely cures it and the treatment for the very severe 
impairment reduces it from very severe to severe. Again, each treatment 
represents the same gain in utility and only one treatment can be 
administered. The interpersonal case differs, however, in that we are able 
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to identify who will develop which impairment. Thus, whereas in the 
intrapersonal case either course of action has a 50 percent chance of being 
effective because we are ignorant as to which impairment the individual 
will develop, in the interpersonal case either course of action will be 100 
percent effective for half the group. We must therefore choose between 
either preemptively treating those who will develop the slight impairment 
or those who will develop the very severe impairment, when each sub-
group of people is equal in number and stands to gain the same level of 
utility (Otsuka & Voorhoeve, 2009, p. 174). 
 
Unlike in the intrapersonal case where they consider either course of 
action reasonable, Otsuka and Voorhoeve argue that the only reasonable course 
of action in the interpersonal case is to increase the utility of those who stand to 
become worse off; that is, we ought to treat those who are to become very 
severely impaired (Otsuka & Voorhoeve, 2009, pp. 174-175). 
 Prioritarians, of course, would also preemptively treat those who will 
develop the very severe impairment in the interpersonal case, as they believe we 
ought to give distributive priority to the worst-off. In the intrapersonal case, 
however, it appears prioritarians must reject Otsuka and Voorhoeve’s claim that, 
because the chance of either impairment developing is 50/50, and because either 
treatment amounts to the same expected utility gain, it is reasonable to administer 
either treatment if the affected individual has no preference. For if prioritarians 
believe ‘utility has diminishing marginal moral importance’ (Parfit, 2002, p. 
105), that is, if they believe, from a moral point of view, that utility matters more 
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the worse off one is and matters less the better off one is, they in turn believe we 
ought to preemptively treat the very severe impairment rather than the slight 
impairment in the intrapersonal case. In other words, although the expected 
utility gain of either course of action is, strictly speaking, equal, for prioritarians 
those utility gains are, morally speaking, unequal, because utility is of greater 
moral importance the worse off one is. 
According to Otsuka and Voorhoeve, the failure of prioritarianism to see 
that either course of action is reasonable in the intrapersonal case is illustrative of 
its inability to recognize a shift toward greater priority to benefit the badly off 
when we move from intrapersonal to interpersonal cases. Their ‘crucial 
argumentative move’ (Otsuka & Voorhoeve, 2009, p. 181), however, is to claim 
that, even if one doubts their conclusion that it is reasonable to administer either 
treatment in the intrapersonal case if the affected individual has no preference, a 
shift in weighting can be denied ‘only on pain of denying the moral significance 
of the separateness of persons’ (Otsuka & Voorhoeve, 2009, p. 179). This phrase 
commonly refers to Rawls’s critique of classical utilitarianism for permitting the 
suffering and/or denial of rights to some if, and for that reason only, the result is 
a greater sum total of utility across persons (Rawls, 1999, §5). Prioritarians are 
not guilty in this respect, for rather than seek to maximize the sum total of utility 
across persons they give distributive priority to benefiting the worst-off. But, so 
Otsuka and Voorhoeve argue, prioritarianism fails to take seriously the 
distinction between persons in the sense that it is insensitive to ‘interpersonal 
considerations that are essentially relational, such as the [non-instrumental] 
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badness of inequality or the comparative strength of the claims [to benefit] of 
different individuals’ (Otsuka & Voorhoeve, 2009, p. 185).30 
The first way of explaining a shift toward greater priority to benefit the 
badly off when we move from intrapersonal to interpersonal cases, then, is by 
appeal to the non-instrumental value of equality of opportunity. In the 
intrapersonal case the value of equality of opportunity cannot factor in our 
considerations as to what we ought to do. In the interpersonal case, however, the 
non-instrumental value of equality of opportunity can explain why we ought to 
preemptively treat those who will develop the very severe impairment. If we (i) 
preemptively treat those who will develop the slight impairment a very unequal 
state of affairs will obtain in which, through no fault or choice of their own, half 
are fully cured and half are very severely impaired. On the other hand, if we (ii) 
preemptively treat those who will develop the very severe impairment a less 
unequal state of affairs will obtain in which, through no fault or choice of their 
own, half are severely impaired and half are slightly impaired. Thus, although 
neither course of action prevents people from suffering inequality for which they 
cannot be held personally responsible, as it does not reflect fault or choice on 
their part, course of action (ii) reduces that morally arbitrary inequality whereas 
course of action (i) increases it. All else being equal, we ought therefore to do (ii) 
because it produces a state of affairs that is non-instrumentally more valuable – 
because fairer – than the state of affairs that would result from doing (i). 
Prioritarians might attempt to resist this explanation by appeal to the 
levelling down objection; if one is moved, as I am not, to embrace either deontic 
                                                 
30 In a follow up article, Otsuka argues that prioritarianism also fails to take seriously the 
distinction between person in the sense that it is insensitive to the presence or absence of 
prudential justifications (Otsuka, 2012, pp. 367-368). 
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egalitarianism or prioritarianism in light of the levelling down objection, she 
doubts equality has non-instrumental value, and will therefore doubt the above 
explanation of the shift toward greater priority to benefit the badly off when we 
move from intrapersonal to interpersonal cases. However, there is a deontic 
egalitarian explanation of the shift, that is, an explanation which does not appeal 
to the non-instrumental value of equality and so sidesteps the levelling down 
objection, which appeals to the comparative strength of claims to benefit of 
different individuals. As Otsuka and Voorhoeve argue, in the intrapersonal case 
no such claims can be made, but in the interpersonal case ‘[t]hose who are 
relatively worse off have stronger claims to a given increment of improvement 
simply by virtue of the fact that it is, other things equal, harder to justify 
improving the situation of someone who is better off rather than someone who is 
worse off’ (Otsuka & Voorhoeve, 2009, p. 183). 
 
The Otsuka and Voorhoeve objection: There is greater priority to benefit 
badly-off people when we move from intrapersonal to interpersonal 
cases. This shift in weighting can be explained by the non-instrumental 
value of equality of opportunity and/or the comparative strength of 
people’s competing claims to benefit. Prioritarianism, however, cannot 
account for this shift in weighting because it pays no attention to people’s 
relative levels of benefit. Thus, we ought to doubt its plausibility as a 
distributive ethic. 
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4.2. In response to the Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection Andrew Williams outlines a 
deontic-restricted prioritarianism which, because it explains the shift in 
weighting when we move from intrapersonal to interpersonal cases without 
appeal to egalitarian considerations, serves to reject Otsuka and Voorhoeve’s 
claim that prioritarianism is implausible. It is a deontic view because, rather than 
being a view about which outcomes would be better, it is a view only about what 
we ought to do. Specifically, in the interpersonal case, it says that we ought to 
preemptively treat those who will develop the very severe impairment, rather 
than those who will develop the slight impairment, because the former group has 
stronger claims to benefit than the latter group in light of utility having 
diminishing marginal moral importance. And, it is restrictive in the sense that, 
‘the conviction that benefiting people matters more as they become worse off 
does not apply to all our decisions but instead is triggered by a specific context in 
which we face interpersonal conflict or must choose between promoting personal 
interests and impersonal values’ (Williams, 2012, p. 323). In other words, the 
shift in weighting when we move from intrapersonal to interpersonal cases is 
explained by restricting the prioritarian conviction that utility has diminishing 
marginal moral importance only to interpersonal cases. Thus, in the intrapersonal 
case, where the chance of either impairment developing is equal and each 
treatment amounts to the same expected utility gain, it is open to deontic-
restricted prioritarians to agree with Otsuka and Voorhoeve that it is reasonable 
to administer either treatment if the affected individual has no preference. 
 Despite showing that the Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection does not show all 
pure prioritarian views to be implausible, I have doubts about the restriction 
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Williams employs. For with respect to the intrapersonal case, I do not believe 
that, because the chance of either impairment developing is equal and because 
either treatment amounts to the same expected utility gain, it is reasonable to 
administer either treatment if the affected individual has no preference. On the 
contrary, because the affected individual is just as likely to develop the very 
severe impairment as she is the slight impairment, I believe that, if she has no 
preference, we ought to preemptively treat her for the very severe impairment 
because utility has diminishing marginal moral importance; morally speaking, 
she has more to gain from us preemptively treating her for the very severe 
impairment than she does from us preemptively treating her for the slight 
impairment. If that is the right view, so that we ought not to restrict the 
prioritarian conviction that utility has diminishing marginal moral importance 
only to interpersonal cases, prioritarianism is susceptible to the Otsuka-
Voorhoeve objection. 
An alternative response to the Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection, which is 
particularly well suited to defending the prioritarian component of Cohen’s 
egalitarian-prioritarian ethic, is Martin O’Neill’s pluralist reply.31 The basis of 
O’Neill’s reply is a distinction he draws between fundamentalist and pluralist 
prioritarians. Fundamentalist prioritarians believe that prioritarianism is a 
complete ethical theory of distribution and denies that egalitarian considerations 
have anything to add. In contrast, pluralist prioritarians believe that 
prioritarianism is an incomplete distributive ethic and that egalitarian 
considerations ought to feature in our moral thinking in interpersonal cases 
                                                 
31 For other responses to the Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection, see (for example) Parfit, 2012; and 
Porter, 2012. 
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(O’Neill, 2012, p. 343). Thus, unlike the fundamentalist prioritarian, the pluralist 
prioritarian can respond to the Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection simply by pointing 
out that, rather than show prioritarianism to be implausible, it shows 
prioritarianism only to be incomplete. It is open to the pluralist prioritarian to 
believe that there is greater priority to benefit badly-off people when we consider 
one’s situation relative to others than when we consider one’s situation in 
isolation from others, and to explain that shift in weighting by appeal to 
egalitarian considerations. As O’Neill says, the incompleteness of prioritarianism 
‘is surely itself no fatal failing, given that it would be fanciful to think that any 
‘single principle’ distributive view, whether egalitarian or prioritarian, could 
capture the full truth about the ethics of distribution’ (O’Neill, 2012, p. 344). 
 Whilst outlining this reply, O’Neill rightly says that there is ‘no 
inconsistency in holding a complex distributive view that allows a role for 
deontic egalitarian considerations… while nevertheless endorsing the Priority 
View’ (O’Neill, 2012, p. 343, emphasis added). It is unclear whether he thinks 
the same is true with respect to telic egalitarian considerations. Yet, just as there 
is no inconsistency in holding the former distributive view, there is no 
inconsistency in holding a pluralist distributive view, as I have interpreted Cohen 
as holding, which allows a role for telic egalitarian considerations while 
nevertheless embracing telic prioritarianism. There is no inconsistency in holding 
that some type of egalitarian social state of affairs – because fair – has non-
instrumental value, but that the state should often pursue Pareto-efficiency over 
equality because a social state of affairs in which people, and particularly the 
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worst-off, enjoy greater benefits is non-instrumentally more valuable than 
egalitarian justice. 
What I have interpreted as the prioritarian component of Cohen’s 
egalitarian-prioritarian ethic is not therefore brought into question by the Otsuka 
and Voorhoeve objection. Its telic prioritarian component cannot explain the shift 
towards greater priority to benefit badly-off people when we move from 
intrapersonal to interpersonal cases. But its telic egalitarian component can 
explain that shift on grounds that in interpersonal but not in intrapersonal cases, 
prioritizing distributive benefits to the worst-off will often have the effect (as in 
the above interpersonal case) of reducing inequalities that do not reflect fault or 
choice on the part of the bearer, and therefore of realizing a non-instrumentally 
more valuable – because fairer – state of affairs. Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian 
ethic is thus all the more plausible for acknowledging the moral significance of 
both prioritarian and egalitarian considerations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The focus of this chapter has been how Cohen understands the relationship 
between equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency in practice. As we have 
seen, in practice, Cohen believes the state should often compromise equality of 
opportunity in the name of realizing Pareto-efficiency. This is the third view I 
identify with Cohen’s positive contribution to the question of what type of 
society we ought to seek.  
In indentifying and clarifying the view, I began with Cohen’s concession 
in Rescuing Part I that, under the influence of a distinction between justice and 
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optimal policy, his view is that distributive justice is some kind of equality of 
opportunity, but that Pareto-efficiency often trumps distributive justice. In 
section 2.1 I clarified the view by considering it in the context of: (i) Cohen’s 
distinction between fundamental principles of justice and state rules of 
regulation; (ii) his previously noted remarks with respect to the equality-Pareto-
freedom trilemma; (iii) his own clarifications in a section on justice and Pareto-
efficiency in Rescuing Part II; and (iv) conclusions he draws elsewhere that 
match those drawn in the relevant section from Rescuing Part II. These 
clarifications led to a more detailed view being fleshed out. It says that when a 
Pareto-efficient alternative to distributive justice, which is some kind of luck 
egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity, is feasible, the state should often 
pursue Pareto-efficiency over equality of opportunity because human flourishing 
is of greater importance than distributive justice. The state should often, as 
opposed to always, take this course of action because in cases where the pursuit 
of Pareto-efficiency means acceding to unjust demands and little rests on not 
acceding to them, and perhaps in cases where the pursuit of Pareto-efficiency 
means compromising equality of opportunity to an unacceptable degree, the state 
might prefer to sacrifice or compromise Pareto-efficiency instead of equality of 
opportunity. 
Further clarifying the view in section 2.2, I considered where it sits in 
relation to Parfit’s distinctions between teleological and deontological 
egalitarianism, and between egalitarianism and prioritarianism. This led to the 
conclusion that Cohen’s view, that the state should often compromise equality of 
opportunity in the name of realizing Pareto-efficiency, is best understood as a 
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pluralist distributive ethic that combines telic egalitarian and telic prioritarian 
beliefs. It says that some kind of luck egalitarian social state of affairs – because 
fair – has non-instrumental value, but the state should often pursue Pareto-
efficiency over a luck egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity because a 
social state of affairs in which people, and particularly the worst-off, enjoy 
greater benefits is non-instrumentally more valuable than egalitarian justice. 
So clarified, Cohen’s view, that the state should often compromise 
equality of opportunity in the name of realizing Pareto-efficiency, faces 
objections from either side of the “equality, priority or what?” debate. Thus, I 
proceeded to evaluate the view, in sections 3 and 4 respectively, by considering 
how it fares in relation to the most prominent objections from either side of the 
debate; the levelling down objection to telic egalitarianism, and the Otsuka-
Voorhoeve objection to prioritarianism. 
In response to the levelling down objection I argued, by drawing on 
arguments from Temkin, that its success depends on whether equality has non-
person-affecting value. Although many believe equality does not have non-
person-affecting value in the way desert appears to in Temkin’s saints and 
sinners example, I share Temkin and Cohen’s belief that, although we ought not 
to level down, some kind of luck egalitarian social state of affairs – because fair 
– has non-instrumental value and thus is in one way better than the unequal 
alternative even when it is better for no one. In Nozick famous example, I believe 
there is something morally good about the all-blind world as compared with the 
world in which half are sighted and half are blind merely as a consequence of 
brute luck, and that something is fairness; the all-blind world is fairer than the 
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world in which half are sighted and half are blind merely due to differences in 
fortune. I therefore reached the conclusion that the levelling down objection does 
not decisively show, as Parfit himself recognizes, telic egalitarianism to be 
implausible, and thus nor does it decisively show the telic egalitarian component 
of Cohen’s view to be implausible. 
In response to the Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection I argued, by drawing on 
arguments from O’Neill, that it shows prioritarianism to be incomplete rather 
than implausible. For it is open to any prioritarian, unless she dogmatically 
believes the priority view accounts for the whole truth about distributive ethics, 
to explain the greater priority to benefit the badly-off when we move from 
intrapersonal to interpersonal cases by appeal to egalitarian considerations. 
Consequently, the telic prioritarian component of Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian 
ethic is not implausible. And, unlike non-restricted pure prioritarianism, it can 
explain the greater priority to benefit the badly-off in interpersonal cases by 
appeal to the non-instrumental value of equality. 
My evaluation of the third view I indentify with Cohen’s positive 
contribution to the question of what type of society we ought to seek therefore 
takes the form of a limited defence. For although I lean toward a luck 
egalitarianism where opportunities are specified in terms of resources rather than 
advantage, and ultimately come to embrace an alternative distributive ethic in 
Chapter 4, I conclude that neither the levelling down objection nor the Otsuka-
Voorhoeve objection shows Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian ethic to be 
implausible. 
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Chapter 4 
The Community Principle 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on how Cohen understands the relationship between 
equality of opportunity and community in principle. As we shall see, Cohen 
holds the view that, in principle, equality of opportunity ought to be constrained 
by a principle of community that is realized by means of voluntary non-state 
agency. This is the fourth view I identify with his positive contribution to the 
question of what type of society we ought to seek. 
Evidence as to how Cohen understands the relationship between equality 
of opportunity and community in principle is to be found in Why Not Socialism? 
As explained in Chapter 1, Cohen is a luck egalitarian and does not therefore 
object to inequalities that result from a voluntary choice on the part of the bearer, 
because she can, in virtue of that choice, be held personally responsible for her 
relative disadvantage.1 Yet in Why Not Socialism? Cohen argues that when 
inequalities of this sort obtain on a sufficiently large scale they nevertheless 
undermine community, and ought therefore to be tempered by a principle of 
community. As I interpret the community principle it tempers luck egalitarianism 
by keeping the inequalities it permits within a range that ensures people’s lives, 
where possible, labor under similar challenges as a result, where necessary, of 
the better-off voluntarily helping the worse-off in the form of resource transfers. 
Cohen therefore embraces a community-constrained luck egalitarianism, and in 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 1, sections 2.1 and 3.2 
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that sense, he compromises equality of opportunity in the name of realizing 
community. 
As noted previously, however, I am more concerned with what we ought 
to do in practice than with what is possible in principle, and so I evaluate 
Cohen’s community-constrained luck egalitarianism in much the same way as I 
evaluated his ethical solution to the equality-Pareto-freedom trilemma in Chapter 
2. That is, I evaluate his community-constrained luck egalitarianism in light of 
people’s predictable use of their right, for which Cohen allows, to pursue self-
interest to some reasonable extent (even when that makes things worse than they 
need be for badly off people). In this context, when people are guaranteed a 
decent life and suffer no disadvantage above the sufficiency threshold for which 
they cannot be held personally responsible, voluntary helping the worse-off falls 
within the better-off’s prerogative not to do. As in all probability many of the 
better-off will exercise that prerogative, and because luck egalitarianism ought to 
be tempered to avoid abandonment of the imprudent to unnecessary suffering, I 
conclude that equality of opportunity ought to be constrained in both principle 
and in practice, and in practice it ought to be constrained by a sufficiency 
qualification that is realized by means of state coercion, rather than by Cohen’s 
community principle. 
 
2. The community principle 
2.1. Cohen’s strategy in Why Not Socialism? is to argue that people embrace a 
socialist ideal when camping, before attempting to refute, or at least question, 
reasons as to why that ideal is not also feasible and desirable at the societal level. 
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He observes that when camping, ‘even most antiegalitarians, accept, indeed, take 
for granted, norms of equality and reciprocity’ (Cohen, 2009, p. 5). The 
alternative in which people assert ownership rights over their property and talents 
and attempt to engage in market type bargaining is routinely rejected. For 
example, refusing to lend one’s knife to a fellow camper without gaining 
something in return, or claiming a right to a larger meal than one’s fellow 
campers because as a talented fisherman you provided a larger share of the 
ingredients, are behaviors that are unlikely to be tolerated by the group (Cohen, 
2009, pp. 5-9). From this observation Cohen derives that camping trips tend to 
realize two principles: socialist equality of opportunity and the community 
principle (Cohen, 2009, pp. 12-13). 
By socialist equality of opportunity Cohen means only that it constitutes 
what I referred to in Chapter 1 as a radical principle of equality of opportunity.2 
That is to say, as Cohen does say of socialist equality of opportunity, that it 
‘seeks to correct for all unchosen disadvantages, disadvantages, that is, for which 
the agent cannot herself reasonably be held responsible, whether they be 
disadvantages that reflect social misfortune or disadvantages that reflect natural 
misfortune (Cohen, 2009, pp. 17-18). Thus, despite socialist equality of 
opportunity lacking in detail as compared with Cohen’s principle of equal access 
to advantage, because it is agnostic on whether opportunities ought to be 
specified in terms of welfare, capabilities, resources or some hybrid, both are 
luck egalitarian principles. For each principle holds that, all else being equal, 
inequalities that result from brute luck are prima facie unjust because the bearer 
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cannot be held personally responsible for her relative disadvantage, whereas 
inequalities that result from voluntary choice on the part of the bearer are prima 
facie just because she can, in virtue of that choice, be held personally responsible 
for her relative disadvantage.  
That a luck egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity is realized 
when camping is derived from the campers unwillingness to tolerate differences 
in talent resulting in unequal distributions, as in the above case of the talented 
fisherman, for to accept her claim to a larger meal would be to tolerate an 
inequality between her and her fellow campers that fails to reflect a choice for 
which the disadvantaged can be held personally responsible.  
Since luck egalitarianism holds that, all else being equal, inequalities that 
result from voluntary choice on the part of the bearer are prima facie just because 
she can, in virtue of that choice, be held personally responsible for her relative 
disadvantage, socialist equality of opportunity does not forbid inequalities of this 
kind. For example, Cohen highlights the fact that socialist equality of opportunity 
permits both regrettable choice inequalities and option luck inequalities (which 
are not mutually exclusive). 
 
Regrettable choice inequality: People suffer from regrettable choice 
inequality when they come to regret a voluntary choice that results in 
inequality. For example, imagine that A and B are situated equally in 
every relevant respect, including in their job preferences and in their 
capacity to expend effort and/or care. A voluntarily chooses to neglect her 
job opportunities whereas B voluntarily chooses to examine them with 
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great care and attention. In hindsight, A comes to regret neglecting her job 
opportunities because her income suffers as a consequence. But, any 
resulting inequality of income between A and B that is traceable to A’s 
voluntary choice to neglect her job opportunities, regardless of whether A 
regrets that choice, is an inequality for which a luck egalitarian principle 
of equality of opportunity does not compensate because A is personally 
responsible for her relative disadvantage (Cohen, 2009, pp. 26-27). 
 
Option luck inequality: People suffer from option luck inequality when 
inequality results from a voluntary choice on the part of the bearer to 
partake in some sort of gamble or risk. For example, imagine that C and 
D are situated equally in every relevant respect, including in their 
disposition toward gambling and in their stake of £100. In the absence of 
coercion and with complete knowledge of the relevant facts, C and D 
both voluntarily choose to bet on a coin toss whereby the loser must pay 
the winner £50. C loses the coin toss and pays D £50 so that C comes to 
have £50 and D £150; C suffers from bad option luck. The resulting 
inequality is an inequality for which a luck egalitarian principle of 
equality of opportunity does not compensate because C is personally 
responsible for her relative disadvantage (Cohen, 2009, pp. 30-31). 
 
Despite being consistent with socialist equality of opportunity, Cohen 
argues that regrettable choice and/or option luck inequalities are ‘nevertheless 
repugnant to socialists when they obtain on a sufficiently large scale, because 
G. A. Cohen and What Type of Society We Ought to Seek 167 
they then contradict community: community is put under strain when large 
inequalities obtain. The sway of socialist equality of opportunity must therefore 
be tempered by a principle of community, if society is to display the socialist 
character that makes the camping trip attractive’ (Cohen, 2009, p. 34). This point 
is made more definitively, and for the same reasons, when he says that the 
relevant ‘inequalities that cannot be forbidden in the name of socialist equality of 
opportunity should nevertheless be forbidden, in the name of community’ 
(Cohen, 2009, p. 37). 
 
2.2. According to Cohen, ‘the requirement of community that is central here is 
that people care about, and, where necessary and possible, care for, one another, 
and, too, care that they care about one another’ (Cohen, 2009, pp. 34-35). The 
community principle that tempers socialist equality of opportunity therefore has 
what Cohen calls ‘two modes of communal caring’ (Cohen, 2009, p. 35). In 
particular, it is the community principle’s first mode of communal caring that 
does the tempering, and by considering what it is supposed to achieve, we gain 
insight as to the means by which it tempers equality of opportunity. 
In setting out what the community principle’s first mode achieves by 
tempering those inequalities consistent with luck egalitarianism, Cohen begins 
with the claim that, ‘we cannot enjoy full community, you and I, if you make, 
and keep, say, ten times as much money as I do, because my life will then labor 
under challenges that you will never face, challenges that you could help me 
with, but do not, because you keep your money’ (Cohen, 2009, p. 35). To 
illustrate such deficits of community he provides the following example. 
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The bus commute 
I am rich, and I live an easy life, whereas you are poor, because of 
regrettable choices and/or bad option luck, and not, therefore 
because of any lack of equality of opportunity. You have to ride 
the crowded bus every day, whereas I pass you by in my 
comfortable car. One day, however, I must take the bus, because 
my wife needs the car. I can reasonably complain about that to a 
fellow car-driver, but not to you. I can’t say to you: “It’s awful 
that I have to take the bus today.” There is a lack of community 
between us of just the sort that naturally obtains between me and 
the fellow car-driver. And it will show itself in many other ways, 
for we enjoy widely different powers to care for ourselves, to 
protect and care for offspring, to avoid danger, and so on.  
(Cohen, 2009, pp. 35-36)  
 
Unfortunately, Cohen provides little more than this by way of explanation 
and so exactly what it is for people to ‘enjoy full community’ is somewhat open 
to interpretation. It’s clear that he thinks the reasonableness of his complaint is 
speaker-audience relative; its reasonableness lies not in its validity but in whether 
its audience is likely to empathize. Cohen thinks it would be reasonable to direct 
his complaint to a fellow car-driver because her life labors under similar 
challenges that do not include regular bus-commuting, thus, she is likely to 
empathize. But, he thinks it would be unreasonable to direct the same complaint 
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to a regular bus-commuter because she faces the relevant challenge every day 
and is therefore unlikely to empathize.  
However, when trying to make sense of how Cohen understands the idea 
of people enjoying full community the above example, specifically its 
interpersonal utterance, serves to confuse rather than to clarify. Instead, we ought 
to pay greater attention to what Cohen says in the quotation immediately prior to 
it. There is no mention here of complaints or any other form of interpersonal 
utterance. On the contrary, what Cohen emphasizes is that people cannot enjoy 
full community (i) when large regrettable choice and/or option luck inequalities 
obtain because people’s lives then labor under different challenges, and (ii) that 
the challenges faced by the poor could be made easier by help, in the form of 
resources, from the rich.  
If (i) is constitutive and (ii) merely incidental of people not enjoying full 
community, we ought to interpret Cohen as thinking that people enjoy full 
community when large regrettable choice and/or option luck inequalities are kept 
within a range that ensures people’s lives labor under similar challenges. The 
italicized qualification is important because people’s lives need not then labor 
under identical challenges, which would be both undesirable and implausible; 
undesirable because it would require the denial of people’s freedom to pursue 
their own conception of the good life, and implausible because even those who 
share the same conception of the good life inevitably lead lives that labor under 
somewhat different challenges.  
If, however, (ii) is also constitutive of people not enjoying full 
community, we ought to interpret Cohen as thinking that people enjoy full 
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community not only when large regrettable choice and/or option luck inequalities 
are kept within a range that ensures people’s lives labor under similar challenges, 
but that people enjoy full community when this occurs as a result, where 
necessary, of the better-off transferring resources to the worse-off. Since there 
will be cases where it is impossible to bring about similarity of challenge through 
redistribution of resources, as in cases of severe physical and/or mental 
impairment, we ought to add the qualification that similarity of challenge is a 
condition of people enjoying full community only when its realization is possible 
as a result of such help. 
I interpret Cohen as thinking that both (i) and (ii) are constitutive of 
people not enjoying full community. For as noted at the beginning of this sub-
section, it is central to Cohen’s understanding of community that, where 
necessary and possible, people care for one another, and that people care that 
they care about one another. This strongly suggests that, for Cohen, not only is it 
constitutive of people enjoying full community that they care for one another, but 
that it is constitutive of people enjoying full community that they voluntarily care 
for one another. Miriam Ronzoni likewise interprets voluntariness as being 
central to the community principle’s first mode, for she derives from it that the 
inequalities permitted by socialist equality of opportunity ‘either never arise or 
are freely mitigated or cancelled out by the voluntary actions of those who are 
better off, in order to maintain the ideal of communal life’ (Ronzoni, 2012, p. 
173, emphasis added). I therefore interpret the community principle’s first mode 
of communal caring as follows. 
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Mode 1. Communal caring as full community 
People enjoy full community when large regrettable choice and/or option 
luck inequalities are kept within a range that ensures people’s lives, 
where possible, labor under similar challenges as a result, where 
necessary, of the better-off voluntarily helping the worse-off in the form 
of resource transfers.   
 
2.3. The community principle’s second mode Cohen names communal 
reciprocity. As Cohen recognizes, this second mode of communal caring ‘is not 
strictly required’ to temper large regrettable choice and/or option luck 
inequalities, but he nevertheless considers it to be ‘of supreme importance’ to the 
socialist ideal (Cohen, 2009, p. 35). Fortunately, Cohen gives a far clearer and 
more detailed explanation of the community principle’s second mode. 
 
Mode 2. Communal caring as communal reciprocity 
Communal reciprocity is the antimarket principle according to 
which I serve you not because of what I can get in return by doing 
so but because you need or want my service, and you, for the 
same reason, serve me… [T]here is indeed an expectation of 
reciprocation, but it differs critically from the reciprocation 
expected in market motivation. If I am a marketeer, then I am 
willing to serve, but only in order to be served…, [whereas] a 
nonmarket cooperator relishes co-operation itself: what I want, as 
a non-marketeer, is that we serve each other; and when I serve, 
G. A. Cohen and What Type of Society We Ought to Seek 172 
instead of trying to get whatever I can get, I do not regard my 
action as, all things considered, a sacrifice… The relationship 
between us under communal reciprocity is not the market-
instrumental one in which I give because I get, but the 
noninstrumental one in which I give because you need, or want, 
and in which I expect a comparable generosity from you. 
(Cohen, 2009, pp. 39-43)3 
 
That communal reciprocity is realized when camping is evident in the 
fact that campers help each other, with an expectation of comparable generosity, 
to overcome certain challenges, such as tent building, fire building, cooking, and 
so on. It should be noted, however, that despite being presented as derivative of 
relations between people when camping, there is strong evidence to suggest that 
in arguing for communal reciprocity Cohen takes inspiration from Karl Marx’s 
vision of higher communism. 
In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx famously gives an 
account as to how society’s resources will be distributed in the lower and higher 
phases of communism. In the lower phase (the initial phase after the fall of 
capitalism) resources will be distributed in accordance with people’s labor 
contribution minus a deduction for common funds (the contribution principle). 
Despite ownership of the means of production no longer playing a distributive 
role, Marx objects to the contribution principle because ‘it tacitly recognizes 
unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity as natural 
                                                 
3 For similar descriptions of communal reciprocity, see: Cohen, 1995, p. 262; and Cohen, 2011g, 
pp. 217-218. 
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privileges’ (Marx, 1977, pp. 568-569). In other words, Marx recognizes that 
because of differences in people’s natural abilities the contribution principle will 
arbitrarily reward some more than others, and because of differences in people’s 
circumstances, it may also reward those who are less needy than others. For 
example, if A has greater productive talent than B, then A will contribute more to 
society’s sum total of resources than B over the same period of hours worked. 
And, because the contribution principle holds that people receive the equivalent 
of what they contribute minus a deduction for common funds, A will 
consequently receive more than B for the same period of hours worked. Unlike 
luck egalitarians who would primarily be concerned with the morally arbitrary 
nature of this income inequality, Marx is concerned with the possibility that B 
may have greater needs than A. For example, B may have a large family to 
support whereas A may have no dependants, or B’s self-realizing needs may be 
greater than A’s because her creative pursuits are more expensive. The lower 
phase of communism therefore remains ‘stigmatized by a bourgeois limitation’ 
(Marx, 1977, p. 568). But in the higher phase of communism, ‘after the 
productive forces have also increased with the all round development of the 
individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly…, 
society [can] inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs’ (the needs principle) (Marx, 1977, p. 569). 
  Elsewhere Cohen says that although we may debate exactly what it is to 
contribute according to ability and receive according to need, ‘the unambiguous 
message of [the needs principle] is that what you get is not a function of what 
you give, that contribution and benefit are separate matters. Here the relationship 
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between people is not the instrumental one in which I give because I get, but the 
wholly non-instrumental one in which I give because you need’ (Cohen, 2011g, 
p. 219; emphasis added). According to Cohen, then, the relationship between 
people that ensues under the needs principle is almost identical to that of 
communal reciprocity. For as the italicization is meant to emphasize, Cohen’s 
interpretation here mirrors the final sentence of his explanation of communal 
reciprocity except for one difference (see above): whereas relations between 
people under the needs principle are said to be wholly non-instrumental, relations 
of communal reciprocity incorporate a caveat against free riding since there is an 
expectation of comparable generosity from others. Nevertheless, it seems clear 
that Cohen’s second mode of communal caring is inspired by Marx’s needs 
principle. 
 
2.4. Nicholas Vrousalis likewise recognizes that Cohen’s community principle 
takes inspiration from Marx, but he misinterprets it as being related to Cohen’s 
idea of a justificatory community. He claims that in Why Not Socialism? Cohen 
‘endorses the idea of a justificatory community, previously rehearsed in Rescuing 
Justice and Equality, and dubs the relations such community embraces 
“communal reciprocity”’ (Vrousalis, 2010, p. 206). Then, he later claims 
(somewhat contradictorily because now he’s referring to the principle’s first 
mode whereas before he was referring to the second) that the principle’s ‘“first 
mode” is something like justificatory community’ (Vrousalis, 2012, p.156). Yet 
neither of the principle’s modes of communal caring reflects justificatory 
community. 
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Cohen’s idea of a justificatory community is a state of affairs that obtains 
when a group of people can justify their actions to one another. It requires that an 
argument for the justification of one’s actions is capable of passing the 
aforementioned interpersonal test.4 According to this test, if the person or group 
to whom a justificatory argument is presented can offer a valid rejection, then the 
argument fails to justify the actions, or intended actions, of the person or group 
presenting the argument (Cohen, 2008, p. 42). If a justificatory argument fails the 
interpersonal test, ‘then anyone proposing that justification in effect represents 
the people it mentions as pro tanto out of community with one another’ (Cohen, 
2008, p. 45). A justificatory community, then, does not necessarily reflect 
communal reciprocity; the former is a state of affairs that obtains when a group 
of persons can justify their actions to one another, whereas the latter is a state of 
affairs that obtains when people give because others need and/or want and in 
which there is an expectation of comparable generosity. 
 Vrousalis’s claim that the principle’s first mode ‘is something like 
justificatory community’ involves drawing a comparison between the bus 
commute example, which I have argued serves only to confuse rather than to 
clarify the first mode, and the previously discussed incentives case.5 As we saw 
in Chapter 2, Cohen argues that the incentives argument for inequality fails the 
interpersonal test. 
 
The incentives case: The large rewards enjoyed by the talented have been 
reduced due to a rise in the top rate of income tax from 40 to 60 percent. 
                                                 
4 See Chapter 2, section 2.2 
5 See Chapter 2, section 2.2 
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Against this tax rise the talented say to the worst-off: “Public policy 
should make the worst off people (in this case, as it happens, you) better 
off. If the top tax goes up to 60 percent, we shall work less hard, and, as a 
result, the position of the poor (your position) will be worse. So the top 
tax on our income should not be raised to 60 percent” (Cohen, 2008, p. 
59). To that, the worst-off can reply: “Given that you would still be much 
better off than we are if you worked as you do now at the 60 percent tax, 
what justifies your intention to work less if the tax rises to that level?” 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 60). Absent controversial appeals to entitlement and 
desert the talented appear unable to answer that question. They cannot 
claim that large rewards are necessary to make the worst-off better off, 
because it is merely their disposition to vary their productivity relative to 
their reward that makes it necessary. Thus, the incentives argument fails 
the interpersonal test when offered as a justificatory argument by the 
talented to the worst-off, and a justificatory community does not obtain. 
 
Vrousalis recognizes that the incentives case and the bus commute 
example differ in important respects, but he nevertheless believes there to be 
‘strong textual evidence that Cohen views the lack of justificatory togetherness… 
as relevantly similar’ (Vrousalis, 2012, p. 154, n. 31). To see this, he asks us to 
compare the above quoted passages from Rescuing and Why Not Socialism? But 
if we do, the evidence is to the contrary. 
With respect to the incentives case, Cohen views there to be a lack of 
justificatory togetherness in the sense that the talented cannot justify their actions 
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to the worst-off; any attempt on the part of the talented to justify their actions to 
the worst-off, so Cohen argues, would likely fail the interpersonal test. But that is 
not true of the bus commute example, which does not employ the interpersonal 
test, and even if it did, there is no reason to think that Cohen would be unable to 
justify to the regular bus-commuter his usually driving to work, because unlike 
the worst-off in the incentives case, the regular bus commuter is said to be 
personally responsible for her relative disadvantage. As Richard Miller argues, 
the principle of community that Cohen develops in Why Not Socialism? ‘is not 
the abstract [justificatory] community that he emphasizes in Rescuing… It is 
community in the ordinary sense, the sharing and caring celebrated as making for 
a wonderful world in a left-wing song of his childhood’ (Miller, 2010, p. 249). It 
is also worth noting that when considering whether people ought to share in a 
justificatory community, Cohen makes no reference to the importance of ‘full 
community’ (as clarified above) or communal reciprocity. Instead, he appeals to 
the value of democracy by claiming: ‘it diminishes the democratic character of a 
society if it is not… [a justificatory community], since we do not make policy 
together if we make it in light of what some of us do that cannot be justified to 
others’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 45). 
That Cohen uses the bus commute for illustrative purposes might appear 
to undermine my interpretation and lend support to Vrousalis’s alternative, 
because although it does not employ the interpersonal test, it does, like the 
incentives case, make reference to interpersonal utterances. It would be incorrect, 
however, to assume that whenever Cohen refers to interpersonal utterances that 
he has justificatory community in mind, because his interest with interpersonal 
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utterances concerns ‘the general point… that there are many ways, some more 
interesting than others, in which an argument’s persuasive value can be speaker-
audience relative’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 36).  
Cohen provides various examples of this, including a slightly different 
articulation of the bus commute example. In this instance, he says that due to the 
inconvenience of taking the bus he might be able to persuade a fellow-middle 
class friend that he has ‘a right to be grumpy,’ but that he is unlikely to be able to 
persuade a carless fellow bus passenger to reach the same conclusion (Cohen, 
2008, p. 36). The manner in which the value of his argument is speaker-audience 
relative, then, has nothing to do with him justifying his actions to others, and 
everything to do with whether the speaker and audience face the same or 
different challenge; that Cohen and the regular bus commuter do not face the 
same challenge with respect to how they commute to work effects the persuasive 
value of his claim to a right to be grumpy, because as a consequence of her 
situation the regular bus commuter will fail to empathize. 
Another example Cohen uses to demonstrate his point that there are many 
ways in which an argument’s persuasive value can be speaker-audience relative, 
and which for my purposes again shows that he does not always have 
justificatory community in mind when referring to interpersonal utterances, 
concerns interpersonal utterances of a hypocritical nature. Specifically, with 
respect to an Israeli ambassador’s condemnation of Palestinian acts of political 
violence, Cohen argues that regardless of whether an act is condemnable, one’s 
right to condemn it is questionable when ‘you are yourself responsible for 
something similar, or worse…, [or when] you are yourself responsible, or at least 
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coresponsible, for the very thing that you are condemning’ (Cohen, 2013b, p. 
126). The interpersonal utterance in such cases is not an attempt by the speaker 
to justify their actions to the audience, rather, it is an attempt by the speaker at 
condemning the actions of others, and its persuasive value is speaker-audience 
relative because if the audience can respond with accusations of hypocrisy then 
its persuasive value is diminished. When evaluating interpersonal utterances of a 
hypocritical nature, then, Cohen does not have in mind justificatory community. 
As Cohen notes with respect to the case of the Israeli ambassador, the 
interpersonal test, and therefore justificatory community, is not a feature of his 
argument (Cohen, 2013b, p. 119, n. 8). 
 
2.5. To complete my interpretation of the community principle I now clarify its 
value. Greater insight in this respect can be gained by comparing it to other 
conceptions of community. A problem, however, is that the concept of 
community has been somewhat neglected by contemporary analytical political 
philosophers. Those familiar with the liberal-communitarian debate and its 
prominence during the 1980s may look upon that claim with skepticism, as the 
differing communitarian critiques of (predominantly Rawlsian) liberalism are 
labeled such because they each appeal in some way to the concept of 
community.6 The communitarian literature, however, as Andrew Mason argues, 
contains no detailed conceptualization of community or explanation of its value 
(Mason, 2000, p. 2). Fortunately for my purposes, Mason explores two detailed 
                                                 
6 For a comprehensive account of the liberal-communitarian debate, see Mulhall & Swift, 1996. 
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conceptions of community: the ordinary conception and the moralized 
conception.  
The ordinary conception has four constitutive elements. The first is (i) a 
shared way of life. This ensues when a group of people participate in a ‘a set of 
rule governed practices, which are at least loosely woven together, and which 
constitute at least some central areas of social, political and economic activity’ 
(Mason, 2000, p. 22). The second element is (ii) identification, because one 
normally identifies with a group by ‘endorsing its practices and seeking to 
promote its interests, whilst regarding her well-being as intimately linked to its 
flourishing’ (Mason, 2000, p. 23). The third element is (iii) shared values, which 
requires not only that each member endorse the practices and interests of the 
group, but that each member ‘perceive[s] them as valuable, whether 
instrumentally or non-instrumentally, and see[s] her concerns reflected in them’ 
(Mason, 2000, p. 23). None of these three elements equate to membership, 
however, and so Mason says that ‘a group of people constitute a community of 
the ideal type only when each recognizes the other as belonging to it’ (Mason, 
2000, p. 25). This is the fourth element, (iv) mutual recognition. 
The moralized conception is likewise comprised of elements i-iv. What 
makes it distinct from the ordinary conception is that it has two additional 
constitutive elements. The first is (v) solidarity as mutual concern, which 
requires that people, at the very least, ‘give each other’s interests some non-
instrumental weight in their practical reasoning’ (Mason, 2000, p. 27). The 
second, (vi) non-exploitation, requires that no systematic exploitation exists 
between the people of a community (Mason, 2000, p. 27).   
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Mason’s discussion of how his conceptions of community have 
instrumental value bears no resemblance to Cohen’s community principle and so 
it would be tangential to cover.7 His explanation as to how his conceptions of 
community have non-instrumental value, however, serves to clarify how Cohen’s 
community principle has non-instrumental value. 
First and foremost, Mason argues that his moralized conception of 
community clearly has non-instrumental value because relationships between 
people that reflect (v) solidarity as mutual concern and (vi) non-exploitation ‘are 
properly valued for their own sake’ (Mason, 2000, p. 50). Although Cohen’s 
community principle bears no resemblance to element vi, its second mode of 
communal caring is similar to element v. For just as solidarity as mutual concern 
obtains when people give each other’s interests some non-instrumental weight 
when considering how to act, communal reciprocity is a non-instrumental 
relationship that obtains when people give because others need, or want, and 
expect comparable generosity in return. As Mason argues, non-instrumental 
caring for others clearly has value in itself. And, although the principle’s first 
mode of communal caring is not a reciprocal relationship, it too involves non-
instrumental caring, because ‘full community’ requires, where necessary, that the 
better-off voluntarily help the worse-off so that, where possible, their lives labor 
under similar challenges. 
 Secondly, Mason argues that both his ordinary and moralized conceptions 
of community have non-instrumental value in virtue of element i. A shared way 
of life understood as a set of rule governed practices for social, political and 
                                                 
7 For the relevant discussion, see Mason, 2000, pp. 51-54. 
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economic activity is cooperative activity, which Mason says, ‘seem[s] to be 
valuable for its own sake’ (Mason, 2000, p. 50). But he then casts doubt on this 
prima facie conclusion by considering whether cooperative activity has non-
instrumental value when its intended or realized end constitutes something bad; 
for example, we might imagine the genocide at Auschwitz that resulted from the 
cooperative activity of the SS. Of course, it is difficult to sustain the view that 
cooperative activity has non-instrumental value when its realized end is mass 
murder. Mason is therefore right to conclude that (i) a shared way of life has non-
instrumental value only when the intended or realized end of its cooperative 
activity is something good (Mason, 2000, pp. 50-51).  
Despite the ‘shared life’ as regards similarity of challenge involved in the 
community principle’s first mode, Mason’s first constitutive element of 
community is not synonymous with it: a shared way of life as set of rule 
governed practices for social, political and economic activity, is not the full 
community that obtains when large regrettable choice and/or option luck 
inequalities are kept within some range that ensures people’s lives, where 
possible, labor under similar challenges as a result, where necessary, of the 
better-off voluntarily helping the worse-off. The latter does not involve 
cooperative activity and so it cannot be non-instrumentally valuable in the same 
way as the former. But, Cohen’s second mode of communal caring, despite once 
again bearing no resemblance to Mason’s element i, is quite literally cooperative 
activity: communal reciprocity obtains when people cooperate in helping each 
other to satisfy their needs and/or wants through comparable generosity. Thus, 
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with the caveat that the realized needs and/or wants are morally good, communal 
reciprocity has non-instrumental value in virtue of being cooperative activity. 
 
3. Community or sufficiency? 
3.1. Now that I have clarified the community principle, I turn to considering 
whether Cohen is right that we ought to forbid large inequalities permitted by 
luck egalitarianism, and if so, whether we ought to because they undermine 
community or because of some other value or reason. An appropriate starting 
point is Elizabeth Anderson’s seminal critique of luck egalitarianism. 
Anderson argues that since luck egalitarianism holds that inequalities 
resulting from voluntary choice on the part of the bearer are prima facie just, 
because the bearer can, in virtue of that choice, be held personally responsible for 
her relative disadvantage, it implausibly mandates leaving imprudent people to 
bear the consequences of their choices no matter the severity of their 
disadvantage (Anderson, 1999, pp. 295-296). To illustrate, consider the 
following case. 
 
The Reckless Driver: Reckless Richard makes a voluntary choice to drive 
recklessly and consequently has an accident that leaves him severely 
injured. Richard’s injuries are the result of bad option luck, because in the 
absence of coercion and with full knowledge of the potential 
consequences, he nevertheless voluntarily chose to partake in risk. 
Richard will make a full recovery if his injuries are treated but will suffer 
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severe physical and/or mental impairment if his injuries go untreated. 
And, Richard cannot afford to pay for the medical treatment he requires. 
 
According to luck egalitarianism, because Richard’s injuries are the 
product of bad option luck it is reasonable to hold him responsible for any 
disadvantage he incurs, and so there is no prima facie injustice in leaving his 
injuries untreated with the consequence that he develops a severe physical and/or 
mental impairment. Anderson calls this ‘the problem of the abandonment of 
negligent victims’ (Anderson, 1999, p. 296); the problem being that leaving 
victims of bad option luck to bear the consequences no matter how severe one’s 
disadvantage does not sit well with our intuitions about distributive justice. 
The response I favor to this problem is to embrace a pluralist distributive 
ethic.8 Luck egalitarians can then argue that the problem of the abandonment of 
negligent victims, rather than show luck egalitarianism to be implausible, shows 
it only to be incomplete. For it is open to luck egalitarians to embrace a 
sufficientarian qualification which says, even though inequalities resulting from 
voluntary choice on the part of the bearer are prima facie just, because the bearer 
can, in virtue of that choice, be held personally responsible for her relative 
disadvantage, we ought not to leave people to bear the consequences of their 
voluntary choices when the effect is their falling below a threshold of what is 
required in order to live a decent life. The reason we ought not to allow it is that 
insufficiency for the imprudent is morally more repugnant than securing 
sufficiency for all, either through restricting people’s negative freedom to 
                                                 
8 See Chapter 3, section 4.2 
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participate in risk and/or through forcing the prudent to bear the costs of other’s 
imprudence. 
Andrew Williams favors this sufficientarian response. As he specifies the 
relevant qualification, it says: ‘individuals have weighty claims against suffering 
certain forms of absolute deprivation that cannot be relinquished through 
voluntary decisions, no mater how favorable the background conditions. Thus, 
only some inequalities can be justified by appealing to personal responsibility’ 
(Williams, 2008b, p. 501). Paula Casal likewise recognizes that instead of 
rejecting luck egalitarianism in response to Anderson’s critique, ‘it may be 
preferable merely to supplement luck egalitarianism with a sufficiency principle 
that tempers its concern for choice and responsibility. We might, then, favor a 
form of sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism, which allows that some 
inequalities in outcome may arise justly but denies that individuals’ having less 
than enough is ever justifiable by appeal to voluntary choice’ (Casal, 2007, p. 
322). 
Liam Shields brings further clarity by distinguishing sufficiency-
constrained egalitarianism from prioritarianism. For unlike prioritarianism which 
holds that utility matters less as we move from the worst-off to the best-off, such 
that we ought to prioritize distributive benefits to the worse-off9, sufficiency-
constrained luck egalitarianism holds that we ought to give distributive priority 
to the worse-off below the threshold but then after sufficiency is secured 
distribute according to some luck egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity. 
As Shields argues, [t]he sufficiency threshold, then, seems to mark a shift in the 
                                                 
9 See Chapter 3, section 2.2 
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nature of our reasons to benefit people further’ that is absent in prioritarianism 
(Shields, 2012, p. 108).  
Williams also adds clarity to the view by outlining two variants of 
sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism that differ according to how each 
secures sufficiency. The internalizing variant protects people from having to bear 
the costs of other’s choices, but restricts the negative freedom of those partaking 
in risk by securing sufficiency through special taxes, compulsory insurance, 
and/or prohibition on activities that could result in them falling below the 
threshold. The externalizing variant, on the other hand, secures sufficiency by 
spreading liability for people’s imprudence across society by means of a welfare 
state funded by coercive redistributive taxation, and therefore effectively forces 
tax payers to bear the costs of other’s imprudence (Williams, 2008b, pp. 501-
502).  
With respect to the externalizing variant, the balance of what is more 
abhorrent out of abandoning negligent victims or forcing the prudent to bear the 
costs of other’s imprudence will largely depend on how well-off the prudent are. 
That is to say, it will depend on whether the prudent can bear the costs of others’ 
imprudence without significantly disadvantaging themselves. Of course, 
‘significant disadvantage’ is an ambiguous notion and I am uncertain as to where 
we draw the line between it and ‘insignificant disadvantage,’ but I do not believe 
the rich or even the middle-class to be significantly disadvantaged by progressive 
tax systems. For example, if middle-class Michelle, as a result of progressive 
taxation that secures sufficiency, has to holiday in the south of Spain rather than 
her preferred destination of the Caribbean, or has to settle for a three-bedroom 
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semi-detached house rather than the four-bedroom detached house she prefers, I 
do not consider her to be significantly disadvantaged.  
No doubt some will disagree and consider Michelle to be significantly 
disadvantaged in these cases, and I do not deny that there is unfairness in her 
having to bear the costs of other’s imprudence.10 For this reason, it is preferable 
to secure sufficiency, at least to the greatest extent possible before turning to 
progressive taxation, by those means associated with the internalizing variant. 
That is to say, because of the unfairness involved in the prudent having to bear 
the costs of other’s imprudence, we ought to secure sufficiency to the greatest 
extent possible through special taxes, compulsory insurance, and/or prohibition 
on reckless activities, before funding the remainder of what is required to secure 
sufficiency through a welfare state funded by coercive redistributive taxation. 
Thus, I favor a sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism that seeks to minimize 
the unfairness of the prudent having to bear the costs of other’s imprudence. 
 
3.2. I have argued that we ought to temper luck egalitarianism with a sufficiency 
qualification so that people are prevented from falling below a threshold of what 
is required in order to live a decent life. Above the threshold, however, I have 
pressed no objection to inequalities permitted by luck egalitarianism. For 
example, in the above regrettable choice and option luck cases11, if voluntary 
choice on the part of the bearer results in her suffering inequality but she does 
not fall below a sufficiency threshold, I have pressed no objection, all else being 
equal, to leaving her to suffer the consequences of her voluntary choice, because 
                                                 
10 For more thorough evaluations of whether we ought to abandon negligent victims, which take 
into consideration a variety of factors, see Olsaretti, 2009, and Stemplowska, 2009. 
11 See section 2.1 
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she can, in virtue of that choice, be held personally responsible for her relative 
disadvantage. Is the same true of the community principle? Is it, in all but name, 
a sufficiency qualification to luck egalitarianism, or does it require a more 
demanding tempering of luck egalitarianism?12 
As we have seen, Cohen argues that, despite being permitted by luck 
egalitarianism, realization of a socialist ideal requires that large regrettable 
choice and/or option luck inequalities be tempered by the community principle. 
In this respect, Cohen’s socialist ideal requires the community principle’s first 
mode of communal caring to obtain. As I have interpreted the principle’s first 
mode, this requires that the relevant inequalities are kept within a range that 
ensures people’s lives, where possible, labor under similar challenges as a result, 
where necessary, of the better-off voluntarily helping the worse-off in the form 
of resource transfers. If the community principle’s first mode is to be understood 
in terms of a sufficiency qualification to luck egalitarianism, it would therefore 
have to be true that the range in which the relevant inequalities must be kept is 
any range where those at the lower end of the scale enjoy a decent life. 
One might point to Cohen’s characterization of socialist egalitarians in 
his Tanner Lecture as evidence in support of interpreting the community 
principle as a sufficiency qualification. For as we saw in Chapter 3, Cohen there 
characterizes socialist egalitarians as having ‘no strong opinion about inequality 
at millionaire/billionaire levels. What they find wrong is that there is, so they 
think, unnecessary hardship at the lower end of the scale’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 31).13  
One might also point to Cohen’s characterization of the car-driver being rich and 
                                                 
12 Although he does not claim that Cohen intends it as a sufficiency qualification, Pablo Gilabert 
explores and defends a sufficientarian interpretation of the community principle (Gilabert, 2012). 
13 See Chapter 3, section 2.1 
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the bus-commuter being poor, and elsewhere, in illustrating the community 
principle’s first mode, to campers eating meagerly whilst a fortunate other, due to 
option luck, has access to a special high grade fish pond (Cohen, 2009, p. 37), as 
suggestive of a concern for tempering the relevant inequalities only when the 
disadvantaged are impoverished as a result. However, just as Cohen’s 
characterization of socialist egalitarians in his Tanner Lecture should not be 
interpreted as evidence of a sufficientarian concern with respect to his view that 
Pareto-efficiency often trumps distributive justice14, nor should it and these 
additional characterizations be viewed as evidence in support of interpreting the 
community principle’s first mode as a sufficiency qualification to luck 
egalitarianism. 
As I interpret Cohen it is partly constitutive of people enjoying full 
community, which is what the community principle’s first mode is supposed to 
achieve by tempering those inequalities consistent with luck egalitarianism, that 
people’s lives, where possible, labor under similar challenges. We should not 
therefore interpret the community principle’s first mode as a sufficiency 
qualification, because we can imagine very large regrettable choice and/or option 
luck inequalities where those at the lower end of the scale, as a result of the 
better-off voluntarily helping the worse-off, enjoy a decent life, but nevertheless 
lead lives that labor under significantly different challenges to the better-off. As 
we have seen, Cohen refers to tenfold income inequalities and widely different 
powers to care for oneself and one’s family as illustrative of people who do not 
                                                 
14 See Chapter 3, section 2.2 
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enjoy full community.15 For example, imagine that market conditions and A’s 
circumstances are such that a sufficiency threshold for her is £20k p.a. Then 
imagine that due to regrettable choice and/or bad option luck, A falls below that 
threshold to the point of £19K p.a., and B, who earns £200k p.a., voluntarily 
transfers £1k p.a. to A. Sufficiency is secured, and it is secured as a result of the 
better-off voluntarily helping the worse-off, but there can be little doubt, because 
of the more of less tenfold income inequality that remains, that A and B’s lives 
labor under significantly different challenges and that they enjoy widely different 
powers to care for themselves and their families. 
 In addition, there is a second important respect in which the sufficiency-
constrained luck egalitarianism I embrace and Cohen’s community-constrained 
luck egalitarianism are distinct, and that is in the means by which each tempers 
luck egalitarianism. The former tempers luck egalitarianism either by 
internalizing and/or externalizing coercive means.16 That is to say, it secures 
sufficiency through special taxes, compulsory insurance, prohibition on activities 
that could result in people falling below the threshold, and/or through spreading 
liability for people’s imprudence across society by means of a welfare state 
funded by redistributive taxation. Cohen’s community-constrained luck 
egalitarianism, on the other hand, or more specifically the community principle’s 
first mode of communal caring, tempers luck egalitarianism by keeping the 
inequalities it permits within a range that ensures people’s lives, where possible, 
labor under similar challenges by means of, where necessary, the better-off 
voluntarily helping the worse-off in the form of resource transfers. Thus, unlike 
                                                 
15 See section 2.2, specifically Cohen’s remarks prior to the bus commute example and that 
example’s final sentence. 
16 See section 3.1 
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the sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism I embrace, which tempers luck 
egalitarianism by means of state coercion, Cohen’s community-constrained luck 
egalitarianism tempers luck egalitarianism by means of voluntary non-state 
agency. 
 
3.3. Should we, then, temper luck egalitarianism with a sufficiency qualification 
so that people are prevented from falling below a threshold of what is required in 
order to live a decent life, but thereafter allow inequalities permitted by luck 
egalitarianism no matter their size? Or, should we embrace Cohen’s more 
demanding community principle which tempers luck egalitarianism by keeping 
the inequalities it permits within a range that ensures people’s lives, where 
possible, labor under similar challenges? 
 The non-instrumental caring that is constitutive of the community 
principle is desirable because if people non-instrumentally care for each other in 
those ways it describes, no individual would fall, as a consequence of inequalities 
permitted by luck egalitarianism, below a sufficiency threshold. That is, when 
equality of opportunity obtains, and when the better-off voluntarily help the 
worse-off where necessary and possible, and where everyone gives because 
others need or want with only an expectation of comparable generosity, all are 
guaranteed a decent life even if they are personally responsible for inequalities 
that would, in the absence of such non-instrumental caring, leave them unable to 
live a decent life. But that would also be true if society were to realize luck 
egalitarianism constrained by a sufficientarian qualification. And I struggle to 
think of any reason weighty enough to justify further tempering inequality 
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through special taxes, compulsory insurance, prohibition on reckless activities, 
and/or coercive redistributive taxation that requires the prudent to unfairly bear 
the costs of other’s imprudence, when everyone is guaranteed a decent life and 
no inequalities exist for which people cannot be held personally responsible. But 
this line of thought is no objection to Cohen’s community-constrained luck 
egalitarianism, because rather than temper luck egalitarianism to a greater extent 
than sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism by coercive means, the 
community principle tempers luck egalitarianism to a greater extent than a 
sufficiency qualification by means of voluntary non-state agency. 
Nevertheless, as my concern is with what type of society we ought to 
seek, I am more concerned with what we ought to do in practice than with what 
is possible in principle. Thus, in evaluating the fourth view I indentify with 
Cohen’s positive contribution to the question of what type of society we ought to 
seek, it is important to consider how it fares in light of the relevant social facts. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Cohen agrees with Samuel Scheffler that ‘only an 
extreme moral rigorist could deny that every person has a right to pursue self-
interest to some reasonable extent (even when that makes things worse than they 
need be for badly off people)’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 61).17 If that is true, if morality 
allows for this personal prerogative, the plausibility in practice of any distributive 
principle whose realization is dependent on non-state agency should be evaluated 
in terms of people’s predictable use of it. 
 We might imagine, then, a society in which a sufficiency-constrained 
luck egalitarianism has been realized, and that, because of the unfairness 
                                                 
17 See Chapter 2, section 2.2 
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involved in the prudent having to bear the costs of other’s imprudence, it is a 
sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism where sufficiency for all is secured to 
the greatest extent possible through special taxes, compulsory insurance, and/or 
prohibition on reckless activities, before turning to redistributive taxation. The 
redistributive taxation that is required in order to realize both the luck egalitarian 
principle of equality of opportunity and sufficiency will, of course, restrict the 
extent to which the members of this society can pursue self-interest. But they are 
not denied their right to pursue self-interest to a reasonable extent; they are 
merely denied the option of pursuing unlimited self-interest.  
If the better-off members of this society were so inclined they could seek 
to realize Cohen’s more demanding community-constrained luck egalitarianism. 
That is, the better-off could voluntarily choose to temper those inequalities 
consistent with luck egalitarianism to a greater extent than that already achieved 
by the state, by voluntarily transferring resources to the worse-off until 
everybody’s lives, where possible, labor under similar challenges because no 
significantly large inequalities of resources exist between society’s members. 
The realization of such a radically egalitarian society, at least when it is realized 
by voluntary rather than coercive means, could be valuable for all sorts of 
reasons. But when people are guaranteed a decent life and suffer no disadvantage 
above a sufficiency threshold for which they cannot be held personally 
responsible, not making the voluntary transfers of resources on which its 
realization depends surely falls within the better-off individual’s right to pursue 
self-interest to a reasonable extent. As in all probability many of the better-off 
will exercise that prerogative, and because luck egalitarianism ought to be 
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tempered to avoid abandonment of the imprudent to unnecessary suffering, in 
practice equality of opportunity ought to be constrained by a sufficiency 
qualification that is realized by means of state coercion, rather than by Cohen’s 
community principle, because the former guarantees a decent life for all whereas 
the latter does not. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The focus of this chapter has been how Cohen understands the relationship 
between equality of opportunity and community in principle. As we have seen, 
Cohen holds the view that, in principle, equality of opportunity ought to be 
constrained by a principle of community that is realized by means of voluntary 
non-state agency. This is the fourth view I identify with his positive contribution 
to the question of what type of society we ought to seek. 
In indentifying and clarifying the view, I began with Cohen’s claim in 
Why Not Socialism? that, despite being consistent with a luck egalitarian 
principle of equality of opportunity, large regrettable choice and/or option luck 
inequalities undermine community and therefore a principle of community ought 
to temper equality of opportunity. Having identified this view I sought to clarify 
it by considering the means by which Cohen’s community principle tempers 
equality of opportunity. In this respect, I argued that the community principle’s 
first mode of communal caring, which is the mode that does the tempering, ought 
to be interpreted in light of what Cohen envisions it as achieving; namely, a 
social state of affairs where people ‘enjoy full community.’ For Cohen, this 
requires (i) that large regrettable choice and/or option luck inequalities are kept 
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within a range that ensures people’s lives, where possible, labor under similar 
challenges, (ii) as a result, where necessary, of the better-off voluntarily helping 
the worse-off in the form of resource transfers. 
In proceeding to evaluate Cohen’s community-constrained luck 
egalitarianism, I considered whether Cohen is right that we ought to forbid large 
inequalities permitted by luck egalitarianism, and if so, whether he is right that 
we ought to forbid them because they undermine community or because of some 
other value or reason. I argued that, even though inequalities resulting from 
voluntary choice on the part of the bearer are prima facie just, because the bearer 
can, in virtue of that choice, be held personally responsible for her relative 
disadvantage, we ought not to leave people to bear the consequences of their 
voluntary choices when the effect is their falling below a sufficiency threshold of 
what is required in order to live a decent life. We ought not to allow this because 
insufficiency for the imprudent is more repugnant than securing sufficiency for 
all, either through restricting people’s negative freedom to participate in risk 
and/or through forcing the prudent to bear the costs of other’s imprudence. Yet 
because of the unfairness involved in the latter means of securing sufficiency it 
ought to be secured to the greatest extent possible by special taxes, compulsory 
insurance and/or prohibition on reckless activities before turning to redistributive 
taxation. Thus, I embraced a sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism that 
seeks to minimize the unfairness of the prudent having to bear the costs of 
other’s imprudence. 
As Cohen’s community-constrained luck egalitarianism keeps those 
inequalities consistent with luck egalitarianism within a range that ensures 
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people’s lives, where possible, labor under similar challenges, it is more 
demanding than the sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism I favor. For it 
requires that, even when those at the lower end of the scale enjoy a decent life, 
the inequalities consistent with luck egalitarianism be reduced to the extent that 
the lives of the worse-off and better-off labor under similar challenges. I argue 
that the value of community is not a weighty enough reason to justify such 
further tempering of inequality by coercive means when everyone is guaranteed a 
decent life and no inequalities exist for which people cannot be held personally 
responsible. This line of argument, however, is no objection to the community 
principle, because it tempers the relevant inequalities by means of the better-off 
voluntarily helping the worse-off.  
Yet, because my concern is with what type of society we ought to seek, 
and thus with what we ought to do in practice rather than with what is possible in 
principle, I evaluated Cohen’s community-constrained luck egalitarianism in 
light of people’s predictable use of the personal prerogative he embraces in 
Rescuing. That is, I evaluated it in light of people’s predictable use of their right 
to pursue self-interest to some reasonable extent (even when that makes things 
worse than they need be for badly off people). In this context, when all are 
guaranteed a decent life and no individual suffers disadvantage for which they 
cannot be held personally responsible, it falls within the better-off’s prerogative 
not to voluntarily help the worse-off. As in all probability many of the better-off 
will exercise that prerogative, and because luck egalitarianism ought to be 
tempered so as to guarantee a decent life for all, I concluded that equality of 
opportunity ought to be constrained in both principle and in practice, and in 
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practice it ought to be constrained by a sufficiency qualification that is realized 
by means of state coercion, rather than by Cohen’s community principle, because 
the former guarantees a decent life for all whereas the latter does not. 
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Conclusion 
 
1. Argument and contribution 
Since the publication of Rescuing in 2008 and Cohen’s death in 2009 there have 
been a number of important publications that focus on evaluating his work; many 
of which I have referred to, sometimes critically, in writing this thesis. A 2008 
special issue of Ratio is devoted entirely to essays by eminent political 
philosophers on Rescuing (re-published in paperback in 20091), whilst The 
Journal of Ethics in 2010, and Socialist Studies in 2012, have also devoted 
special issues to the evaluation of Cohen’s political philosophy. In 2015 a 
collection of essays on Cohen’s account of egalitarian justice has been published 
under the title, Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage, whilst the 
forthcoming monograph by Nicholas Vrousalis, The Political Philosophy of G. 
A. Cohen: Back to Socialist Basics, is due to be published shortly after 
submission of this thesis.  
My distinctive approach has been to clarify and evaluate Cohen’s positive 
contribution to the question of what type of society we ought to seek following 
his turn from Marxism to normative political philosophy. And, for those reasons 
outlined in the Introduction2, in trying to answer this question I have specifically 
focused on his critical engagement with Dworkin and Rawls, and on his positive 
vision of society as set out in Why Not Socialism? In brief, and to somewhat 
oversimplify, I have interpreted Cohen as holding that, in principle, we ought to 
                                                 
1 Feltham, B. et al (2009), Justice, Equality and Constructivism: Essays on G. A. Cohen’s 
Rescuing Justice and Equality, ed. Brian Feltham, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
2 See Introduction, sections 3 and 4 
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seek a society that reflects equal access to advantage (or some kind of luck 
egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity3), together with Pareto-efficiency 
and freedom of occupational choice as a consequence of people’s occupational 
choices being informed by an egalitarian-Paretian ethos, and a principle of 
community realized by means of voluntary non-state agency that significantly 
tempers inequalities consistent with equality of opportunity. I have additionally 
argued that his concession about Pareto-efficiency often trumping equality of 
opportunity, in practice, is best understood as a pluralist distributive ethic that 
combines telic egalitarian and telic prioritarian beliefs. 
In evaluating equal access to advantage I have argued that, unlike a luck 
egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity where opportunities are specified 
in terms of resources, it is susceptible to the problem of indexing, the problem of 
perfectionism and the problem of expensive tastes, with the latter being 
reinforced by the appeal of the continuity test. To equalize advantage as Cohen 
specifies it requires the creation of an index of valuable states of the person and 
their relative worth so that an access to advantage score can be summed for each 
individual and compared against the scores of others. Consistent with a 
subjective theory of value the creation of such an index will prove implausible, 
whilst consistent with an objective theory of value derived from a perfectionist 
theory of the good-life, equal access to advantage conflicts with justificatory 
neutrality. If an objective index is to be derived by non-perfectionist means, then, 
Cohen must provide the relevant explanation, which he does not.  
                                                 
3 For clarification see Chapter 3, section 2.1, and Chapter 1, section 3.2. 
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These two problems aside, equal access to advantage counterintuitively 
compensates for expensive tastes when claims to compensation fail the 
continuity test. This test requires that the bearer of an expensive taste is able to 
claim in good-faith, as a consequence of her bad price luck, that others are better 
off in terms of opportunities consistent with her beliefs as to what makes for a 
valuable life. The continuity test is appealing because when we employ it we 
avoid the absurdity of compensating people for expensive tastes when, as in most 
cases, they do not consider themselves relevantly worse off. That equal access to 
advantage compensates for expensive tastes (when the claimant’s access to 
advantage score is not equal to that of others) regardless of whether the bearer’s 
claim to compensation passes the continuity test is a strong reason, in addition to 
the problems that plague the creation of the required index, not to embrace it. 
Thus, I have argued that the appropriate metric of egalitarian interpersonal 
comparison is not equal access to advantage, but rather an alternative luck 
egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity where opportunities are specified 
in terms of resources. 
 As regards Cohen’s view that, in principle, equality of opportunity, 
Pareto-efficiency and freedom of occupational choice are co-obtainable when 
people’s occupational choices are informed by the egalitarian-Paretian ethos, I 
evaluated this view in light of each person’s predictable use of their right, for 
which Cohen believes morality allows, to pursue self-interest to a reasonable 
extent (even when that makes things worse than they need be for badly off 
people) (the personal prerogative). The first to point out that the personal 
prerogative is problematic for Cohen was David Estlund, who argues that if 
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Cohen allows for it he must also allow for a fraternal prerogative (a right to 
pursue the interests of one’s family and/or friends to some reasonable extent even 
when that makes things worse than they need be for badly off people), and thus 
for the acceptance of unequalising incentives by the talented (Estlund, 1998, pp. 
106-107). More recently, Jonathan Quong has argued, as I argue below, that the 
‘ethical solution requires morally supererogatory choices on the part of the 
talented…, [and therefore] only succeeds by relying on utopian assumptions 
about persons’ (Quong, 2010, p. 329).  
 My approach in Chapter 2 was to argue that because the realization of 
Pareto-efficiency in practice likely requires occupations to be filled for which 
insufficient numbers of people will have a preference when reward is consistent 
with equality of opportunity, there will be numerous cases where it falls within 
one’s prerogative either (i) to depart from the Paretian component of the 
egalitarian-Paretian ethos by filling a Pareto-inefficient occupation or by not 
working at her upmost capacity in a Pareto-efficient occupation, or (ii) to depart 
from the egalitarian component of the egalitarian-Paretian ethos by accepting 
unequalizing incentives to fill a Pareto-efficient occupation, rather than (iii) act 
in accordance with both components of the egalitarian-Paretian ethos by 
voluntarily choosing to fill a Pareto-efficient occupation, and to work at her 
upmost capacity in that occupation, for reward consistent with equality of 
opportunity. The three desiderata are therefore co-obtainable only if either we 
deny people recourse the personal prerogative or people do not exercise it with 
respect to their occupational choices.  
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If morality allows for such a prerogative we ought not to deny people 
recourse to it, and so the desiderata co-obtain only if people choose not exercise 
it when making occupational choices about how hard to work and what 
occupation to fill. Yet people will inevitably exercise their right to pursue self-
interest to a reasonable extent when making such occupational choices. The 
upshot is inequality of opportunity and/or Pareto-inefficiency to a significant 
degree. Thus, I have argued that although equality of opportunity, Pareto-
efficiency and freedom of occupational choice might4 be co-obtainable in 
principle, they are not co-obtainable in practice. Although this is no critique of 
Cohen, because his concern is with what is possible in principle, it is important to 
clarify that in practice we must either deny people freedom of occupational 
choice, which virtually nobody would endorse, or sacrifice or compromise at 
least one of equality of opportunity or Pareto-efficiency. 
As we must choose in practice between either the sacrificing or 
compromising of at least one of equality of opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and 
freedom of occupational choice, I sought to clarify and evaluate Cohen’s view 
that, in practice, the state should often compromise equality of opportunity in the 
name of realizing Pareto-efficiency. As this view is not fully developed by 
Cohen it is somewhat open to interpretation. I therefore offered an interpretation 
of the view by considering it in the context of: (i) Cohen’s distinction between 
fundamental principles of justice and state rules of regulation; (ii) certain 
remarks of his about the equality-Pareto-freedom trilemma; (iii) his own 
clarifications in a section on justice and Pareto-efficiency in Rescuing Part II; (iv) 
                                                 
4 ‘Might’ rather than ‘are’ because whether the three desiderata are co-obtainable in principle 
depends on whether the egalitarian-Paretian ethos is a requirement of distributive justice and on 
how we conceptualize freedom. See Chapter 2, section 4.2 
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conclusions he draws elsewhere that match those clarifications; and (v) where it 
sits in relation to Derek Parfit’s distinctions between teleological and 
deontological egalitarianism, and between egalitarianism and prioritarianism. 
These considerations led me to argue that the view is best understood as a 
pluralist distributive ethic that combines telic egalitarian and telic prioritarian 
beliefs. It says that some kind of luck egalitarian social state of affairs – because 
fair – has non-instrumental value, but the state should often pursue Pareto-
efficiency over a luck egalitarian principle of equality of opportunity because a 
social state of affairs in which people, and particularly the worst-off, enjoy 
greater benefits is non-instrumentally more valuable than egalitarian justice. 
Due to its pluralism Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian ethic faces objections 
from either side of the “equality, priority or what?” debate. I therefore evaluated 
it by considering how it fares given the levelling down objection to telic 
egalitarianism and the Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection to prioritarianism. As I share 
Cohen’s belief that, although we ought not to level down, some kind of luck 
egalitarian social state of affairs – because fair – has non-instrumental value and 
is thus in one way better than the unequal alternative even when it is better for no 
one, I argued, by drawing on Larry Temkin’s work, that the levelling down 
objection does not decisively show telic egalitarianism to be implausible. In 
response to the Otsuka-Voorhoeve objection I embraced Martin O’Neill’s 
pluralist reply, which says that the objection shows prioritarianism to be 
incomplete rather than implausible, because any pluralist prioritarian can explain 
the greater priority to benefit the badly-off when we move from intrapersonal to 
interpersonal cases by appeal to egalitarian considerations. My evaluation 
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therefore took the form of a limited defence. For although I went on to embrace a 
sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism, which does not prioritize distributive 
benefits to the worst-off after sufficiency has been secured for all, I have 
nevertheless argued that neither the levelling down objection nor the Otsuka-
Voorhoeve objection shows Cohen’s egalitarian-prioritarian ethic to be 
implausible. 
 With respect to Cohen’s view that, in principle, equality of opportunity 
ought to be constrained by a principle of community that is realized by means of 
voluntary non-state agency, others have argued, as I have, that the principle’s 
second mode of communal caring takes inspiration from Marx’s principle of 
‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.’ Yet unlike 
Vrousalis, I have argued that the community principle’s first mode of communal 
caring, which is the mode that does the tempering, ought to be interpreted based 
on the ‘full community’ Cohen envisions it as achieving, as opposed to the bus 
commute example and its interpersonal utterance which serves only to muddy the 
water. This marks an important difference between Vrousalis’s interpretation and 
my own, as by clarifying the principle’s first mode by reference to the bus 
commute example I have argued that his reading of it as ‘something like’ 
Cohen’s notion of a justificatory community is a misinterpretation. My approach, 
on the other hand, produces a reading of the first mode that sees it as distinct 
from justificatory community, and as tempering large regrettable choice and/or 
option luck inequalities to the extent that they are kept within a range that 
ensures people’s lives, where possible, labor under similar challenges, as a result, 
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where necessary, of the better-off voluntarily helping the worse-off in the form 
of resource transfers. 
In evaluating the view I considered whether we ought to forbid large 
inequalities permitted by luck egalitarianism, and if so, whether we ought to 
forbid them because they undermine community or because of some other value 
or reason. I argued that, even though inequalities resulting from voluntary choice 
on the part of the bearer are inequalities for which she can be held personally 
responsible, we ought not to leave people to bear the consequences of their 
voluntary choices when the effect is their falling below a sufficiency threshold of 
what is required in order to live a decent life. Ultimately, I came to embrace a 
sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism that secures sufficiency for all 
through special taxes, compulsory insurance and/or prohibition on reckless 
activities before turning to redistributive taxation, so that the unfairness of the 
prudent having to bear the costs of other’s imprudence is minimized. 
As Cohen’s community-constrained luck egalitarianism keeps those 
inequalities consistent with luck egalitarianism within a range that ensures 
people’s lives, where possible, labor under similar challenges, it is more 
demanding than sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism; although it achieves 
the even more radically egalitarian social state of affairs by means of the better-
off voluntarily helping the worse-off, rather than by means of state coercion. 
Despite Cohen’s view again being about what is possible in principle, I once 
again evaluated it based on each person’s predictable use of the personal 
prerogative, because my concern is with what type of society we ought to seek, 
and therefore with what we ought to do in practice. In this context, when all are 
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guaranteed a decent life and no individual suffers disadvantage for which they 
cannot be held personally responsible, it falls within the better-off’s right to 
pursue self-interest to a reasonable extent (even when that makes things worse 
than they need be for badly off people) not to voluntarily help the worse-off. As 
in all probability many of the better-off will exercise that prerogative, and 
because luck egalitarianism ought to be tempered so as to guarantee a decent life 
for all, I have argued that equality of opportunity ought to be constrained in both 
principle and in practice, and in practice it ought to be constrained by a 
sufficiency qualification that is realized by means of state coercion, rather than 
by Cohen’s community principle, because the former guarantees a decent life for 
all whereas the latter does not. 
 
2. Cohen’s utopianism 
I now end the thesis by reflecting on the utopian nature of Cohen’s normative 
political philosophy. In the Introduction I noted one might object, with respect to 
my evaluation of Cohen’s views that, in principle, equality of opportunity, 
Pareto-efficiency and freedom of occupational choice are co-obtainable when 
people’s occupational choices are informed by the egalitarian-Paretian ethos, and 
that equality of opportunity ought to be constrained by a principle of community 
that is realized by means of voluntary non-state agency, that I am talking at cross 
purposes with Cohen.5 The reason for the objection is that these views are about 
what is possible in principle when we abstract from social facts, yet I evaluate 
them based on people’s predictable use of the personal prerogative, and therefore 
                                                 
5 See Introduction, section 4.6 
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in light of a social fact, and reach conclusions not about what is possible in 
principle, but about what is possible, and about what we ought to do, in practice. 
To repeat my earlier response, I once again emphasize that I do not frame 
my conclusions about these views as objections. On the contrary, I repeatedly 
acknowledge that they are not objections. Moreover, even though it is open to 
Cohen to agree with my conclusions about what is possible, and about what we 
ought to do, in practice, these conclusions are nevertheless important when 
clarifying and evaluating his positive contribution to the question of what type of 
society we ought to seek, because they show it to be utopian. 
 As Christine Sypnowich argues, Cohen is ‘in a significant sense a utopian 
socialist, not in Marx’s sense of offering ‘fantastic’ predictions about an ideal 
future, but insofar as he was prepared to endorse a radical alternative to existing 
society’ (Sypnowich, 2012, p. 27). That is, in the sense that he ‘was adamant that 
one should not give up on an ambitious aspiration for an emancipated human 
society. This is manifest in his commitment to a radical approach to justice based 
on ‘principles’ rather than ‘facts,’ and moreover his contention that a consistent 
egalitarianism involves personal contribution to the amelioration of 
disadvantage’ (Sypnowich, 2012, p. 21). But how utopian should we be, in the 
sense of abstracting from social facts, when doing normative political 
philosophy? 
Cohen’s view, of course, is that we ought to abstract from social facts 
when seeking to discover fundamental principles, but we ought to take into 
account the relevant social facts when developing rules of regulation, because 
when it comes to how we ought to organize society in practice, the relevant 
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social facts inevitably restrict the extent to which fundamental principles can be 
applied. Sypnowich appears to endorse something like this approach when she 
says, ‘[w]e should, like Cohen, affirm the utopian aspiration in political 
philosophy without falling prey to a utopianism about how to achieve that 
aspiration’ (Sypnowich, 2012, p. 32). My view, however, is that by abstracting 
from people’s predictable use of the personal prerogative, and therefore from a 
particularly relevant social fact, the relevant views I identify as part of Cohen’s 
positive contribution are excessively utopian even in aspiration. 
In Chapter 2 we saw that Cohen believes every person has a right to 
pursue self-interest to some reasonable extent (even when that makes things 
worse than they need be for badly off people), because denial of this prerogative 
would be tantamount to viewing people as ‘nothing but slaves to social justice’ 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 10).6 In general, those who embrace such prerogatives do so 
because they consider utilitarianism and other consequentialist ethical theories 
overly demanding. For example, if I am morally required to do that which 
produces the greatest overall impartial good, I am guilty of wrongdoing 
whenever I spend sixty pence on a chocolate bar rather than donate my sixty 
pence to Oxfam. If that strikes us as overly demanding, and thus counterintuitive, 
we might be tempted to adopt the view that morality allows for a prerogative of 
the sort embraced by Cohen. That is, we might be tempted to embrace the view 
that morality allows some room for people to pursue self-interest even when the 
consequence is less overall impartial good. If that is true, it falls within my 
prerogative to at least sometimes satisfy my craving for a Cadbury Twirl rather 
                                                 
6 See Chapter 2, section 2.2 
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than donate all the money I would ever spend on chocolate to Oxfam. Those who 
embrace prerogatives would not deny that in this case, and others like it, it would 
be good if I act to produce greater overall impartial good; they hold only that it is 
at least sometimes a supererogatory act. 
Now, the human capacity for selfishness is a social fact from which we 
must abstract to some extent when doing normative political philosophy, 
otherwise we simply give in to human badness. As Sypnowich argues, ‘political 
philosophy cannot be reduced to a mere assent to the world as we find it; it must 
be a normative enterprise, concerned with human progress and social 
improvement’ (Sypnowich, 2012, p. 31). But if morality allows for a personal 
prerogative, so that when people exercise it they are not guilty of wrongdoing, to 
take into account its predictable use, and therefore a social fact, is by definition 
not to accommodate human badness within our ethical thinking. It is not, we 
might say, to be guilty of holding a normative political philosophical view that is 
insufficiently utopian. On the contrary, if one believes that morality allows for a 
personal prerogative, but presses a view which rests on people not exercising it, 
that view is by their own lights overly demanding. It is, we might say, to be 
guilty of holding a normative political philosophical view that is, by one’s own 
standards, excessively utopian. 
 The relevant views I identified as part of Cohen’s positive contribution 
are both views of the latter sort. The first of these views is that equality of 
opportunity, Pareto-efficiency and freedom of occupational choice are co-
obtainable when people’s occupational choices are informed by the egalitarian-
Paretian ethos. Yet Cohen believes morality allows for the personal prerogative, 
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and, as I have argued, the three desiderata are co-obtainable only if either we 
deny people recourse to the personal prerogative or people do not exercise it with 
respect to their occupational choices. The view is therefore overly demanding by 
Cohen’s own lights, and in that sense, it is excessively utopian. The second of 
these views is that equality of opportunity ought to be constrained by a principle 
of community, to the extent that people’s lives, where possible, labor under 
similar challenges, and which is realized by means of voluntary non-state 
agency. Yet, as I have argued, when all are guaranteed a decent life and no 
individual suffers disadvantage for which they cannot be held personally 
responsible, it falls within the better-off’s personal prerogative not to voluntarily 
help the worse-off. Again, the view is overly demanding by Cohen’s own lights.7 
In addition to this excessive utopianism, there is another respect in which 
I find the utopian nature of Cohen’s positive contribution disappointing, and that 
is in its focus on fundamental principles to the detriment of rules of regulation. 
For, although conceptual knowledge might lead us toward different justifications 
and conclusions about what we ought to do than conceptual ignorance, action-
guiding conclusions should be our ultimate goal. Contrary to that claim, Cohen 
maintains that although ‘political philosophy is a branch of philosophy, whose 
output is consequential for practice…, the question for political philosophy is not 
what we should do but what we should think, even when what we should think 
makes no practical difference’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 268). I would argue, however, 
that when what we should think makes no practical difference, there is little to be 
                                                 
7 Although Cohen does not refer to the personal prerogative in Why Not Socialism?, he believed 
in it at the time of writing. Since he embraces the personal prerogative in his 1991 Tanner 
Lecture, ten years prior to the first publication of Why Not Socialism?, and remains committed to 
it in the 2008 reprinting of the lecture in Rescuing. 
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gained from thinking about it, and we should concentrate instead on thinking 
about what we ought to do. 
Cohen imagines a defender of Rawls making a similar point. This 
imaginary Rawlsian says, ‘“I accept your distinction between basic principles 
and principles of regulation. But why should I care about basic principles? I care 
about what we should do, and the rules of regulation that we adopt in light of the 
facts determine that”’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 267). Cohen’s response is that ‘we 
necessarily have recourse to basic principles to justify the rules of regulation that 
we adopt: facts cast normative light only by reflecting the light that fact-free first 
principles shine on them’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 267). And again later, he argues, 
‘fundamental principles do bear on practice, since they are needed to justify the 
practice-guiding ruler of regulation’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 307). But, even if it is true, 
even if contrary to a contractualist methodology we need to know what the 
fundamental principles of justice and other values are in order to justify rules of 
regulation, action-guiding conclusions, and thus development of a set of rules of 
regulation, should be our ultimate goal.  
Of course, there is only so much one can say in a career, and so it is 
somewhat unfair of me to criticize Cohen for not making the move from locating 
fundamental principles to justifying a set of rules of regulation But considering 
his turn from Marxism to normative political philosophy was originally 
motivated by a belief that leftists need to be clearer about what we seek and why 
we are justified in seeking it, I cannot help but feel somewhat disappointed. As, 
despite my clarification in Chapter 3 of his undeveloped view that, in practice, 
Pareto-efficiency often trumps distributive justice, it is by no means clear what 
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type of society Cohen thinks we ought to seek in practice when taking into 
account a plurality of values and the relevant social facts. Bearing in mind his 
undoubted genius, this strikes me as a great shame. 
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